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Abstract: 
Judea Pearl has provided a book long treatment to the topic of causality from a formal 
and predominantly non-philosophical perspective. One of the main aims of Pearl's 
treatment is to increase the clarity of scientists' reasoning about problems involving 
causal relationships. I offer a philosophical interpretation of Judea Pearl's treatment of 
causality. I argue Pearl (2000a) articulates an analysis of causality in two distinct parts. I 
claim that Pearl unifies several of the key concepts of causality relevant to the 
epidemiological, economic, social and biological sciences on one part and that Pearl 
describes several general conditions characteristic of objective causal processes on the 
other. I label the first part Pearl's account of causal modelling and the second part Pearl's 
account of causal processes respectively. I find that Pearl's account of causal processes is 
of the greatest philosophical interest despite the fact that Pearl's account of causal 
modelling is the primary component of the overall treatment. I locate Pearl's account of 
causal modelling first within the recent philosophical literature on the nature of models 
and modelling practices before the literature on causation and explanation as has been the 
standard elsewhere. With some reservations I argue Pearl's views on o1>jective constraints 
are consistent with a nomic view of causation. To focus my interpretation I discuss 
several philosophical criticisms of Pearl's account and argue that each one is misplaced 
when targeteq at the first part of the account and merely analogues to familiar problems 
of model interpretation and justification when targeted at the second. I conclude that 
Pearl's account provides good reason to re-sharpen the philosophical focus on what it is 
to give an analysis of causation. 
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A Philosophical Interpretation of 
Judea Pearl's Theory of Causality 
"Insofar as geometry is about experience it is not certain, and insofar as geometry is certain it 
is not about experience" 
Albert Einstein. 
1.0 Introduction 
Some time ago Vaughn McKim asserted that the goals of non-experimental research 
in the sciences required an urgent and fundamental rethinking. McKim implied that 
methods designed to draw causal conclusions in these sciences were in a state of 
crisis (McKim and Turner 1997:19). Today many hold the view that little has 
changed. What has changed is where the blame is laid. It is our definition of 
causality, which has been rethought, and not the belief that causal knowledge is 
achievable in non-experimental research. In the time since McKim's comments about 
a crisis in causality the goals of causal modelling in non-experimental settings have 
received several formulations and, principally through the work of Pearl (2000a), 
have undergone a fundamental rethinking. At present the theoretical work behind 
causal modelling is as much about shifting causal reasoning beyond the realm of 
statistical analysis as it is about aiding in the discovery of causal relationships. 
Contemporary causal modellers in sciences such as biology and epidemiology look 
upon the suite of distinct and apparently incompatible theories of causation 
painstakingly built by philosophers, not as theories competing to articulate the correct 
account, but as a toolkit to be exploited and adapted to solve problems on a case-by-
case basis. 
Contemporary causal modelling methods presuppose that the world is a world of 
causation rather than mere correlation and that the patterns exhibited in quantitative 
descriptions of the world offer a window through which to identify causal relations 
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when few or no experimental methods are applicable. This is the view that causal 
relationships produce statistical relationships. According to this view, non-
experimental techniques are used in the social and behavioural sciences, 
epidemiology and biology to test hypothesised causal relations underlying sets of 
observational data. In each of these fields a premium is placed upon the identification 
of mechanisms and it is becoming increasingly common to look to modern modelling 
techniques to build mathematical structures toward their identification and 
description. The general goal, held in common with experimental techniques, is that 
of contributing to the scientific understanding of reality through discovery. A subtle 
but seemingly indispensable part of the project of discovery using non-experimental 
methods is the construction of a language purpose built for the clear expression and 
evaluation of causal claims. 
Over the last decade two prominent and distinct causal modelling research groups 
have emerged, both aiming to achieve the goal of clarifying causal language and 
inference in science. Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993) and the TETRAD 
program represent the centre of one group and Pearl (1988, 2000a) represent the 
centre of the other. Both programs aim to design algorithms capable of discovering 
and quantifying causal relationships in data sets by searching and locating in data 
some number of equivalent 'causal structures' consistent with the probabilistic 
dependence and independence relationships the data exhibit. The standard view of 
these projects is that they have two primary aims. The first is inference. Causal 
modelling programs aim to establish formal methods for drawing causal conclusions 
from statistical data. The second is clarification. Causal modelling programs aim to 
clarify the role that causality plays in science in order to positively affect the way in 
which practicing scientists construct models and collect data. However, according to 
the standard view, causal modelling programs discuss and work with 'causal' 
concepts toward the realisation of these aims without first providing a definition of 
causality. Instead, causal modelling programs 'axiomatize' familiar causal notions 
within a formal language and then use this language to express, quantify, and test 
causal claims. It is in this sense, it is thought, that causal statements do not report the 
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observations of the investigator, but instead are conditional on the axioms and 
licensed by the inference rules of a formal calculus. As Pearl admits, causal 
modelling programs attempt a 'mathematization' of causality. 
The causal notion of greatest importance to the mathematization of causality is 
expressed through the Causal Markov condition. According to the Causal Markov 
condition the value of a variable in a causal model is independent of that variable's 
effects, when conditioned on its direct causes. Stating that a model is causally 
Markov means that, ignoring the effects of any given variable in the model, all 
relevant probabilistic information about the model's variables may be discerned from 
each variable's direct causes. The underlying notion is that the state of a system at 
one given moment is relevant to its subsequent state in a way that the prior states of 
the same system are not (Scheines 1997:190). Concentrating upon a variable and its 
direct causes in this way lends a causal model a modular character and invites 
consideration of how a model might respond if its individual modules were to be 
altered. At this point it seems natural to compare the alteration of a model's 
components with experimental manipulation and it is commonplace that comparison 
between experimental and non-experimental methods is described in terms where the 
latter becomes a simulation of the former. The common ground between the two is 
that in both cases the investigator wishes to gain knowledge of causal relationships. 
The key difference between the two is that instead of identifying and quantifying 
cause/effect relationships by allowing nature to run its course within a suitably 
monitored and isolated space, as with experimental methods, non-experimental model 
manipulations follow the rules of a formal calculus. According to Michael Freedman, 
it is here that causal modelling programs violate the law of conservation of rabbits: If 
you want to pull a rabbit out of the hat, you have to put a rabbit into the hat 
(Freedman 1997: 181-182). In other words, to discover causal relationships using 
non-experimental methods you have to put them in to the model in the first place, and 
this defies elementary principles of science. 
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I deny that Pearl's theory of causality is at odds with elementary principles of 
science. As a first step towards a clear demonstration of this claim I aim to set out in 
this thesis a philosophical interpretation of Pearl's theory of causality. Second, there 
is, to the best of my knowledge, no widespread agreement on the correct 
classification of Pearl's theory within the body of philosophical work on causation, 
nor is there any consensus regarding the theory's fundamental features. I intend that 
my interpretation will specify Pearl's theory's fundamental features and correctly 
locate the theory in the body of philosophical work on causation. 
I present the thesis over three chapters. The interpretation I develop is that Pearl's 
theory of causality consists of two distinct components or 'tiers'. I label one of the 
two 'Pearl's regimentation' and explain how it is an account of causal modelling in 
science. I label the other tier 'Pearl's objective account' and argue that it amounts to a 
partial analysis of causal relations as constraints on physical processes. In the first 
chapter I set the ground for the presentation of Pearl's theory and the interpretation to 
follow. I identify in chapter 1 that Pearl's theory has important connections with the 
so-called causal/mechanical tradition in philosophy but that Pearl's theory is by-and-
large discontinuous with the philosophy of science on issues involving explanation 
and causation. I find that an adequate philosophical interpretation must connect the 
preoccupations of the philosophy of science and the preoccupations of scientific 
modellers. To make the connection I look to several emerging projects in the 
philosophy of science, which focus on the nature of scientific models. I identify the 
account of mechanisms recently offered by Stuart Glennan as a natural philosophical 
counterpart for Pearl's concept of causal structure. Last, I compare Pearl's orientation 
towards causation with the orientation attributed to him by contemporary 
philosophers of causation and explanation. I suggest that the case for classifying Pearl 
as a manipulation theorist is not clear-cut. 
In chapter 2 I articulate what I see as the primary components of Pearl's theory of 
causality in his (2000a). I describe these components in two sections, the first 
presents the syntactic features of the theory and the second presents its semantics. 
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The presentation traces a path that begins with the mathematical theory of graphs, 
especially Directed Acyclic Graphs, moves through the detail of Pearl's logic of 
causal reasoning and ends with a discussion of how causal expressions of the logic 
may be deduced from a causal model. Following my presentation of Pearl's 
formalism I offer an informal interpretation. The most important components I 
discuss include Pearl's interpretation of his formalism's counterfactual semantics; the 
theory's account of types versus token causes; and the theory's interpretation of 
mechanisms. In the final section of chapter 2 I discuss the fact that Pearl's theory is 
committed to a boundary between statistics and causality. The discussion centres on 
Pearl's view that statistical modelling is limited to the estimation and manipulation of 
expressions that represent 'static' observations, whereas causal models extend to the 
representation of mechanisms responsible for the production of observations. I argue 
it is a puzzle how Pearl is able to move from a statistical interpretation of the 
relationships within a Bayesian Network to a causal interpretation of the same 
network when the former encodes degrees of belief and the latter encodes 
mechanisms representing objective law-like relations in the natural world. Finally, 
after suggesting how the puzzle might be resolved I explain that the subjective and 
objective components identified in the preceding discussion are suggestive of two 
distinct uses of causality in Pearl's theory. 
In chapter 3 I argue that the two distinct senses of causality identified in the previous 
chapter are reflective of two distinct components to Pearl's theory of causality. I 
claim here that Pearl's theory of causality is the conjunction of an account of causal 
modelling in the applied sciences and an account of the natural properties assumed to 
exist by those sciences. I call the first conjunct 'Pearl's regimentation of causal 
concepts' and claim it resembles a conceptual analysis but really isn't one, and I call 
the second conjunct 'Pearl's objective account' and claim it resembles an incomplete 
empirical analysis of the causal relation. I then proceed to set out my view that 
Pearl's account of causal modelling involves the explicit specification and 
regimentation of several important causal concepts and a set of procedures for their 
application in non-experimental sciences. Then I discuss Pearl's view that the world 
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consists of numerous autonomous invariant linkages that correspond to physical 
processes and compare this view to what philosophers have called nomic causation. 
After detailing my interpretation of what Pearl is saying about causality I look to 
deepen the discussion by exploring a number of criticisms levelled against Pearl's 
theory. I argue that several key criticisms of Pearl's theory are misplaced because 
each mistakenly assumes that Pearl's theory is nothing over-and-above what is on my 
interpretation Pearl's regimentation. In discussion I identify that each criticism in 
effect amounts to a challenge of a model's credentials to represent causal 
relationships. In concluding this chapter I suggest that credentialing a causal model is 
not an all or nothing affair and draw a link between this issue and contemporary 
philosophical literature concerned with ontological commitment. 
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Chapter 1: Pearl's Theory of Causality 
1.1 Causal Modelling in Science 
I begin this chapter with an introduction to issues pertinent to causal modelling in 
science. But, before I attend to those details I will need to say something about why I 
begin with a discussion of causal modelling when, as I claim in the introduction, one 
of the key aims of this research is to offer an interpretation of Judea Pearl's theory of 
causality. The answer is straightforward. Pearl (2000a) is as much about procedures 
for building and vetting models of causal interactions in various areas of science as it 
is about the nature of those causal interactions. However, there is a twist here 
involving the relationship between model building procedures and analysing 
causation that will take a moment to sketch. The onus of adequately interpreting 
Pearl's (or anyone's) theory (of causation) rests, of course, with the interpreter. 
Interpreting a causal theorist's intentions arguably brings with it more pressing 
concerns than those to be found in other areas of the philosophy of science due to the 
fact that causal concepts are pervasive throughout natural language and are wrapped 
up in everyday human practice. Causal concepts can be difficult to isolate. Attempts 
to draw technical definitions of familiar causal terms can often add more confusion 
than clarity, especially when theorists draw on intuitions or make use of examples 
and analogies pertaining to the everyday world. In short, the task of interpreting and 
analysing a theory of causation is probably second in difficulty only to that of 
constructing a workable theory of causation itself mainly because it is especially 
difficult to analyse something without the benefit of sufficient distance. 
There are numerous ways to discuss the philosophical study of causation. Granted 
that causation involves some form of relation, philosophical interest in causation may 
be summarised as the attempt to answer the following sorts of questions. Beginning 
with what is perhaps the question of greatest importance, philosophers interested in 
causation wish to know what distinguishes causal from non-causal sequences. 
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Besides this question philosophers wish to know what are the relata of the causal 
sequences, how many relata there are to the relation, how are these relata 
individuated, and how to explain the apparent asymmetry of the causal relation. Some 
have argued that the category of causation may be eliminated so far as science is 
concerned (eg. Russell 1913), and others have claimed that causation must be taken 
as a primitive notion (eg. Anscombe 1993, Tooley 1993). Those who accept that 
causation exists and is amenable to analysis have produced numerous distinct 
theories. For instance, probability theories claim that the causal relation must involve 
a probability increase or change (eg. Suppes 1970; Cartwright 1979; Eells 1991), 
process theories claim that causation must involve, for example, the world lines of 
objects that possess a universally conserved quantity (eg. Skyrms 1980; Dowe 2000), 
or property transference (eg. Aronson 1971; Ehring 1998). Counterfactual theories 
claim that the causal relation must involve some form of counterfactual dependence 
(eg. Lewis 1973b, 1986; Ramachandran 1997), and other theories offer hybrid 
analyses (eg. Schaffer 2001). 
Philosopher's interested in theorising causation expend considerable effort trying to 
situate their theory amongst existing projects. As is the case with theories of 
causation, there are several ways to describe contemporary projects involved with the 
philosophy of causation. One division categorises a project according to whether its 
aim is to provide an analysis of what causation is in contrast to an analysis of what 
natural language causal utterances mean and how (folk and specialised) causal 
concepts are best mapped (Sosa and Tooley 1993; Armstrong 1997; Jackson 1994; 
Bigelow and Pargetter 1990). An alternative approach groups projects according to 
their acceptance or denial of key Humean ideals about causation and laws of nature, 
such as the so-called Humean supervenience thesis ( eg. Psillos 2002)1• What is 
noteworthy is that no matter the approach adopted, philosophers tend to agree the task 
1 These issues are recounted in part across a large literature mcluding, for instance, Beauchamp and 
Rosenberg (1981), Mackie (1974), Sosa and Tooley (1993), Lewis (1986), Mellor (1995), Salmon 
(1984, 1990, 1998), Sankey (1999), and Psillos (2002) to name a few. 
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of constructing and assessing causal theories is one best carried out by philosophers2 
Likewise, analysing what causation is has typically been taken throughout the 
literature to be (at least primarily) a task built for philosophy3• 
Here enters the twist. In my reading of Pearl (2000a) I discover his project cuts across 
those approaches and attitudes taken by the majority of philosophers of science when 
analysing (or constructing) an account of causation. I discover that, taken broadly, 
Pearl's present approach is oriented towards the needs and requirements of the 
scientific modelling community4 and although attentive to some philosophical issues, 
the practices, outcomes, and measures of success tend to differ in that area compared 
to those which are cited throughout, and which to some extent propel, key projects in 
the philosophy of science5• 
Modellers in science are charged with a task made difficult by numerous factors. 
These include such things as lack of suitable formal tools and computational power, 
time constraints, poor data, lack of adequate funding and expertise, lack of research 
'breakthroughs' or successes, and in many cases just the brute intellectual complexity 
of attempting to comprehend and represent the phenomena under investigation with 
the myriad tools and techniques available. With such factors conspiring together, the 
task of the modeller is liable to be driven more by the need to achieve a meaningful 
conclusion, no matter how partial, than by following received doctrine or by being 
attentive to so-called 'foundation issues' 6• 
2 That is, within the body of philosophical work relevant to causation. See, for instance, comments by 
Psillos (2002: 3). 
3 This can be read as both a compliment and a slight. Those who claim that causation is mysterious and 
metaphysical slight philosophers when they claim it is the philosopher's task to analyse it. 
4 Exactly what community this term refers to is difficult to specify precisely. Briefly stated, I have in 
mind working scientists engaged in non-experimental techniques of data analysis. This research has a 
large following spanning across several disciplines. I detail the orientation of some groups within this 
community below. 
5 For instance, Menzies (2002) comments that Pearl's (2000) and (2001) have unfortunately not been 
broadly acknowledged by causal theorists let alone the philosophy of science community. See also 
similar comments by Gillies (2001). 
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Pearl's program is attentive to and appears to have developed in parallel with the 
difficulties encountered 'on the ground' by modellers far more so than the approach 
with which the philosophy of science has tended to tackle causal theorising. The 
reader will appreciate then that there is a gulf to be bridged between Pearl's approach 
to causality and those approaches commonly adopted in the philosophy of science 
before any interpretation can commence. There are several reasons why the gulf 
exists. One is simply because philosophers rarely initiate or participate in scientific 
investigations first hand and so are somewhat insulated from day-to-day pragmatic 
issues, problems, and developments. But this aspect of the gulf is not what I have in 
mind and so can be noted and set aside. What I see as the primary reason behind the 
existence of the gulf will take some explaining. A good place to start is with scientific 
theories and models. 
There are numerous philosophical issues surrounding the task of building models in 
science. Many of these are related to broader issues in the philosophy of science 
including how to account for the structure of scientific theories; how to account for 
progress and discovery in science; questions that concern the nature of scientific 
methodology and the role of explanation and of truth; appropriate ways of confirming 
hypotheses; and questions related to analogical reasoning and how models mediate 
between theories and the world, to name but a few. Building models that aim to 
capture causal relations or that licence causal inferences has impacted upon each of 
these areas of investigation and their associated difficulties and impasses. Indeed 
calling them 'issues' in the philosophy of science is to understate their importance. At 
one time, and for many philosophers of science today, such issues are the central 
concern. For instance, Frederick Suppe expresses the following sentiments 
concerning the constitution of the philosophy of science: 
If any problem in the philosophy of science justifiably can be claimed the 
most central or important, it is that of the nature and structure of scientific 
6 This is to claim not that scientists and modellers aren't attentive to foundational issues in their 
respective disciplines or don't conform to received doctrines but that these are typically the first to go 
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theories, including the diverse roles theories play in the scientific enterprise. 
For theories are the vehicle of scientific knowledge, and one way or another 
become involved in most aspects of the scientific enterprise. It is only a slight 
exaggeration to claim that a philosophy of science is little more than an 
analysis of theories and their roles in the scientific enterprise. A philosophy of 
science's analysis of the nature of theories, including their roles in the growth 
of scientific knowledge, thus is its keystone; and should that analysis prove 
inadequate, that inadequacy is likely to extend to its account of the remaining 
aspects of the scientific enterprise and the knowledge it provides (Suppe 
1977: 3)7. 
Woodward (2003) confirms and focuses these sentiments: 
Issues concerning scientific explanation have been a focus of philosophical 
attention from Pre-Socratic times through the modern period. However, recent 
discussion really begins with the development of the Deductive-Nomological 
(DN) model. This model has had many advocates (including Popper 1935, 
1959, 
Braithwaite 1953, Gardiner 1959, Nagel 1961) but unquestionably the most 
detailed and influential statement is due to Carl Hempel (Hempel, 1942, 
1965, Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). These papers and the reaction to them 
have structured subsequent discussion concerning scientific explanation to an 
extraordinary degree (Woodward 2003: 1). 
As does Psillos (2002) when he asserts that the pervasive nature of causal and 
explanatory talk in the sciences elevates its importance to a level that can hardly be 
exaggerated (Psillos 2002 p 1). Most would agree that to understand what science 
tells us about the way the world is requires analysis of the nature of scientific 
theories. Increasingly the analysis has tended to focus on explanation and causation. 
when Nature fails to come to the party. 
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I agree with Psillos (2002) that the connection between causal and explanatory talk is 
important to highlight. For some time one of the primary areas for research into 
causation has been the project of accounting for scientific explanation. A major tenet 
of this project is that explanation is the main goal of scientific theorising. In Salmon's 
words: 
Science, the majority say, has at least two principal aims-prediction 
(construed broadly enough to include inference from the observed to the 
unobserved regardless of temporal relations) and explanation. The first of 
these provides knowledge of what happens; the second is supposed to furnish 
knowledge of why things happen as they do (Salmon 1978: 684, emphasis in 
original). 
But if scientists hold the same sentiments as philosophers on such matters they rarely 
express them. Scientists involved with modelling have tended to treat causation (if at 
all) as a technical difficulty that, to be overcome, requires advances in the types of 
formalism and testing procedures that lead to greater predictive power, a 
simplification or unification of current methods, or the introduction of entirely new 
methods. As Pearl remarks, scientists need to track down cause-effect relations from 
the environment via limited actions and noisy observations (Pearl 2000a: 42-43). 
Analysing theory structure does not seem necessary to such practices. Moreover, the 
ability to identify and quantify causal relations is, according to Pearl (2000a), the 
ability to answer 'how' (and/or 'what-if') questions, such as: 'How to shape the beam 
so that it will carry the required load?' and 'What if the beam were narrower; would it 
still carry the load?' rather than 'why' questions (Pearl 2000a: 343)8. Pearl's 
7 Recently Suppe has rejected this view. See Suppe (2000), especially pp 109-110, and below for 
discussion. 
8 This is controversial. Pearl is open to the charge that what he hears as 'how' questions are really just 
Salmon's 'why' questions in disguise. One could further claim that Pearl's views are consistent with 
Karl Pearson's regarding the aims of science. There is some truth in this latter point. However, I should 
think Pearson would strongly disagree with Pearl's thesis on causality. It is worth noting that Salmon 
finished his presidential address by stating that that scientific explanation offers, over and above the 
inferential capacity of prediction and retrodiction, 'knowledge of the mechanisms of production and 
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comments imply that knowledge of how a system works comes prior to and is of 
greater importance than knowing why. The difference is partly due to Pearl's 
perspective of explanation in science. Pearl's perspective on explanation in science 
can be partially summarised by the following three assertions9: 
1. Providing an account of scientific explanation requires a prior account of 
causality. 
2. The principal task that besets an account of causality and explanation is 
providing procedures that aid the search for answers to 'how' and 'what-if' 
questions given a specific investigator-relative context. 
3. Success in prediction and explanation follows from the ability to answer 
'how' and 'what-if' questions and is parasitic on the ability to express causal 
queries in a clear language, devise successful 'experiments'-whether actual or 
hypothetical-and/or construct appropriate apparatus. 
Pearl's view of explanation places the identification of mechanisms in a central 
position, and since, for Pearl (2000a), causation underpins explanation, the 
identification of mechanisms is the backbone of his causal discovery program. This 
means that modelling causal systems primarily involves articulating a procedure for 
representing what a system is doing and how it is doing it in such a way that one may 
know how the system would behave if it were altered. Pearl's view holds little 
resemblance to the project philosophers identify as explanation by unification and 
instead is reminiscent of the causal/mechanical tradition and what Salmon and others 
call the causal/mechanical project of explanation in science10• According to Salmon 
(1998), from the causal/mechanical view 'one looks at the world and its furniture as 
black boxes whose internal workings cannot always be directly observed but where 
propagation of structure in the world' and that he held the view that 'knowledge of the mechanisms of 
production and propagation of structure in the world yields scientific understanding, and that this is 
what we seek when we pose explanation-seeking why questions'. In light of this one could argue that 
Salmon's 'why' questions are really Pearl's 'how' questions. 
9 See Pearl (2000a: 334-335) and Halpern and Pearl (200lb). 
10 The former project is primarily identified with the work of Kitcher and Freidman. For details and 
further discussion see Kitcher (1976, 1981, 1985, 1989), Freidman (1974), and Salmon (1985, 1990, 
1997). 
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science's overriding aim is to open those boxes and expose the mechanisms inside' 
(Salmon 1998: 77). On this view scientific explanation aims to provide understanding 
where understanding results from knowing how things work (Salmon 1984: 240) 11 • 
Similarly for Pearl, understanding is the result of knowing how things respond to 
novel interventions and alterations (Pearl 2000a: 25-26). 
However, despite these connections, I find that the resemblance is not enough on 
which to base an interpretation of Pearl (2000a). Pearl (2000a) diverges from the 
causal/mechanical tradition in several respects. First, when Salmon speaks of 'the 
world and its furniture' he means to make no distinction between the macro and 
micro world, whereas Pearl (2000a) intends only to take account of causal processes 
in the macro world12• Second, rather than focusing on the relationship between a 
theory and its models, as is typical in the causal/mechanical tradition, Pearl attempts 
to elicit how things work via appropriate modelling procedures focussed on getting a 
model to 'fit the data' conditional upon the context provided by the investigator's 
scientific specialty and present state of knowledge13• 
The divergence has several consequences. The most salient consequence is that it 
marginalizes the relevance of the philosophical literature on the structure of scientific 
theories and its accompanying account of scientific explanation. Hence, the 
divergence also displaces the importance of analysing and interpreting the 
components of Pearl's theory within the context of the semantic account of theories 14• 
However, since Pearl aims to construct a formalism suitable for causal reasoning and 
explanation, formal models are not dispensed with altogether. Therefore, to both 
illustrate the extent of the divergence and to identify an acceptable context with 
11 Compare comments by (Pearl 2000: 334-336; 343; 345). 
12 And even then only from the perspective of specific disciplines. 
13 But where fitting data is carried out not just with statistical techniques but with causal techniques 
also. I discuss the difference in sections 2.0.3 and 2.1 of chapter 2. The requirement that explanation 
take place within an investigator relative context lends the account an epistemic dimension. I discuss 
the dimension in chapter 2 when I detail Pearl's account of counterfactual conditionals. Note also that 
Pearl tends to identify mechanism with structure. Of course, exactly what the identification amounts to 
forms one of the main preoccupations of this thesis. 
14 This divergence is discussed in some depth by Woodward (2000). But, see also Suppe (2000). 
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which to commence an interpretation it is now necessary to briefly discuss the 
semantic view of theories. 
Scientific theories have tended to be analysed by philosophers of science as formal 
structures. It was once thought that understanding what a scientific theory tells us 
about the world must flow from the logical analysis of the theory's structure. Such 
logical analysis proceeded on the assumption that the linguistic expression of a theory 
could be reconstructed as an axiomatic system formulated in the language of 
mathematics and predicate logic. Understanding a specific theory meant drawing a 
connection between the syntactic features of the reconstructed theory and a given 
stock of observation terms via a set of correspondence rules. For several reasons this 
'classical' view of theories was dispensed with. In the move away from the classical 
view of scientific theories, the 'semantic view' characterises scientific theories as sets 
of models conceived as mathematical structures. The difference between the two 
views is that, on the semantic view, theories are identified with a set of models, such 
that, in contradistinction to the classical view, the set remains the same no matter in 
what language it is expressed (Teller 2001: 394). According to Suppe (1974): 
Theories [on the semantic conception] are extralinguistic entities which can be 
described by their linguistic formulations. The propositions in a formulation 
of a theory thus provide true descriptions of the theory, and so the theory 
qualifies as a model for each of its formulations. This suggests that the 
semantic techniques of model theory [ ... ]will be useful in analysing the 
structure of scientific theories. This suggestion gains further plausibility when 
it is noted that in actual practice the presentation of a scientific theory often 
takes the form of specifying an intended model[ ... ] (Suppe 1974: 222 quoted 
by Glennan 2000a: 2) 
Thus, the semantic conception includes the general claim that theories are semantic 
rather than syntactic entities and so the apparatus of formal semantics and model 
theory illuminate questions about the nature of scientific theories and models. On the 
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semantic conception the class of scientific models is thought of as a proper subset of 
the class of semantic models. In particular, the set of scientific models of a scientific 
theory is just the set of intended models of a formulation of that theory. Furthermore, 
on the semantic conception a scientific theory is just the class of intended models of 
one of the (equivalent) formulations of that theory. Hence, a scientific model is a 
form of semantic model and scientific theories are collections of semantic models, 
which apply to the world by the relation of isomorphism between models and some 
parts of the world (Glennan 2000a: 2; Teller 2001: 394). 
The term 'semantic model' has been variously defined in terms of set theory and state 
spaces. The set-theoretic approach, due chiefly to Suppes (1960, 1967), takes 
scientific models to be semantic models familiar from presentations of the semantics 
of predicate logics. Giere ( 1999) points out that according to Suppes' s thesis the 
meaning and use of models can be interpreted as being the same in the empirical 
sciences as it is in mathematics and mathematical logic. Glennan (2000a) provides 
the following summary: 
In such presentations [of the semantic conception], a model is defined as an 
interpretation of a set of statements of predicate logic under which all 
members of that set are true. An interpretation is in tum understood to be a 
function from non-logical symbols of the language onto individuals or sets of 
individuals of a given domain. If we consider the image of this function, we 
have a set-theoretic structure that is said to satisfy the set of statements 
[presenting the theory] (Glennan 2000a: 3). 
Alternatively, on the state space approach, the state of a physical system is 
characterised by a set of variables that may measure the values of various physical 
magnitudes, such that the set of logically possible states of the system is to be 
identified with the set of all possible combinations of values of each of the variables. 
In tum, these combinations are treated as vectors in the state space and the dynamical 
behaviour of a modelled system may then be characterised in terms of the trajectory 
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of the system through this vector space over time. Laws of succession or coexistence 
may then be defined to characterise physically possible changes in the state of a 
system and physically possible combinations of values of state variables respectively 
(Suppe 1989)15 • 
However, no matter which presentation is used, on the semantic conception models 
are emphasised in the main only in-as-much as they are taken to satisfy the theory's 
specifications. It is theories that are held to 'define a class of ideal systems which are 
then held (via theoretical hypotheses) to represent actual physical systems' and so 
models are important only in as much as it is important to be attentive to their 
identification with their respective theory (Glennan 2000a: 2, 5, 7). That is, to 
reiterate a point from above, scientific theories are on the semantic conception just 
the class of intended models of one of the equivalent formulations of that theory. 
But, there are a number of ways in which models are thought to mediate between 
laws and physical systems. For instance, a model may specify the idealised conditions 
under which laws can be appropriately applied to a system, or, a model may specify 
how a combination of general laws or principles combine to apply to a particular case 
(Glennan 2000a: 6-7). The latter has the most in common with Pearl's view of the 
role models play in causal discovery because, for Pearl, models play the role of 
mediator; a modeller attempts to construct models that have some kind of predictive 
relationship to a complex natural phenomenon. Through clarifying the questions the 
investigator has about the causal relationships in the system under study, the 
investigator uses the model to solve causal problems. As such and in contrast with the 
semantic conception, the relationship between model and theory is not tight since, as 
is clear from practice, models are not hatched straightforwardly from theories: 
While models generally incorporate a great deal of the theory or theories with 
which they are connected, they are usually fashioned by appeal to, by 
inspiration from, and with the use of material from, an astonishingly large 
15 See also van Fraassen (1980; 1987). 
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range of sources: empirical data, mechanical models, calculational techniques 
(from the exact to the outrageously inexact), metaphor, and intuition 
(Winsberg 2003: 106). 
The result is that the applicability of the semantic conception is curtailed precisely 
because it identifies theories with models or classes of models but not, say, with 
theory fragments 16• 
Adherence to the semantic conception's view of scientific models obscures the role 
that modellers perform when they attempt to build models from a collection of theory 
fragments or a collection of laws and principles17• The differing orientation of the 
modelling community to sections of the philosophy of science turns on the fact that 
philosophers have tended to gravitate towards explicating the relation between 
theories and their models whereas scientific modellers (including Pearl) are 
concentrating on exemplifying the relation between models and 
phenomena18(Glennan 2000a). The consequence is this: the semantic view of 
scientific theories and the causal/mechanical account of explanation do not together 
nor separately make an adequate context within which to commence an interpretation 
of Pearl's account of causality. Evidently, Pearl disagrees with the spirit of Suppe' s 
assertion that 'theories are the vehicle of scientific knowledge', since, for Pearl, 
focussing on theories obscures the role models and competition between models play 
in explanation. Pearl's project diverges from the causal/mechanical project in terms 
16 In fact, Suppe has recently come to reject his earlier characterisation of theories. See Suppe (2000) 
and Norton and Suppe (2001) for discussion. 
17 As a consequence, even a rational reconstruction of the investigator's model represented as a 
semantic model can be at odds with or have no obvious meaning given the intended interpretation of 
the collection of theories (fragments) employed by the investigator. 
18 With, of course, the aim of making correct predictions and solving actual problems. This divergence 
is particularly notable when one takes into account Pearl's attempt to define 'actual causation'. The 
point stands even in relation to recent works that question the semantic conception's account of 
scientific explanation such as Woodward (2000) and Hitchcock and Woodward (2003a, 2003b). For 
instance, whilst Woodward (2000) pays close attention to the identification of 'domains of invariance' 
in place of subsumption under law he all but ignores the piecemeal nature of model construction. 
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not only of why causation is important to science and how it is to be investigated but 
also of what use a workable causal theory can be put19• 
Even so, the differences should not overshadow altogether the resemblance Pearl 
(2000a) bears to the causal/mechanical project of explanation in science and the 
semantic conception of theories. There are some striking similarities between Pearl's 
formal approach to modelling, and the idea that scientific theories are abstract 
structures that are related to phenomena by some form of mapping relation. 
Moreover, the causal/mechanical tradition is a comparatively broad church. Those 
who consider van Fraassen's (1980, 1989) position on explanation in science to be 
consistent with the causal/mechanical project will see no harm in taking Pearl's 
account of modelling causes to be consistent also20• Furthermore, the semantic 
conception has continued to evolve alongside the causal/mechanical tradition; Suppe 
(2000) argues for continuity between contemporary research on the nature of 
scientific theories and his (1977, 1989) and Suppes (1962), with the exception that it 
is models that carry the burden rather than theories (Suppe 2000: 109-110). It is fair 
to say that debates about explanation in the philosophy of science are far more 
diverse today than compared to the time when Camap and Hempel dominated the 
project of accounting for scientific explanation. An increasing number of 
philosophers take interest in debates that centre on modelling practices in science and 
its relationship with explanation21 • Whether or not the divergence is a result of a 
difference of perspective on scientific methodology accompanied by a difference of 
attention regarding the question of what it is to model a given (causal) system would 
19 I suggest that this divergence between research in science and the philosophy of science is 
widespread. However, I do not thereby intend to suggest that Philosophers and Scientists aren't in 
agreement due to the fact that they belong to incommensurable fields of study. Indeed, naturalistically 
inclined philosophers tend to think that philosophy and science are continuous. Instead, I think that 
philosophers and scientists simply hold different aspects of problems to be important as a matter of 
contingent fact. For instance, see Pearl's statements identifying the 'quest for understanding' 
(philosophy's why questions) with how questions and hence with successful prediction under variable 
circumstances (Pearl 2000: 26). 
20 See also Suppe (1989). 
21 But where, again, possibly as a result of a difference in attention, philosophers often assimilate the 
role played by causation in causal modelling uncritically with an account of explanation tied to laws of 
nature. But see Woodward (2002a) and Hausman and Woodward (1999) for an account that does not 
do this. 
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take some time to illustrate22• In any case, that a gulf exists is clear, even if I have not 
succeeded in characterising its features correctly23• 
Recent research into both the nature of scientific models and how models are used to 
aid scientific reasoning is presented in, for example, Magnani and Nersessian (2002), 
Norton and Suppe (2001) Morrison and Morgan (1999), Magnani et al. (1999) and 
Herfel et al. (1995). Models are commonly employed in the sciences as analogies, as 
parts of cognitive systems and as representation devices (Giere 1999). Some argue 
that models, experiments, and simulations are not categorically different to each other 
since each can function as an object of investigation in its own right. Along these 
lines Boumans (2002) argues some models are not even descriptions or 
representations. Instead some models perform the role, not of a representational 
entity, but of a data sensor where the model is central in the creation of data. 
Displacing the primacy of isomorphism or similarity as the relation between model 
and reality sidesteps the need for bridging principles and ceteris paribus clauses 
opening a space for what Boumans and others call 'negligibility assumptions' in the 
application of models to problems (Boumans 2003: 317). 
Glennan (1996, 2000a, 2000b, 2002) offers a philosophical account of models and 
mechanisms that has much in common with Pearl's conception of causal models. As 
such it is worth spending some time to articulate the salient portions of Glennan's 
(2000a) account of scientific models toward the goal of setting out an orienting 
context within which to interpret Pearl's account of causality. A caveat is appropriate 
here. Granted Glennan' s account is instructive, I do not intend that it serve as a direct 
translation of Pearl's account and its commitments nor does Glennan offer it as one. 
Even so, there are good reasons for using Glennan's account. One is that Glennan's 
account of mechanism is the one philosophical account that is most consistent with 
Pearl's view of modelling practice together with Pearl's conception of structure. 
22 Hitchcock (2001: 641) briefly addresses this issue. 
23 For instance, philosophical research on the relation between theory and experiment in science does 
not sit altogether comfortably with the divergence. See Hacking (1991) for discussion. It is arguable 
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Glennan (2000a) aims to provide an appropriately general account of scientific 
models. He calls his account a 'model of scientific models' as distinct from a 'theory' 
of scientific models in the spirit of highlighting the practical aspect of modelling in 
science. At the centre of Glennan's (2000a) account stand his definition of a 
'mechanical model' (hereafter (MM)) and the concomitant notion of a 'mechanism' 
(M): 
(MM) A mechanical model is a description of a mechanism that includes (i) a 
description of the mechanisms behaviour and (ii) a description of the 
mechanism that accounts for that behaviour. 
(M) A mechanism underlying a behaviour is a complex system which 
produces that behaviour by the interaction of a number of parts according to 
direct causal laws24• 
The details of the account are as follows. According to Glennan's (2000a) 'model of 
scientific models,' mechanisms are assumed to underlie 'behaviours'. The 'behaviour 
of the mechanism' is taken to be what the mechanism does. Direct causal laws are 
defined in Glennan's account as counterfactual-supporting generalisations that 
describe how changes, whether spontaneous or not, in one part of the model directly 
produce changes in another part. The 'directness' of the laws is a requirement that 
pertains to the efficiency with which mechanisms, and so models, are described. That 
is, the mechanisms that figure in a model should not be described at the expense of 
the model's completeness. There is, therefore, some sense in which 'direct causal 
laws' have an atomic description. The notion of law referred to in (M) picks out that 
class of generalisations made true by the nature of the contingent facts about how 
mechanisms are constituted and configured. The behaviour of a mechanism then 
that a related divergence exists between the philosophy of logic and logic in Artificial Intelligence 
research. For discussion of the relationship between logic and Al see Thomason (2003). 
24 Glennan (2000) claims this conception of mechanisms can be found in the work of Winsatt (1974) 
and Herbert Simon. 
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supervenes on (a class of) counterfactual supporting generalisations. In particular, 
Glennan expects that the reliable behaviour of mechanisms depends upon the 
existence of lawful relations between their parts, and direct causal laws characterise 
these relations25• It should be noted that Glennan's notion oflaws is significantly 
different from the notions of laws that figure elsewhere in philosophical conceptions 
of scientific theories. For instance, Glennan's account is to be contrasted with the 
conception of laws that figures prominently in the 'covering law' account of 
explanation. For Glennan, laws, as these pertain to scientific models, do not cover 
most ordinary phenomena as laws of nature are expected to. For instance, laws on 
Glennan's account have narrow scope, whereas the standard account takes laws to 
have wide scope. Furthermore, there are innumerable laws, as many as one for each 
mechanism on Glennan's account whereas, according to the covering law conception 
of laws, there are expected to be few bona fide laws of nature (Glennan 2000a: l0-
l1)26. 
Note that Glennan's characterisation of mechanical models has two parts-one 
concerned with the description of the behaviour of the mechanism, and the other with 
its mechanical description. According to Glennan, the latter description pertains to 
the internal structure of the mechanism and the former to the external description. 
Descriptions are considered to be semantic entities akin to propositions. Hence, there 
may be many different formulations of the one descriptive entity and yet no change in 
the mechanism described, but a change in the specification of the descriptive entity 
necessarily involves the description of an alternative mechanism. On Glennan's 
model of scientific models the relation that obtains between a model and a 
mechanism is one of 'approximate similarity'. As Glennan remarks: 
25 There are many accounts of mechanism available in the philosophical literature. For instance, 
besides Glennan's account, see Salmon (1984), Machamer (2002), Machamer et al. (2000) and 
Woodward (2002a). 
26 Pearl (2000a) takes a similar notion to Glennan and adds further constraints. In particular, Pearl 
(2000a) considers only non-backtracking counterfactuals and ties these in turn to the notion of 
invariance. I discuss this greater length in section 2.0.3 and again in chapter 3. 
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The behaviour of the system in nature is described (to varying degrees of 
approximation) by the model's behavioural description and the internal 
structure of the system is described (again to varying degrees of 
approximation) by the model's mechanical description. To make claims about 
the nature of a mechanism, one constructs a model and asserts that it is similar 
to a system in nature (Glennan 2000a: 12). 
Glennan's account makes two further presuppositions relevant to the explication of 
Pearl's account. First, the concept of a mechanism's behaviour presupposes a concept 
of 'normal functioning'. The idea here is that, in describing the behaviour of a 
mechanism, the description is carried out on the supposition that the mechanism is 
not broken and this includes mechanisms that are not the product of design or 
selection. The second presupposition involves the relationship between behavioural 
and mechanical descriptions. It is assumed that this relationship is one-many due to 
the fact that the same behaviour can be produced by numerous distinct mechanisms. 
That is, behaviours underdetermine mechanisms. To Glennan this one-many 
relationship raises the following question: 'If one has two competing models of a 
mechanism which both predict the same behaviour, how does one choose?' (Glennan 
2000a: 14). Pearl deals with this question via the specification of a 'minimality' 
constraint on the construction of causal models together with a 'stability' condition 
on model parameters and allows the investigator recourse to causal information not 
explicitly displayed by a given model. Moreover, for Pearl (2000a) the behaviour of a 
mechanism is described via a probability distribution and the mechanical description 
is carried by the functional equations and accompanying pictorial graph of a 
mathematical object labelled a 'structural causal model'. For now the details of these 
conditions and objects are not important; rather it is important to recognise that the 
overall account of models offered by Glennan (2000a) sets in place many of the key 
ideas according to which an interpretation of Pearl's account of causality may 
proceed27• 
27 Glennan continues to develop his account of both mechanism and models. See for instance, Glennan 
(2000b, 2002) and Tabery (2004). I discuss these issues in greater detail in section 3.4 of chapter 3. 
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In any case, I began with the claim that the overall aim of the present research effort 
is to set out and to examine Pearl's theory of causation. I conclude this section with 
the thought that Pearl (2000a) does not intend to offer a theory of causation so much 
as a theory of causal modelling. 
I have reasoned that the divergence is important to recognise since it affects what one 
thinks Pearl's theory is and, therefore, how criticisms of the theory are to be framed 
and a coherent interpretation traced. There is a considerable amount of detail that 
needs to be added to fully illustrate the nature and extent of this divergence. 
However, I have said enough to identify it and since doing that much has served 
present purposes I leave further discussion of its details to later chapters. 
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1.2 The Two Questions of Causation 
In this section I take up the task of providing some detail to the enterprise of causal 
modelling in science in as much as the enterprise is conceived of by Pearl (2000a). 
Pearl sets out his picture of causal modelling as follows28 • The causal modeller may 
assume 
[ ... ]that the world is described by random variables, some of which may have 
a causal influence on others. This influence is modelled by a set of structural 
equations, where each equation represents a distinct mechanism (or law) in 
the world, one that may be modified (by external actions) without altering the 
others. In practice, it seems useful to split the random variables into two sets, 
the exogenous variables, whose values are determined by factors outside the 
model, and the endogenous variables. It is these endogenous variables whose 
values are described by the structural equations (Halpern and Pearl 2001a). 
A number of points from this comment require clarification. Pearl views the task of 
causal modelling as an induction game that scientists play against Nature (Pearl 2000: 
43-45). The claim here is that Nature is assumed to act as though it were in 
possession of what Pearl calls 'stabl~ causal mechanisms', which, were they open to 
inspection, would best be described as deterministic functional relations between 
(sometimes unobservable) variables. Furthermore, the modeller assumes that these 
mechanisms are organised in the form of an acyclic structure and then attempts to 
identify these mechani~ms and/or specify the values of endogenous variables from 
available observations29• But all that is available to the modeller are data. What a 
28 Pearl (2000a) indicates that the discussion of causal modelling talces an idealized view both of model 
construction practices and in some instances the statistical methodologies. However, considerable 
detail is added as the account unfolds. 
29 This restatement is an idealization of the task of causal modelling. There are alternative modelling 
procedures that do not assume acyclicity and where assumptions regarding Nature's features differ 
significantly. I return to this issue when I discuss model identifiability and justification in section 3.4 
of chapter 3. 
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causal modeller attempts to do is identify causal relations using non-experimental 
techniques. The point can be better illustrated after discussing the nature of 
experimental and non-experimental techniques. 
In the context of the collection of sciences listed above one can distinguish two basic 
types of experiment; controlled and randomised. It is commonly accepted that each of 
these types is designed to aid in establishing the existence of cause-effect 
relationships. Since most view the randomised experiment as the stronger of the two 
(despite the fact that, as Shipley points out, the controlled experiment precedes the 
randomised experiment in terms of historical discovery) I will discuss it first (Shipley 
2000: 7). To illustrate the logic of this experimental form, consider the following 
example due to Shipley (2000): 
[Picture an] experiment designed to determine whether the addition of a 
nitrogen-based fertiliser can cause an increase in the seed yield of a particular 
variety of wheat. A field is divided into 30 plots of soil ( 50cm x 50cm) and 
the seed is sown. The treatment variable consists of the fertilizer, which is 
applied at either 0 or 20kg/hectare. For each plot we place a small piece of 
paper in a hat. One half of the pieces of paper have a 'O' and the other half 
have a '20' written on them. After thoroughly mixing the pieces of paper, we 
randomly draw one for each plot to determine the treatment level that each 
plot is to receive. After applying the appropriate level of fertilizer 
independently to each plot, we make no further manipulations until harvest 
day, at which time we weigh the seed that is harvested from each plot. 
The seed weight per plot is normally distributed within each treatment group. 
Those plots receiving no fertiliser produce 55g of seed with a standard error 
of 6. Those plots receiving 20kg/hectare of fertilizer produce 80g of seed with 
a standard error of 6 (Shipley 2000: 7). 
The randomisation of the treatment allocation allows the researcher to calculate the 
probability that the results occurred by chance and, given a considerably small 
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probability in this instance, distinguish between chance associations and systematic 
ones30• Systematic associations, in contrast with chance associations, are assumed to 
be the result of some underlying mechanism (Shipley 2000: 7). When the probability 
that a chance event has occurred is sufficiently small the researcher discards the 
possibility that a rare event has occurred and, in the present example for instance, 
reasons that there is very good evidence of a positive association between the 
addition of fertilizer and the increased yield of the wheat. 
Many statisticians and scientists accept that the process of randomisation allows them 
to differentiate between associations due to causal effects of the treatment and 
associations due to some variable that is a common cause of both the treatment and 
response variables. Hence, the next step in the process is to examine what reasons 
there may be for concluding that the result is in fact due to causality. It is generally 
accepted that there can only be three basic causal explanations of an association 
between two variables X and Y: either X is the cause of Y, Y is the cause of X, or 
there are some other causes that are common to both X and Y. In the example above, 
Shipley asserts that we can exclude the possibility that seed produced by the wheat 
caused the amount of fertilizer that was added since it is clear in this instance that 
causes must precede their effects in time. Moreover, we have to hand the common 
causes of treatment quantities and treated plots. These are simply the numbers that the 
experimenter saw written on the piece of paper attributed to an actual plot. However, 
it remains a possibility that these are not the sole common causes in operation. But, 
even so, Shipley continues, we can exclude the possibility that the observed 
association is due to unrecognised common causes since, by definition, the random 
process by which the treatment units were chosen ensures that the order in which the 
plots receive the treatment is causally independent of any attributes of the plot, its 
soil, or the plant at the moment of randomisation (Shipley 2000: 8). 
Shipley summarises the logic of the randomised experiment in the following way. 
30 Shipley (2000) calculates that the probability that a rare event occurred is 5 X 1 o-s. 
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We began by asserting that, if there was a causal relationship between 
fertilizer addition and seed yield, then there would also be a systematic 
relationship between these two variables in our data: causation implies 
correlation. When we observe a systematic relationship that can't reasonably 
be attributed to sampling fluctuations, we conclude that there was some causal 
mechanism responsible for this association. Correlation does not necessarily 
imply a causal relationship from the fertilizer addition to the seed yield, but it 
does imply some causal relationship that is responsible for this association. 
There are only three such elementary causal relationships and the process of 
randomisation has excluded two of them. We are left with the overwhelming 
likelihood that the fertilizer addition caused the increase in seed yield (Shipley 
2000: 9)31 • 
Hence, the process of randomisation serves two purposes in causal inference. First, 
randomisation causally isolates the experimental units from the treatment variable 
and other possible common causes. Second, randomisation helps the investigator to 
reason about the likelihood that an association is due to chance and not to a causal 
mechanism32 (Shipley 2000: 10; Pearl 2000a: 347-348). 
The other basic form of experiment is the controlled experiment. A controlled 
experiment consists of testing hypothesised causal relationships by deducing what 
would happen if specific variables in the experiment were fixed in a particular state 
(controlled) and comparing the result of the deduction with the observed result 
(Shipley 2000: 15). Holding a variable fixed has generally meant taking some steps to 
31 The alternative causal explanations are not excluded categorically since it is possible that in this case 
the plots that received the fertilizer had some attribute, such as higher moisture holding capacity, that 
actually caused the increase in seed yield. See Shipley (2000: 9-10) for discussion in the context of this 
example. 
32 It is usual that randomised and controlled experiments have a population significantly greater than 1. 
But this is not always the case. In some cases of medical diagnosis, for instance, an experimental 
method, called Single Patient Outcome Trial (SPOT), is used to ascertain the effects of interventions 
on just one individual over time. The aim of the method is to discover and catalogue how such 
interventions affect the individual. The method is contrasted with diagnostic techniques and treatments 
that extrapolate from patterns described by studies carried out on populations. I note that the method 
resembles Pearl's view of actual causality. 
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physically intervene in the experimental set-up so that they can no longer vary 
naturally. However, control in an experiment is not necessarily physical and may 
often be observational (statistical) (Shipley 2000: 15-16). The latter form of control 
involves the notion of statistical conditioning and leads naturally into a discussion of 
non-experimental methods of identifying causal relationships. The basic conception 
of causal inference within the non-experimental domain involves the construction of 
a language within which to express causal claims and a translation procedure for 
moving between the language of causality and the language of statistics (i.e. 
probability). The idea is that in cases where manipulation, control and randomisation 
cannot actually be implemented the queries held by an investigator might nonetheless 
be translated into a model, which then serves as a simulation of the experiment the 
investigator intended to perform. In this sense, the investigator attempts to set out the 
necessary and sufficient conditions needed to specify a joint probability distribution 
that must exist given a specific causal process (Shipley 2000: 24-25). In taking the 
step away from experimental methods, the investigator makes causal claims on behalf 
of the mathematical details of the model in conjunction with the investigator's 
knowledge, rather than on behalf of the experimental design. Pearl likens this step in 
the modeller's task to an attempt to acquire causal knowledge without the benefit of 
randomisation or control (Pearl 2000a: 42-43). What allows the modeller to make the 
inference to causality in these instances involves the identification of what Pearl calls 
autonomy. I discuss the details of autonomy below. What is important to note at this 
point is that Pearl denies modellers must give up on causality just because they 
cannot conduct experiments. The reason for the denial is that Pearl thinks of 
randomisation and control as mere markers of autonomy (Pearl 2000a: 63, 253). 
Hence, it is not experimental design in and of itself that licenses causal inference. It is 
the fact that randomisation and control are ways of tracking autonomous mechanisms 
that endows them with causal characteristics. 
From this conception of the causal modeller's main occupation it is clear why Pearl 
thinks that the fundamental questions of causality are: 
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(1) What empirical evidence is required for legitimate inference of cause-
effect relationships? 
(2) Given that we are willing to accept causal information about a 
phenomenon, what inferen".es can we draw from such information and how 
can we draw them? 
In effect, Pearl is claiming that causal relationships are common in nature but often 
complex and obscure. That there is causation in nature is taken as granted33 • The 
(difficult) task that remains is its identification. By analogy, Pearl's view of causal 
modelling is akin to the attempts an investigator might make to construct a machine 
that behaves (over time or under interventions) in the same or relevantly similar ways 
to the part of reality the investigator has under investigation. There are several 
assumptions Pearl claims we are justified in making about the world the investigator 
seeks to understand. The investigator is seeking to learn cause-effect relations via 
uncontrolled observations of Nature. Pearl insists that humans demonstrate the ability 
to learn cause-effect relations day-to-day and so he intends to craft tools, which in 
providing a means to answer the following three questions, allow for the codification 
of this ability: 
1. What clues prompt people to perceive causal relationships in uncontrolled 
observations? 
2. Is it feasible to infer causal models from these observations? 
3. Would the models inferred tell us anything useful about the causal 
mechanisms that underlie the observations? 
Pearl's picture of the investigator's task first assumes that the world as seen through 
the investigator's eyes is (quasi-) deterministic. In Pearl's words, his view of causal 
models is that they be understood to: 
33 In as much as the causal modeller is concerned. However, Pearl has a position regarding the 
epistemology and perception of causal relations, which I discuss in section 3.3 of chapter 3. 
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... reflect Laplace's (1814) conception of natural phenomena, according to 
which nature's laws are deterministic and randomness surfaces owing merely 
to our ignorance of the underlying boundary conditions (Pearl 2000a: 26). 
Pearl bases his preference for a Laplacian conception of (the modelling of) Nature on 
three considerations. First, the Laplacian conception of Nature is more general than 
the competing stochastic conceptions34• Second, the Laplacian conception of Nature 
is closer than the stochastic conceptions to human intuitions35• Third, counterfactual 
propositions are easily defined within the Laplacian conception but are not definable 
within a stochastic conception due principally to the fact that the probability calculus 
(alone) cannot express the structure of counterfactual expressions (Pearl 2000a: 26-
27). 
I do not think Pearl intends this to be a proclamation concerning the actual nature of 
the physical world although it does belong to a specific world-view. Instead the claim 
of determinism is linked to the role played by the Markov condition in causal 
modelling and, as such, is thought of as a convention guiding the causal modelling 
procedure. As is mentioned in the introduction the Markov condition (for Pearl) states 
that the value of a variable in a causal model is independent of that variable's effects, 
conditional on its direct causes. To see this, consider the following overview of the 
modelling procedure. In one part of the modelling procedure the causal modeller 
takes the following steps. First, the modeller builds a prototype model structure 
designed to meaningfully embody causal claims, which Pearl calls a 'causal 
structure'. This structure consists only of a set of variables such that each distinct 
variable is represented as a node within the graph, and where the edges of the graph 
represent direct functional relationships among corresponding variables (Pearl 2000a: 
44 ). Second, the modeller then attempts to construct from this prototype a workable 
34 I take Pearl to mean by 'stochastic conception' the view that Nature is inherently probabilistic and 
that without the benefits that accompany knowledge of 'laws' or 'regularities' the modeller must 
accept that each event is equi-probable. 
35 This assertion is underpinned by Pearl's belief that humans store causal information in terms of 
counterfactuals and his view that such causal information is stable under the influence of external 
interventions. 
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causal model by specifying the precise way in which each variable is influenced by 
its parents in the graph. 
In Pearl's words, when building a model the 
[ ... ]Markov condition guides [the investigator] in deciding when a set of 
parents is considered complete in the sense that it includes all the relevant 
immediate causes of variable X. It permits [the investigator] to leave some of 
these causes out of the set of parent variables (and be summarised by 
probabilities), but not if they also affect other variables modelled in the 
system (Pearl 2000a: 44) 36• 
Most importantly, the use of the Markov condition reflects the assumption that 
Nature has a structure such that correlations are sometimes reflective of a 
deterministic causal structure37• 
However, Pearl further assumes that: 
... Nature is at liberty to impose arbitrary functional relationships between 
each effect and its cause and then to perturb these relationships by introducing 
arbitrary (yet mutually independent) disturbances. These disturbances reflect 
'hidden' or unmeasurable conditions and exceptions that Nature chooses to 
govern by some undisclosed probability function (Pearl 2000a: 44). 
The upshot is that the causal modeller can access only a subset of variables - the ones 
that are measurable or observable - since, it is thought, Nature hides the full detail of 
36 I discuss the Markov condition and its status within Pearl's account at greater length in chapter 3. 
37 I note here that Pearl does not explicitly draw any distinction between determinism and 
determinability. However, the distinction is treated by fiat since Pearl considers making predictions 
under conditions of uncertainty of a type related to lack of information. But, on several occasions Pearl 
conflates (epistemic) predictability with (ontic) determinism. I take this issue up in chapters 2 and 3 
where I find that the primary sense given to determinism is the one in which certain variables of a 
structural equation are a function of other distinct variables of the same equation. 
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the underlying causal structure of the phenomena being modelled. It seems to follow 
that with only observed or measured variables to hand the modeller can only 
construct a model that defines a joint probability distribution over the variables in a 
system. But since the observed variables are but a subset of the variables of the 
system (the remainder being unmeasured) the resultant model may simply be on a par 
with a (possibly infinite) class of observationally equivalent models. 
So far then the 'machine' constructed by the investigator may have a 'good fit' with 
the phenomenon. But this is only in the sense that the machine is able to (more-or-
less) match the behaviour of the set of variables open to measurement to the 
satisfaction of the person who constructed the machine. The idea of getting the 
machine to match the behaviour of the variables conjures notions of simulation. Two 
metaphors for simulation cited include building the machine to 'look like' the data on 
the one hand and building the machine to 'operate' like the process that generated the 
data. The latter metaphor is the more apt of the two for causal modelling38• Either 
way, the metaphor of the machine and the discussion of causal modelling that precede 
it serve to set the stage for the interpretation of Pearl's account of causality that 
follows. 
38 See, for instance, chapter 1 of Shipley (2000). 
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1.3 Manipulation, Intervention and Agency 
In this section I examine how Pearl's (2000a) account has been interpreted in recent 
literature. At the time of writing the number of articles and books containing specific 
comment about Pearl (2000a) are relatively few. The literature does, however, span 
several disciplines and continues to grow as Pearl's ideas are more widely 
disseminated and as researchers attempt to put his ideas to use. In the philosophical 
literature on causation it appears an early orthodoxy has formed around the opinion 
that Pearl (2000a) offers what is essentially a 'manipulation' account of causation and 
has renewed focus and attention on the so-called 'agency' theories of causation. After 
introducing comments from economic and epidemiological literature I spell out the 
characteristics of agency theories of causation and briefly discuss the strength of the 
view that Pearl is a manipulation theorist. 
Providing a detailed interpretation of Pearl's theory is no mean feat. The task is not 
aided by the fact that Pearl (2000a) never actually specifies a complete stand-alone 
account of his theory despite the overall thrust of the publication being towards its 
elucidation. Pearl expends considerable effort elaborating on how his account is best 
interpreted - the fundamentals of which I have attempted to present in sections I. I 
and 1.2. But, despite Pearl's best efforts enough leeway exists in his presentation for 
several distinct interpretations to exist. A survey of published comment regarding 
Pearl (2000a) shows his theory to be variously interpreted. Differences in opinion 
concerning the key components and aims of the theory typically vary according to the 
central questions and debates of the disciplines each reviewer represents. For 
instance, econometricians have taken the main thrust of Pearl (2000a) to concern 
methodological issues. LeRoy (2002), for example, asserts: 
Three ideas underlie everything Pearl writes: 
(1) Causal ideas are indispensable in [the natural and special sciences, 
philosophy, and statistics]. Pearl rejects the calls one periodically 
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hears to dispense entirely with the terms 'cause' and 'effect' or 
substitute for them terms like 'functional dependence', as if by doing 
so one could somehow circumvent the need to deal explicitly with 
causal ideas. 
(2) Causality is different from probability. Even though the two are 
obviously related, they are not identical, and a separate analysis is 
required if probabilistic relations are to be interpreted causally. 
(3) The informality with which most of us use causal language leads to 
much confusion, and this confusion could be avoided if we made more 
use of formal methods to analyse causality. Indeed one purpose of 
[Pearl (2000a)] is to convince us that the relevant formal tools -
principally graph theory - are already available and well developed. 
For what it is worth, I completely agree with the first two points and 
the first part of the third. As to whether graphical analysis, or formal 
methods generally, have much to contribute to the analysis of 
causation as Pearl believes, I am not yet convinced, particularly with 
regard to economics39.(LeRoy (2002) 
Some epidemiologists comment that graphical modelling methods such as Pearl's 
[ ... ]have seen extensive analytic application (especially in the social 
sciences) [but] nonetheless, in epidemiology these models remain confined 
largely to the conceptual teaching realm (to the extent that they appear at all) 
(Greenland and Brumback 2002: 1036). 
39 If graphical methods are indeed the fundamental component of Pearl's theory, then LeRoy's 
comments bear some weight, since not being convinced of the formalisation is, in effect, not to be 
convinced of Pearl's theory of causality. What remains on the table for LeRoy then are just 
methodological concerns relating to study design. 
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Other epidemiologists comment that the importance of Pearl (2000a) lies in its 
unification of various different approaches to causal modelling. According to these 
epidemiologists Pearl (2000a) has shown how one or another approach to expressing 
and representing causal relationships (such as Structural Equation Models or causal 
diagrams) translates directly into other approaches (such as counterfactual models) 
(Maldonado and Greenland 2002). 
Philosophers tend to agree amongst themselves40 that Pearl (2000a) elaborates a 
manipulation account of causation. Whether or not this opinion is well justified it is 
in any case clear that philosophers have taken Pearl to offer an analysis of causation. 
For instance, commenting on a quotation from Cook and Campbell (1979) Woodward 
(2001) asserts: 
[Cook and Campbell's general ideas regarding causation as manipulation] are 
commonplace in econometrics and in the so-called structural equations or 
causal modelling literature, and very recently have been forcefully reiterated 
by the computer scientist Judea Pearl in an impressive book length treatment 
of causality (Pearl 2000a) (Woodward 2001: 1). 
Such that, Woodward thinks, "[t]he characterisation of the notion of intervention is 
rightly seen by many writers as central to the development of a plausible version of a 
manipulability theory [and] [o]ne of the most detailed attempts to think 
systematically about interventions and their significance for understanding causation 
is due to Pearl (2000a) [ ... ]"(Woodward 2001). 
But, for others, Pearl is not primarily engaged in developing a manipulability theory 
of causation so much as offering a counterfactual theory. For example, Menzies 
(2002) asserts that Pearl (2000a) articulates a counterfactual theory of token 
causation: 
40 But this is by no means universal. For instance, see Hitchcock's review in Hitchcock (2001). See also 
Menzies (2002). 
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Pearl's theory of token-causation can be called a counterfactual theory. In his 
(2000), he attempts to capture within the structural equations framework the 
notion of quasi-dependence that Lewis (1986) introduced as a tentative 
solution-though later discarded-to the difficulties that the late pre-emption 
examples posed his original counterfactual theory (Menzies 2002: 4). 
Variation of opinion concerning the nature of Pearl's project is not surprising given 
the differing histories and developmental contingencies within and between 
disciplines. But, this is not to say that there is no (cross-discipline) agreement about 
the nature of Pearl's project. As I mentioned above, it is still early days for the 
analysis of Pearl's account. Two points are worth making. First, it cannot be taken as 
given that Pearl has articulated a stand-alone theory of causality. Second, differences 
in the various disciplinary comments on Pearl (2000a) together with the fact that 
Pearl has attempted to write for a somewhat heterogenous audience have a strong 
bearing on what the key components of the theory are taken to be. Broadly speaking, 
most agree that Pearl attempts to account for causality by using the properties of path 
diagrams of graphs. But, even so, the details of Pearl's theory depend upon whether 
one endorses their applicability. In this sense opinion varies according not just with 
the details of Pearl's account but also with what domain of problems Pearl intends his 
account to be useful in solving. Across the literature on causality these tasks vary 
from aiding investigators in drawing causal inferences, to the identification of 
confounding, to the metaphysical analysis of causal relations. The breadth of this 
domain of application is one explanation for the variety of different opinions 
concerning the nature of Pearl's account. Writing for a heterogenous audience has 
this disadvantage. 
Another aspect of this plurality involves the level at which Pearl's account is pitched. 
Pearl (2000a) throws into question several foundational issues not typically addressed 
by statisticians, epidemiologists, and econometricians. For instance, Pearl asks 
econometricians and statisticians why they resist formal approaches to assessing 
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causal claims. Likewise, Pearl notes that confounding bias is somewhat of an 
anathema to statisticians because accounting for it requires reckoning with causality. 
Statisticians might argue that in so doing Pearl steps into philosophical or 
'metaphysical' territory. They may be correct. Pearl's views on foundational issues, 
sparing as they are, extend to (the discipline of) philosophy, where Pearl has 
questioned what the discipline is meant to contribute41 • 
I now tum to examine more closely the contribution made by.philosophers towards 
an interpretation of Pearl's account. As I mentioned above the leading interpretation 
categorises Pearl as a manipulation theorist. The details of manipulation theories and 
the claim that Pearl is a form of manipulation theorist are as follows. 
Psillos (2002: 6-8) recently elaborated on a distinction between what he calls the 
platitudes of causal theorising and our pre-theoretical intuitions about the nature of 
causation. The four platitudes he cites include the difference platitude, the recipe 
platitude, the explanation platitude and the evidence platitude42• The pre-theoretical 
intuitions tend toward one of two centres; the apparent intrinsic nature of the causal 
relation on the one hand and the intuition that causation must exhibit regularity on the 
other. I wish to draw particular attention to the recipe platitude and use it to introduce 
the notion of manipulation and its place in causal theorising. As for the distinction 
itself, Psillos's aim in introducing it is to highlight the disparities that exist within the 
field of causal theories and to utilise it as a means to break up the field of causal 
theories into instructive categories43• At the most general level Psillos's categorisation 
of causal theories distinguishes between those that entertain the existence of causal 
powers or dispositions of some form or other and those theories that do not. Speaking 
broadly, those of the former category are labelled non-Humean theories of causality 
and those of the latter category Humean or regularity theories of causality. The 
410n the issue of what philosophy contributes see Pearl's challenge m section 3.4 of chapter 3. See also 
Pearl (2000a: 310). 
42 See also Mellor's discussion of 'connotations' in his (1988: 230) and discussion in chapter 1 of 
Dowe (2000). 
43 For an alternative view on categorising theories of causation see Menzies (1999). 
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several platitudes are then mobilised either individually or in combinations to act as 
yardsticks against which a theory from one category or the other may be compared. 
According to the recipe platitude, causes are a means to producing or preventing their 
effects44• In more modem guise the recipe platitude is a statement of the fact that 
causes can be used to manipulate their effects but, typically, not vice versa. This idea 
has a relatively rich history and there is some considerable detail afforded to it in the 
literature. 
For instance, the later Wittgenstein arguably came to the view that causation was a 
'family resemblance concept' in as much as it proved to be immune to specific 
analysis. That is, causation for Wittgenstein reflects an interconnected web of 
concepts related by similarity, which may be taken account of via mapping, rather 
than by an analysis conducted in terms of, say, necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Focusing on how people establish causal connections in day-to-day contexts, 
Wittgenstein noted a variety of 'prototype' causal connections. These include impact; 
traction; mechanism; human reactions to sensation and emotion; and regularity of 
succession (Glock 1996: 72-73). Such prototypes are, according to Wittgenstein, 
manifest in the variety of human practices. Hence, no one prototype in particular was 
thought by Wittgenstein to be fundamental. Even so, it seems clear Wittgenstein 
thought that the notion of causation as agency was at least genetically prior to that 
based on observation45• 
Gasking took causation to be essentially related to the manipulative techniques 
humans employ in order to produce a result. Influenced to some degree by 
Wittgenstein's thought on the subject, G.H. von Wright claimed that 
... to think of a relation between events as causal is to think of it under the 
aspect of (possible) action. It is therefore true, but at the same time a little 
44 The term 'recipe' in relation to causes is due to Gasking (1955). 
45 For further discussion see Glock (1996) and Wittgenstein (1976). 
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misleading to say that if p is a (sufficient) cause of q, then if I could produce p 
I could bring about q. For that p is the cause of q, I have endeavoured to say 
here, means that I could bring about q, if I could do (so that) p (von Wright 
1971: 74). 
That is, von Wright held that nature would unfold in a deterministic fashion but for 
the interference of agents. It is by the action of agents that an analysis of causation 
becomes a possibility. Hence, for von Wright "p is a cause relative to q, and q an 
effect relative to p, iff by doing p we could bring about q, or by suppressing p we 
could remove q or prevent it from happening" (Sosa and Tooley 1993: 16). 
Moreover, the connection between causation and action is logical in its nature and as 
such is intertwined with the raft of human practices that surround free action (von 
Wright 1973). 
In more recent work, Menzies and Price argue that causation should be analysed as a 
secondary quality. Their basic idea is that " ... an event A is a cause of a distinct event 
B just in case bringing about the occurrence of A would be an effective means by 
which a free agent could bring about the occurrence of B" (Menzies and Price 1993: 
187). Menzies and Price (1993) in effect are saying that causation is reducible to the 
volition of agents to 'bring about' some effect via the manipulation of its cause, and 
that the notion of an agent 'bringing about' an effect is based upon non-causal (non-
linguistic) ostension (similar to the role that ostension takes in the analysis of colour 
concepts) (Psillos 2002: 103). 
Woodward's account of (causal) explanation in scientific contexts emphasises the 
notion of intervention. For Woodward the relationship between two events 
(variables), call them X and Y, can be considered causal if, based on an intervention 
that changed the value of X, the value of Y would change whilst the overall 
relationship between X and Y remains stable (Woodward 2000: 205). This 
formulation involves a counterfactual component. What this means is that the notion 
of intervention is not limited to interventions that are actually performed. Instead the 
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idea is that X is a cause of Y if and only if Y would change if an appropriate 
manipulation of X were carried out. According to Woodward (and others), Pearl 
offers a similar type of interventionist account of causation. This claim is primarily 
based on the fact that Pearl (2000a) utilises causal graphs that, when constructed 
according to the principles and assumptions Pearl recommends46, act as 'oracles'-a 
counterfactual predicting device-that display the effects of interventions. 
Each of these views draws attention to the fact that causation47 essentially involves 
the notion of manipulation. As such each view places the recipe platitude somewhat 
ahead of the others in order of importance. Even so, each view differs significantly 
from the others. Manipulation theorists have, often to avoid inheriting the 
shortcomings of a predecessor or in response to criticism, introduced several 
distinctions that help to differentiate their specific view from others of the same 
variety. Some of these are worth outlining since a number will be instructive when 
the time comes to detail and assess Pearl's account of causality. 
By adding another level of detail on top of the general manipulation thesis, one can 
claim that causation involves manipulation conceived in terms of either free human 
action or independently of human action48• Analyses of causation pertaining to the 
former view have come to be called 'agent' accounts and those pertaining to the latter 
are called 'interventionist' accounts. Clearly, Gasking, Menzies and Price (1993), and 
less clearly von Wright stand under the umbrella of the agency account since it is part 
of their views that causation requires essential reference to (human) agency. But, 
Woodward (and Hausman) stand with the interventionist's since they seek a 
definition of causation that is not reducible to an agent's volition or intention. 
Still further divisions exist. Manipulation accounts of causation may seek to be 
reductive or not and may attempt or decline any attempt to offer a universal account 
46 Primarily the notions of stability, invariance, and dependence, which I detail in chapter 3. 
47 And in some instances explanation also. 
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of the causal relation. In the case of the former, a reductive manipulationist account 
of causality asserts that causal relations can be completely explained in terms of 
manipulation or intervention. In the case of the latter, the manipulation theorist 
asserts that there are no causal relations that a manipulation theory cannot take 
account of. Further differences amongst individual manipulationist views of causality 
may follow according to the stance they adopt toward the remaining connotations of 
causation; the order with which one thinks answers should be provided to questions 
concerning causal inference as distinct from causal analysis; how the account relates 
to laws of nature; and what the account makes of instances of singular or token 
causation. 
However, to my mind there remains some question as to whether Pearl should be 
classed as a manipulation theorist since, in light of Pearl's intentions, it is not clear 
that he means to articulate such an account, and even if it turns out that he has 
(possibly unintentionally) done so, it is not true that manipulation is the only 
available category to which his theory might belong nor is it clear that manipulation 
is at the centre of the theory49• The primary reason uncovered so far for denying Pearl 
the title of manipulation or agency theorist is that despite Pearl's obvious 
endorsement of the means/end intuition, Pearl holds that manipulations only reveal 
causal relations when they are in fact there to be revealed. Hence, it seems clear that 
Pearl would not accept that 'causality means manipulation', much less that causation 
is manipulation. Also, it is not clear that one can move from conceptions of 
manipulation in experimental settings to manipulation of model structures without 
loss or change of meaning. This will not, however, be the last word on the matter. I 
return to this question in chapter 2. 
On the issue of differing standpoints I declare my interest in Pearl's account to lie 
within the discipline of philosophy. I take it that Pearl (2000a) contains an analysis of 
48 Taking this platitude seriously might lead one to manipulation but other commitments might also 
lead one into agreement with the recipe latitude. It can be a starting point in one's causal theorising or a 
happenstance finishing point. 
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causality granted the caveats of sections 1.1 and 1.2 concerning causal modelling. In 
the final chapter I argue that Pearl offers a 'two-part' theory of causation that is at 
base neither manipulationist nor counterfactual. But, before I provide the details of 
my interpretation it is first necessary to set out the key components of Pearl's account 
as they appear in their original form. 
49 That is, in spite of comments to the contrary on p 104 regarding Spirtes's 1991 lecture at the 
International Congress of Philosophy of Science (Pearl 2000a: 104 ). 
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Chapter 2: Pearl's Theory of Causality 
2.0 Pearl's Theory of Causality 
There are several ways to trace out an account of Pearl's theory of causality. In fact 
there are several accounts available in the literature. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present and comment on Pearl's account of causality more or less as one finds it in 
Pearl (2000a). The presentation primarily draws on Pearl (2000a) and secondarily 
upon Halpern and Pearl (2001a)50• I intend the presentation to represent what the 
reader may view as a standard account of Pearl's theory. This account will then 
function as the reference point of the philosophical interpretation I offer in chapter 3. 
I deal with specific exegetical issues of importance in the later sections of this chapter 
and again in the following chapter as the need arises. One such issue is the need to 
clarify the role that counterfactuals play in Pearl's account. I do this in section 2.1. 
Pearl contends that the path traversed through each chapter of his (2000a) roughly 
parallels that in which the account developed over time. What I find useful in tracing 
this path is the transition from Bayesian Networks to Causal Functional Models. 
However, several issues dictate that a clearer presentation might be had by detailing 
some of the key concepts and principles of Pearl's account out of step with their 
historical discovery. Hence, I will begin with Bayesian Networks and move to Causal 
Functional Models more or less in step with the progression in Pearl (2000a). But I 
will break step to present definitions and conditions that pertain to what Pearl calls 
'actual causation'; Pearl's account of type and token causes; and Pearl's account of 
counterfactual statements. At a conceptual level the presentation traces a path that 
begins with the mathematical theory of graphs, especially Directed Acyclic Graphs, 
moves through the detail of Pearl's logic of causal reasoning and ends with Pearl's 
demonstration of how expressions of the logic may be translated between different 
forms of causal models in accord with the type of problem the modeller is attempting 
to solve. The presentation is broken into three components reminiscent of many 
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presentations of formal logical systems. First I set out the syntax and then I trace its 
semantics. Last, I present the informal reading of the semantics. 
2.0.1 Syntax 
It is fair to say that the foundation of Pearl's account is the Bayesian Network. A 
Bayesian Network is a form of path diagram or graph capable of representing joint 
probability functions over distributions of variables51 • The so-called graphoid axioms 
confirmed by Dawid (1979), Spohn (1980), and Pearl and Paz (1987) determine the 
properties of Bayesian Networks52• As such, a Bayesian Network can be thought of as 
a mathematical object designed to represent and to facilitate reasoning about 
probabilistic relationships between sets of variables. According to Pearl, Bayesian 
Networks are so-called for three reasons. First, their input information is subjective, 
representing (in part) the investigators' knowledge. Second, Bayes's conditioning is 
used to update information in the light of new evidence; Third, decision procedures 
for Bayesian Networks distinguish between causal and evidential modes of 
reasoning53 (Pearl 2000a:14). Bayesian Networks have several alternative 
applications to those which Pearl has put them. These uses include language 
understanding, map learning, and decision making. Bayesian Networks are known by 
several other names such as knowledge maps, (Bayesian) belief networks, expert 
systems and probabilistic causal networks (Charniak 1991: 50). Recently the use of 
Bayesian Networks has tended to be greatest in two fields of study: Artificial 
Intelligence research and the study of human decision-making (Kennett et al. 2001). 
Despite the variety of applications the following presentation is intended to track the 
so I also draw upon a number of technical papers authored by Pearl and others. See citations in text. 
51 Or conditional probability tables. 
52 See Pearl (1987) and Geiger et al. (1990). See also Edwards, D. (2000) for a recent introductory 
treatment of graph theory. See Charniak, E. (1991) for an introduction to Bayes Nets. The graphoid 
axioms are recounted in Pearl (2000a: 11). I do not set out the graphoid axioms since they are not 
necessary for the discussion. The main thrust of the axioms and the notion of information relevance 
will be covered when introducing the d-separation criterion and independence assumption below. 
53 None of these conditions are necessary to define the properties of graphs. 
I 
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use and conception of Bayesian Networks consistent with Pearl (2000a), which is 
primarily geared towards statistical and causal modelling. 
Pearl asserts that there are two primary reasons for using graphical methods in 
probabilistic and statistical modelling. One is that Bayesian Networks are capable of 
perspicuously representing the investigators' assumptions (typically concerning 
structure) and the other is that Bayesian Networks offer an effective method of 
representing joint probability functions. In other words, Bayesian Networks"[ ... ] 
provide a compact and clear representation of complicated probabilistic 
independencies" (Twardy and Korb 2002: 2) and offer a visual as well as formal 
guide to facilitate the drawing of inferences (Pearl 2000a: 13). The syntax of Pearl's 
account has two main components. The first is the language of graphs and the second 
is the so-called 'calculus of interventions', which in part is the rules of inference 
governing permissible alterations to graphs. To gain a reasonable picture of graphs, 
and so too Bayesian Networks, I will briefly set out the basic principles of graph 
theory and follow by commenting on the relation between statistical models and 
Directed Acyclic Graphs. 
A graph is a mathematical object constructed from a set Vof vertices (or nodes) and a 
set E of edges (or links) connecting some pairs of vertices. For Pearl, nodes 
correspond to variables and edges denote a relationship that holds between pairs of 
variables, the interpretation of which varies according to application. The edges in a 
graph can be directed or undirected. Directed edges are marked by a single arrowhead 
oriented toward the direction of influence and undirected edges remain unmarked. In 
some applications graphs may use 'bi-directed' arcs to denote the existence of 
unobserved common causes or confounders. If all edges in a graph G are directed the 
graph is called a 'directed' graph. Removing all arrowheads from the edges in a graph 
G results in an undirected graph called the 'skeleton' of G. A 'path' in a graph G is 
some sequence of edges where each edge begins with the vertex ending the preceding 
edge. That is, a path is any unbroken, non-intersecting route that may be traced along 
the edges in a graph. A path may be traversed through a graph either along or against 
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the arrows. If every edge in a path contains an arrow pointing from the first to the 
second vertex of the pair, the path is called a 'directed' path. When there is a path 
between two vertices in a graph the two vertices are labelled 'connected', and if not, 
they are labelled 'disconnected'. For three subsets a, b, and s of V, sis said to 
'separate' a and b when all paths from a to b intersects (Pearl 2000a:12-13). 
A directed graph may include directed cycles, but directed graphs may not contain 
self-loops (eg. X => X). A graph that contains no directed cycles is called 'acyclic' 
and a graph that is both directed and acyclic is called a 'directed acyclic graph' 
(DAG). Graph theory makes use of kinship relations to refer to specific relationships 
amongst vertices (nodes) in a graph (eg. parents, children, descendants, and 
ancestors). Kinship relations are defined along the full arrows in the graph, including 
arrows that form directed cycles but ignoring bi-directed and undirected edges. For 
instance, a 'family' in a graph is a set of nodes made up from a specific node together 
with all its parents (Pearl 2000a: 12-13). A 'backdoor' path from one node X to 
another node Y is a path whose first edge is an arrow pointing into X. A 'blocked' 
path between nodes X and Y is a path that passes from a parent to a child and then on 
to another parent (Greenland and Brumback 2002: 1030-1031). A node in a directed 
graph is called a 'root' if it has no parents (explicitly represented as nodes in the 
graph) and a 'sink' if it has no children. Every DAG has at least one root and at least 
one sink. A connected DAG such that every node has at least one parent is called a 
'tree'. A tree in which every node has at most one child is called a 'chain', and a 
graph in which every pair of nodes is connected by an edge is called 'complete' 
(Pearl 2000a: 12-13). Graphs typically summarize relationships between individuals 
within a population where each variable represents the states of individuals within 
that population. A population may contain just one individual and 'individuals' may 
represent almost any unit of interest to the modeller (Greenland and Brumback 2002: 
1030-1031). A Bayesian Network has a function associated with each of its nodes -
which is either a probability density function or a conditional probability table -
stating that node's dependence upon its parents, or, when the node is a root, 
associating it with a prior probability distribution (Twardy and Korb 2002: 2). 
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Since they are a form of graph, each of these conditions and terminology applies to 
Bayesian Networks. Even so, Bayesian Networks perform a different role to that of 
graphs found in other forms of modelling such as regression and factor modelling54• 
The primary role of Bayesian Networks in statistical modelling is to provide guidance 
when drawing inferences under conditions of partial knowledge or uncertainty. In this 
sense Bayesian Networks are a graphical method for the representation and 
manipulation of probability distributions. As Kennett et al. (2001) explain, Bayesian 
Networks 
[ ... ] allow a probability distribution to be decomposed into a set of local 
distributions. The network topology, and associated independence semantics, 
indicates how these local distributions should be combined to produce the 
joint distribution over all random variable nodes in the network (Kennett et al. 
2001: 3) 
And, since a statistical model is a type of probability distribution it follows that 
Bayesian Networks can represent the properties of statistical models. In practice 
many statistical models of interest contain enough variables so as to make the 
(stepwise) drawing of inferences a practical impossibility. In such cases Bayesian 
Networks function as data reduction and/or efficient organization devices. In fact, the 
primary practical purpose of a Bayesian Network includes the 
[ ... ]substantial reduction in the number of parameters required to specify [a] 
distribution when the network connectivity is low; the ability to use more 
efficient algorithms for local distributions; and the separation of the 
quantification of influence strengths from the qualitative representation of the 
causal influences between variables[ ... ] (Kennett et al. 2001: 3-4). 
54 See Murphy (2001) and Edwards (2000) for a useful overview. 
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Constructing a Bayesian Network has two parts - the specification of the structure of 
the network domain and the quantification of the dependencies and independencies so 
specified (Kennett et al. 2001: 4). Hence, the term 'structure' is to be identified at this 
stage with relations of probabilistic dependence and independence. The nature of 
these relationships as they pertain to Bayesian Networks is as follows. Granted a 
statistical parameter is the specification of a joint probability function over a 
distribution of variables, conditional independence may be defined in the following 
way. Given a finite set of variables V = {li;, V2, •• • , Vn} and a joint probability function 
P(.) defined over V, and where X, Y, Z are any three subsets of variables in V, X and Y 
are conditionally independent given Z if 
P(x I y, z) = P( x I z) whenever P(y, z) > 0. (1.26) 
That is, in the terminology of the 'information relevance' literature; 'learning the 
value of Y does not provide additional information about X, once we know Z'. Or, 
more commonly, Z 'screens off' X from Y. Pearl utilises the following notation, due 
to Dawid (1979), to denote the conditional independence of X and Y given z55: 
(X II Y I Z)p iff P(x I y, z) = P(x I z)56 (1.28) 
Unconditional independence or marginal independence is then denoted by (X II Y I 
0); that is, 
(XII y I 0) iff P(x I y) = P(x) whenever P(y) > 057• (1.29) 
Conditional and marginal independence admit the following graphical analogues. 
Consider an imaginary data set consisting of a set of (arbitrarily ordered) 
measurements {V, W , ... ,Z} gathered on some population N. The measurements and 
55 Note that (X 11 Y I Z) implies the conditional independence of all pairs of variables Vi E X and Vj 
E Y, but the converse is not necessarily true (Pearl 2000a: 11). 
56 I use the symbol ' II', for want of the appropriate symbol, to denote the screening-off relation. 
57 These definitions resemble those found in Pearl (2000a p 11) from where they are paraphrased. 
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the entities in N represent observations. When building a model of such data 
statisticians assume that the measurements are random variables with a joint 
probability function of the form: 
f 9(v, w, ... , z) 
where '8' is taken to be some undisclosed parameter. A statistical model then is a 
family of possible densities (such as {f 9 : 8 EE>}), where sub-models correspond to 
parameter subsets (Edwards 2000: 6). Given such a model, an undirected graph 
G = (V,E) can be constructed such that Vis the set of variables from the statistical 
model, and E represents the edges between pairs of variables that are not 
conditionally independent given the remainder of the variables in V. The general idea 
is to identify the statistical property of conditional independence with a graph-
theoretic analogue. The analogue is labelled 'separation' (Edwards 2000: 7). With the 
identification of the graphical property of separation with the statistical property of 
independence it becomes possible to translate a set of conditional independence 
relations present in a statistical model into the language of Bayesian Networks. Pearl 
(2000a) describes the process in the following way. 
Consider a distribution P defined on a distribution N of discrete variables ordered 
arbitrarily as X 1,X2 ••• • ,Xn. Using the chain rule of the probability calculus P may be 
decomposed as the product of n conditional distributions: 
(PD) P(xp·· .,xn) =IT P(x1 I X 1, ... ,x1_1). 
j 
It may tum out that the conditional probability of some variable X i in N is 
independent of all its predecessors once the value of a select subset of predecessors is 
known. Call this subset PA1 and define the following equivalence: 
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The r.h.s of this equivalence may then be substituted into the product of (PD) in the 
process, simplifying the amount of information required to specify the probability of 
X,. That is, given the decomposition scheme just outlined, less information is 
required to specify the probability of X j conditional on just the possible realisations 
of the set PA, rather than conditional on all possible realisations of X, 's 
predecessors Xp·· .,X1_ 1 (Pearl 2000a: 14). Pearl labels the set PA, the 'Markovian 
parents' of Xj, or 'parents' for short, and defines the set in the following way: 
Markovian Parents58 
Let V = {X1, ••• ,Xn} be an ordered set of variables, and let P(v) be the joint 
probability distribution on these variables. A set of variables PA j is said to be 
the Markovian parents of X j if PA j is a minimal set of predecessors of X j 
that renders Xj independent of all its other predecessors. In other words, PA, 
is any subset of {Xj' ... ,X,_1 } satisfying P(x, I pa)= P(xj I x1' ... ,xj_1) but 
such that no proper subset of PA 1 does
59
• 
If it is the case that every configuration v of variables has some finite probability of 
occurring then the Bayesian Network associated with P(v)is unique given the 
ordering of the variablesro (Pearl 2000a: 15). According to the definition of 
Markovian parents Bayesian Networks are carriers of independence relationships 
along the order of construction. Hence every distribution that satisfies the definition 
of Markovian Parents must decompose into the product of 
58 This definition is from Pearl (2000a: 14). 
59 Lower-case symbols such as; 'x', 'paj' denote particular values of their corresponding variables 
written in upper-case symbols. 
60 See Pearl (1988) for a proof. 
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This product decomposition does not depend upon any specific variable ordering 
since, given the distribution P and its graph G, one can calculate whether P 
decomposes into the product given by (PF) without reference to the ordering of the 
variables in P. It therefore follows according to Pearl, that " ... a necessary condition 
for a DAG G to be a Bayesian network of probability distribution P is for P to admit 
the product decomposition dictated by G" (Pearl 2000a: 16). Pearl captures this 
notion through the following definition: 
Markov Compatibility61 
If a probability function P admits the factorisation of (PF) relative to a DAG G, then 
G represents P, or, in other words, P and G are (Markov) compatible. 
Pearl claims it is important to ascertain the compatibility between DAGs and 
probabilities in statistical modelling because compatibility is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a DAG G to explain a body of empirical data represented by 
P (Pearl 2000a: 16). 
Pearl offers a decision procedure for identifying conditional independencies in 
Bayesian Networks called 'd-separation'. The d-separation criterion is a rule-guided 
method for deciding, given three disjoint sets of variables {X}, {Y}, {Z} represented 
by a graph G, whether X is independent of Y given Z. Put simply, d-separation offers 
a procedure for translating the dependence and independence relationships present in 
a graph into equivalent statements expressed solely in the language of probability. 
Pearl intends that the condition of statistical dependence should be associated with 
connectedness in the graph-theoretic sense, and that statistical independence should 
be associated with the absence of a connected path (i.e. with separation). The upshot 
is that the 'd' in 'd-separation' connotes directionality and the condition of d-
separation and d-connection is intended to account for the direction of the arrows 
present in some DAGG and hence the dependence relations present in the statistical 
model. d-separation is defined as follows: 
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d-separation62 
A path p is said to be 'd-separated' or 'blocked' by a set of nodes Ziff 
1. p contains a chain i ==? m ==? j or a fork i <== m ==? j such that the middle 
node m is in Z, or 
2. p contains an inverted fork or collider i ==? m <== j such that the middle node 
is not in Z and such that no descendant of m is in Z. 
A set Z is said to d-separate X from Y iff Z blocks every path from a node in X 
to a node in Y. 
Given two singleton variables x and y that form part of a DAG, the application of the 
criterion of d-separation obeys the following three rules63: 
(Rule 1) Unconditional Separation 
x and y are d-connected if there is an unblocked path between them. 
An unblocked path is a path that can be traced without traversing a pair of 
arrows that collide 'head-to-head' 64• 
(Rule 2) Blocking by Conditioning 
x and y are d-connected, conditioned on a set Z of nodes, if there is a collider-
free path between x and y that traverses no member of Z. If no such path 
exists, x and y are d-separated by Z or, in other words, every path between x 
and y is 'blocked' by Z. 
(Rule 3) Conditioning on Colliders 
61 The definition of Markov Compatibility is from Pearl (2000a: 16). 
62 This definition is from Pearl (2000a: 16-17). 
63 The~e rules appear in Pearl (2001b). 
64 Pearl notes the ramification of rule 1 is that the covariance terms corresponding to these pairs of 
variables will be zero, for every choice of model parameters. 
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If a collider is a member of the conditioning set Z, or has a descendant in Z, 
then it no longer blocks any path that traces this collider. 
The application of these rules to a DAG allows the investigator to read off every d-
separation relation contained in the graph and to infer that these relationships obtain 
in the distribution as statistical independencies if the model is correct. 
The last condition I wish to introduce before moving on to the remaining components 
of the syntax to Pearl's account is that of 'observational equivalence'. This condition 
is used to determine whether every probability distribution that is compatible with 
one given DAG is compatible with another. 
Observational equivalence65 
Two DAGs are observationally equivalent if and only if they have the same 
skeletons and the same set of v-structures (i.e. two converging arrows whose 
tails are not connected by an arrow). 
According to Pearl (2000a): 
Observational equivalence places a limit on our ability to infer directionality 
from probabilities alone. Two networks that are observationally equivalent 
cannot be distinguished without resorting to manipulative experimentation or 
temporal information (Pearl 2000a: 19-20). 
Using the d-separation criterion it is possible to determine the set of independencies 
consistent with a specific DAG. It is also possible to specify all the DAGs implied by 
a given set of independencies. Using the criterion of observational equivalence it is 
then possible to determine which of these DAGs has the same set of v-structures. The 
fact that the set contains DAGs where the orientation of one or more arrows may be 
65 The definition of observational equivalence is provided by Theorem 1.2.8 from Pearl (2000a: 19). 
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reversed without thereby destroying any v-structures reinforces the point that 
Bayesian Networks encode associational information. 
Although Bayesian Networks are the foundation of Pearl's account, they do not take 
on any lustre until Pearl provides them with a causal interpretation. After outlining 
the causal interpretation of Bayesian Networks Pearl introduces the causal Markov 
condition and thus moves on to the explication of functional causal models. I will not 
detail the causal interpretation of Bayesian Networks here. The appropriate place to 
do so is in section 2.0.3 where I discuss the account's informal semantics. The reason 
is straightforward; strictly speaking, the account is at this point un-interpreted 
formalism. The idea that Bayesian Networks may encode causal relations is read into 
their use as models. I discuss this issue at length in the following chapter. Suffice it to 
say that the general idea of interpreting Bayesian Networks as causal diagrams 
involves assuming each parent-child relationship in a Network to represent an 
'autonomous mechanism' whereby such mechanisms underpin or produce the 
conditional independence relations manifested by a network (Pearl 2000a: 22-23). 
Getting back to the formalism, Pearl defines a causal Bayesian Network in the 
following way: 
Causal Bayesian Networks66 
Let P(v) be a probability distribution on a set Vof variables, and let P/v) 
denote the distribution resulting from the intervention do(X = x) that sets a 
subset X of variables to constants x. Denote by P* the set of all interventional 
distributions Px(v), X c V, including P(v), which represents no intervention 
(i.e. X = 0). A DAG G is said to be a causal Bayesian network compatible 
with P* if and only if the following three conditions hold for every Px E P*: 
(i) Px(v) is Markov relative to G; 
66 The definition of causal Bayesian networks is from Pearl (2000a: 23). 
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(ii) Px(v,) = 1 for all v; E X whenever v, is consistent with X = x; 
(iii) Px(vi I pa)= P(v, I pa) for all V, ~ X whenever pai is consistent with 
X=x. 
Pearl contends that whenever a graph G is a causal Bayesian Network with respect to 
p* the following two properties of G can be proven: 
Property 1: 
For all i, 
P(v, I pa,)= Ppa, (v,) 
Property 2: 
For all i and for every subset S of variables disjoint of {"V,,PA,}: 
According to Pearl, Property 1 renders every parent set (PA,) exogenous relative to 
its child v;, thus ensuring that the conditional probability P(vi I pa,) coincides with 
the effect (on v;) of setting PAi to pa, by external control. Property 2 states that, 
once we control its direct causes PA,, no other interventions will affect the 
probability of V, (Pearl 2000a: 21-24). 
The next step Pearl takes in setting out the syntactic machinery of his account is to 
generalise the machinery of the causal Bayesian Network to 'functional causal 
models' and to introduce the 'causal Markov condition'. The value of generalising 
causal Bayesian Networks to functional causal models lies in the wider applicability 
of functional causal models to problems involving the quantification of causal 
relationships and the fact that functional causal models make the structural 
component of graphs more perspicuous. A functional causal model consists of some 
number of equations each possessing the following form: 
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X; = f 1(pa1,u,), i = l, ... ,n, 
where ' pa;' stands for specific values of variables from the set of variables judged to 
be 'immediate causes' of x,, and where' u,' stands for specific values from the set of 
the disturbances or errors that result from factors omitted from the model. Pearl calls 
a set of such functional equations (and interprets each equation to represent an 
'autonomous mechanism') a 'structural model'. When, in any given structural model, 
each equation (mechanism) determines the value of only one variable the model is 
referrec;l to as a 'structural causal model' and the sole variable is labelled the 
'dependent' variable (Pearl 2000a: 27). Pearl demonstrates that structural causal 
models are capable of representing the same structures of dependence and 
independence as Bayesian Networks. The first step in the demonstration is to 
introduce the notion of a 'causal diagram'. 
Given a structural causal model, its accompanying graph G, called a 'causal 
diagram', may be constructed by drawing an arrow from each member of the set PA; 
toward the set X,. If the causal diagram that results from this procedure is acyclic the 
corresponding structural causal model is labelled 'semi-Markovian' and each of the X 
variables will be uniquely determined by the U variables. If the disturbance terms of 
this acyclic causal diagram are mutually independent then the corresponding 
structural causal model is labelled 'Markovian' and the following theorem holds: 
Causal Markov Condition61 
Every Markovian causal model M induces a distribution P(x1, ••• ,xn) that 
satisfies the parental Markov condition relative to the causal diagram G 
associated with M; that is, each variable X, is independent on all its non-
descendants, given its parents PA, in G. 
67 The definition of the Causal Markov Condition is from Pearl (2000a: 30). 
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For Pearl the causal Markov condition shows that each child-parent relationship in a 
model can be read as both a deterministic function and a conditional probability. In 
fact Pearl takes the two to be equivalent in-as-much as the functional reading imposes 
equivalent independence constraints on the resulting distribution and lead to the same 
recursive decomposition that is characteristic of the probabilistic reading. The upshot 
then is that 
[ ... ]for every Bayesian network G characterised by a distribution P (as in 
(PF) above), there exists [at least one] functional model that generates a 
distribution identical to P. It follows that in all probabilistic applications of 
Bayesian networks[ ... ] [the investigator] can use an equivalent functional 
model [ ... ] and[ ... ] can regard functional models as just another way of 
encoding joint probability functions (Pearl 2000a: 30-31). 
The last major component of Pearl's syntactic machinery is the notational norms and 
inference rules that govern what and how interventions or surgeries may be 
performed upon models and what form the results of such interventions must take. 
Pearl labels his notation and inference rules the 'calculus of interventions' or the 'do-
calculus' for short68• The overall point of the calculus is to provide a (syntactic) 
method by which sentences concerning interventions may be transformed into 
equivalent observational sentences that pertain to post-intervention effects (Pearl 
2000a: 85). 
Define the simplest type of intervention as one in which a single variable X; is fixed 
to a constant value x,, which in the process destroys the pre-intervention influence of 
the old functional mechanism and installs a new functional mechanism in its place. 
Call such an intervention 'atomic'. In Pearl's words, an atomic intervention" ... 
amounts to lifting X; from the influence of the old functional mechanism X; = 
f ;(Pa;,u;) and placing it under the influence of a new mechanism that sets the value 
X; while keeping all other mechanisms unperturbed" (Pearl 2000a: 70). The notation 
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used to denote an atomic intervention is do(X, = x;), or do(x,) for short. Performing 
an intervention creates a new model (and graph) that represents what happens to the 
original model when it is manipulated. That is, 
[ ... ] when an intervention forces a subset X of variables to attain fixed values 
x, then a subset of equations is to be pruned from the [causal model], one for 
each member of X, thus defining a new distribution over the remaining 
variables that completely characterises the effect of the intervention (Pearl 
2000a: 70). 
When used to alter graphs the do-calculus obeys the following set of inference rules. 
Where X, Y, and Z are arbitrary disjoint sets in a DAG G, denote by 'Gx' the graph 
that results from deleting all arrows in G pointing to nodes in X. Denote by 'GK 'the 
graph that obtains by deleting all arrows that emerge from nodes in X. Denote by 
'Gx~' the graph that results from the deletion of both incoming and outgoing arrows 
in G. Finally the expression P(y I x,z) = P(y,z Ix) I P(z Ix) stands for the probability 
of Y = y given that X is held constant at x and that (under this condition) Z = z is 
observed (Pearl 2000a: 85). 
The basic inference rules of the do-calculus are encapsulated in the following three 
rules69: 
Inference Rules of do-calculus 
Let G be the directed acyclic graph associated with a causal model defined in 
(3.2), and let P(.) stand for the probability distribution induced by that model. 
For any disjoint subsets of variables X, Y, Z, and W, we have the following 
rules. 
68 This has been called the 'set(x) calculus' elsewhere. 
69 The proofs of these rules appear in Pearl (1995) and this presentation of the rules is from Pearl 
(2000a: 85-86). 
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Rule 1 (Insertion/deletion of observations): 
(3.31) P(y I x,z, w) = P(y I .X, w) if (YilZ IX, W)G-
x 
Rule 2 (Action/observation change): 
(3.32) P(y lx,z,w)=P(y lx,z,w) if (YilZ IX,W)G-x,, 
Rule 3 (Insertion/deletion of actions) 
(3.33) P(y I x,z, w) = P(y I .X, w) if (YilZ IX, W)G- __ where Z(W) is the set 
X Z(W) 
of Z-nodes that are not ancestors of any W-node in Gx 
Rule 1 reaffirms d-separation as a valid test for conditional independence in the 
distribution resulting from the intervention do(X = x), hence the graph Gx. This rule 
follows from the fact that deleting equations from the system does not introduce any 
dependencies among the remaining disturbance terms. Rule 2 provides a condition for 
an external intervention do(Z = z) to have the same effect on Y as the passive 
observation Z = z. The condition amounts to {Xu W} blocking all backdoor paths70 
from Z to Y (in Gx ), since Gx~ retains all (and only) such paths. 
Rule 3 provides conditions for introducing (or deleting) an external intervention 
do(Z = z) without affecting the probability of Y = y. The validity of this rule stems 
from simulating the intervention do(Z = z) by the deletion of all equations 
corresponding to the variables in Z (hence the graph Gxz )71 (Pearl 2000a: 85-86). 
2.0.2 Formal semantics 
70 Where a set of variables Z satisfies the 'backdoor' criterion relative to an ordered pair of variables 
(Xi, Xj) in a DAG G just in case: (i) no node in Z is a descendant of Xi, and (ii) Z blocks every path 
between Xi and Xj that contains an arrow into Xi. See Pearl (2000a: 79-80) for further details and 
discussion. 
71 Proofs of the inference rules of the do-calculus are presented in Pearl (1995). 
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The move from Bayesian Networks to structural causal models accompanied by the 
calculus of intervention culminates in the definition of 'causal model'. Once causal 
models and their properties are defined Pearl introduces a further two objects to 
complete the formal component of the account-the remainder being left to 
interpretation. The first of these objects is the 'causal world' and the second is the 
'causal theory'. The introduction of causal models, worlds and theories marks the 
shift in Pearl's account from syntax to semantics (Pearl 2000a: 202). I begin with 
Pearl's definition of causal models72• 
Causal Modez73 
A causal model is a triple (U, V,F), where: 
(i) U is a set of background or exogenous variables that are determined by 
factors outside the model. 
(ii) Vis a set of variables {y;, V2 ,. • ., Vn} labelled endogenous that are 
determined by variables in U u V. 
(iii) Fis a set of functions {f1, f 2, .. ., fn} such that each fi is a mapping from 
the respective domains of U u (V \ V;) to V; and such that the entire set F 
forms a mapping from U to V. That is, each f 1 defines the value of V. given 
the values of all other variables in U u V, and the entire set F has a unique 
solution V ( u). The members of the set of F can be represented by v; = 
f (pa;, u;), i = 1,. . ., n, where ' pa,' is any realisation of the unique minimal set 
of variables PA; in V\Vi sufficient for representing f;. Likewise, 'U; u U' 
72 It is important to note that Pearl's account was developed over a number of years in conjunction with 
broader developments in the fields of statistics and Artificial Intelligence and is still undergoing a 
process of extension and refinement. There are several variations of the account's notational and 
formal (syntactic) structure and formal semantics available in the literature. Even so, I take it that the 
key components of the semantics are the interpretation provided to the calculus of interventions and 
the evaluation of causal sentences. 
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stands for the unique minimal set of variables in U sufficient for representing 
f .14 I • 
All causal models can be associated with a graph, or what Pearl now calls a causal 
diagram, G(M) such that each node of the graph G corresponds with a variable of the 
model and the directed edges point from a member of the sets PA, and U, towards a 
member of v; (Pearl 2000a: 203). Once provided with a set of measurements and 
some theoretical context, the model is taken to represent a portion of reality. In other 
words, a causal model makes a number of positive assertions about the nature of 
some portion of the world where such assertions are true conditional on the efficacy 
of the model (Pearl 2000a: 202). This relationship holds also in the case of a 
'probabilistic causal model' except that in the case of the latter the correspondence 
relation is mediated via the investigator's beliefs about the likely truth of the model 
given available evidence. 
Probabilistic Causal Model 
A probabilistic causal model is a pair 
(M,P(u)), 
where Mis a causal model and P(u) is a probability function defined over the 
domain of U. 
The most important feature of causal models is their capacity to represent the effects 
of interventions. As with causal Bayesian Networks, interventions can involve a 
simple action such as setting a variable to a constant or some more elaborate action 
involving the quantification that a change in one variable has on another. 
73 The definition of causal model is from Pearl (2000a: 203). But see also the version presented below 
belonging to Menzies (2002), which is adapted from the account provided by Halpern and Pearl 
(2002a). 
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Interventions on causal models amount to transforming a pre-intervention model into 
a post-intervention model. Pearl calls post-intervention models 'submodels' and 
provides them with the following definition: 
Definition 7 .1.2 (Submodel) 75 
Let M be a causal model, X a set of variables in V, and x a particular 
realization of X. A submodel Mx of Mis the causal model 
Where 
What this means is that a submodel Fx is formed by deleting from a causal model F 
all functions F; that correspond to the set of variables X and replacing them with the 
set of constant functions X = x (Pearl 2000a: 204). This idea is encoded in the 
following definition: 
Definition 7.1.3 (Effect of Action)76 
Let M be a causal model, X be a set of variables in V, and x a parlicular 
realization of X. 
The effect of action do(X = x) on Mis given by the submodel M x. 
The idea here is that the transformation of a causal model M to a submodel M x 
results in an alteration of the content of the set of model functions F. The 
transformation opens the possibility of using the set of functions Fx to calculate the 
74 Pearl defines sufficiency in this setting in the following way. A set of variables X is sufficient for 
representing a function y = f(x, z) if f is 'trivial' in Z (that is, if for every x, z, z' we have f(x, z) = f(x, 
z'). 
75 This definition is from Pearl (2000a: 204). 
76 This definition is from Pearl (2000a: 204). 
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value that variables besides X assume in response to actions. Pearl labels this the 
'potential response' a variable Yhas to an intervention performed on another variable 
X: 
Defini~ion 7.1.4 (Potential Response)77 
Let X and Y be two subsets of variables in V. The potential response of Y to 
action do(X = x), denoted Yx (u), is the solution for Y of the set of equations 
Fx. 
Likewise, submodels may be used to determine the value that a variable would have 
obtained had a distinct variable of the model undergone a 'natural change' or been 
intentionally manipulated. Pearl sees such relations as counterfactual and thinks of 
interventions in such cases as hypothetical modifications of the model's equations 
aimed at simulating what would have happened in reality had nature's mechanisms 
been (minimally) altered (Pearl 2000a: 205). Such counterfactual phrases are defined 
as a form of potential response function: 
Definitjon 7 .1.5 (Counterfactual) 
Let X and Y be two subsets of variables in V. The counterfactual sentence 
'The value that Y would have obtained, had X been x' is interpreted as 
denoting the potential response Yx (u). 
In fact, Pearl believes that this definition provides the functions of a causal model 
with interventional sense precisely because v, = f, (pa;,u,) is just the value of V; in 
the submodel Mv \ v,. That is,"[ ... ] fi(pai'u,) stands for the potential response of V; 
when we hold constant all other variables in V' (Pearl 2000a: 205 original emphasis). 
Pearl provides the following procedure - summarised by a theorem - for calculating 
the values of counterfactual quantities in probabilistic causal models: 
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Theorem 7 .1. 778 
Given a model (M,P(u)), the conditional probability P(BA I e) of a 
counterfactual sentence 'If it were A, then B', given evidence e, can be 
evaluated using the following three steps. 
1. Abduction - Update P(u) by the evidence e to obtain P(u I e). 
2. Action - Modify M by the action do( A), where A is the antecedent of the 
counterfactual, to obtain the submodel MA . 
2. Prediction- Use the modified model (MA,P(u I e)) to compute the 
probability of B, the consequent of the counterfactual. 
The definition of causal models can be extended to include 'causal worlds' and 
'causal theories'. Pearl defines these objects as follows: 
Worlds and Theories79 
A causal world w is a pair (M,u), where Mis a causal model and u is a 
particular realisation of the background variables in U. A causal theory is a set 
of causal worlds. 
Pearl asserts that a world w can be viewed as a probabilistic model for which 
P( u) = 1. Causal theories are used in Pearl's account to characterise partial 
specifications of causal models. That is, for example, with models sharing the same 
causal diagram or models in which the 'f,' are linear with undetermined coefficients 
(Pearl 2000a: 205-207). However, even though Pearl compares his account of 
partially specified models with Lewis's account of possible worlds, Pearl does not 
77 This definition is from Pearl (2000a: 204). 
78 This theorem is from Pearl (2000a: 206). 
79 This definition is from Pearl (2000a: 207). 
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seem to be aware of Lewis's modal realist commitments80• The two accounts cannot, 
therefore, be straightforwardly equated. 
Given the specificity of the model, truth-values may be assigned to sentences that 
take, or may be transformed into those of the following three generic forms: 
Predictions - "The value of y would be n, given we know x." 
Interventions - "The value of y would be n if we set the value of x ton." 
Counteifactuals - "The value of y would have been n if the value of x was n, 
even given that the actual value of y is n' and x is n"." 
According to Pearl (2000a), providing truth-values to each of these three generic 
sentences requires an increase in the level of specific information needed to arrive at 
a decision as one moves from predictive sentences through to counterfactual 
sentences. Pearl comments that evaluating predictive sentences is the simplest of the 
three tasks because it requires only the specification of a joint probability function. 
Interventions are more involved since they require the specification of a joint 
probability function and sufficient information about the causal structure of the 
phenomena under investigation. Counterfactuals are more labour intensive again 
since their evaluation requires some information concerning the functional 
relationships between variables if not also infonnation pertaining to the distribution 
of the omitted factors that make up the model (Pearl 2000a: 38). Sentences taking one 
or another of these forms are considered to be generic in the sense that the forms offer 
a 'well-formed' sentential vehicle with which to pose questions to a given model. All 
that is required to complete any one of these sentence forms is to substitute the 
sentence's variables for values. Then, if the resulting sentence follows from a model 
of interest that sentence is true. In effect, a causal model entails the truth of a sentence 
just in case that sentence is either trivially true given the model, or the sentence can 
serve as the conclusion of a valid argument of which the (sub-)model serves as a set 
80 This may not affect the comparison however, since Lewis also thought that the relevant 
counterfactual truths about the actual world are true solely in virtue of features of this world. See 
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of premises, or the sentence may be deduced from a model via the appropriate 
inferences rules81 • The idea is extended to causal quantities through the specification 
of criteria for identifiability82• 
2.0.3 Informal Semantics 
As one would expect, the formal semantics is accompanied by an informal 
treatment83 • In a general sense an informal treatment of the formal semantics is 
necessary so as to add meaning to the (principle terms of the) latter since, without an 
informal treatment, the formal semantics remains un-interpreted. The trouble with 
leaving the semantics un-interpreted in this instance is that the formal semantics does 
not employ the terms cause, effect, truth and so forth in a meaningful way. Left in 
such as state the formal semantics is not a causal semantics and the models consistent 
with the semantics do not say anything about causal relationships84• The principal 
goal of the informal semantics is in this instance to provide 'X is the cause of Y' and 
other generic expressions of the formal semantics with a meaningful or intended 
interpretation given the context within which such sentences appear'85• Furthermore, 
since the notion of truth that Pearl uses attaches to models, which are intended to be 
models of reality, that notion will in turn depend for its meaning on what Pearl has to 
say about how models represent reality. It is interesting to note that a large portion of 
Pearl (2000a) is spent interpreting the account's semantics and yet one cannot readily 
locate the kernel of the account86• Here I set out only part of what I take to be the 
Armstrong (1999b) for discussion. 
81 Completeness proofs are outlined in Pearl (2000a: 230-231). 
82 The notion of identifiability for such models involves determining the quantitative effect one 
variable of a model has on another. See Pearl (2000a: 91-96) for discussion. I examine related issues in 
section 3.4 of the following chapter. 
83 Principally canvassed in Section 7.2 p 215. 
84 For details of the difference between a formal and an informal semantics see for instance Copeland 
(1983), Plantinga (1974) and Haack (1978: 188-190). 
85Berkovitz (2002) offers an argument to this effect. I outline his argument in the following chapter. 
86 Pearl is criticised on this point by several philosophers who assert that Pearl (2000a) says little about 
what causality is. I take this issue up in detail in chapter 3. But, see Hitchcock's comments in his 
(2001). 
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informal interpretation before taking up further issues for discussion in later sections 
as the need arises. The most important components of the informal account to be 
placed on the table at this point are, to my mind, Pearl's interpretation of his 
counterfactual semantics; his account of types versus token causes; and of the 
mechanisms that underlie a causal model's functions. The sense Pearl (2000a) 
provides to each of these is somewhat intertwined. I begin with Pearl's interpretation 
of functions and follow with mechanisms and close with Pearl's interpretation of type 
and token causes. 
It is clear from the discussion above that Pearl (2000a) thinks mechanisms should be 
equated with a specific form of mathematical function. What is not obvious at first 
glance is how this function is to be understood. Two questions need to be decided. 
First, what is the mathematical form of the function? Second, what interpretation does 
Pearl provide such forms? Both questions can be addressed together. 
At the outset Pearl asks that the reader take note of the difference between the use of 
the '=' sign to represent equality in algebraic systems and its meaning within Pearl's 
formalism. Pearl states that in his formalism the '=' acts like an assignment operator 
in the sense that the variable appearing on its l.h.s. is assigned a value according to 
the solution of the terms appearing on the '=' sign's r.h.s. but not vice versa. There is 
a related difference to be noted with the interpretation of each equation. In Pearl's 
words: 
A set of mechanisms, each represented by an equation, is not equivalent to the 
set of algebraic equations that can be assembled from those mechanisms. 
Mathematically, the latter is defined as one set of n equations, whereas the 
former is defined as n separate sets, each containing one equation. These are 
two distinct mathematical objects that admit two distinct types of solution-
preserving operations. The calculus of causality deals with the dynamics of 
such modular systems of equations, whereas the addition and deletion of 
equations represent interventions (Pearl 2002b: 212 original emphasis). 
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The latter portion of this comment implicates the distinction Pearl draws between 
'seeing' and 'doing' as a component in the interpretation of model'functions. The 
distinction is relevant in the sense that the notion of 'doing' coincides with the 
'equation wipe-out' interpretation of intervention and an intervention on a variable 
within a causal model is represented as the deletion of one equation and its 
replacement with another. That is, interventions 'wipe-out' an equation and in so 
doing place some relevant variable under the influence of a new function. How 
interventions may be performed is governed by the rules of the do-calculus. The 
reason that such a 'calculus of interventions' is necessary, Pearl asserts, is that 
interventions cannot be successfully expressed using the probability calculus alone. 
Probability theory is inadequate, according to Pearl, because: 
... probability theory deals with beliefs about an uncertain, yet static world, 
while causality deals with changes that occur in the world itself. Causality 
deals with how probability functions change in response to new conditions 
and interventions that originate from outside the probability space, while 
probability theory, even when given a fully specified joint density function on 
all variables in the space, cannot tell us how that function would change under 
external interventions. Thus, "doing" is not reducible to "seeing", and there is 
no point trying to fuse the two together. [ ... ]The additional information 
needed for making [predictions about change] is analogous to the causal 
information (about invariant mechanisms) that the do calculus extracts from a 
directed acyclic graph (DAG) (2002a: 208)87 • 
In tum notions of intervention and of 'doing' are underpinned by the notion of 
'modularity'. Modularity is, for Pearl, an assumption pertaining to mechanisms such 
that each parent-child relationship represented by a graph may be changed without 
87 This quote illustrates well Pearl's strong commitment to a subjective interpretation of probability. It 
almost goes without saying that interpretations of probability are always contentious in one way or 
another. Many scientists trained to think of probabilities as frequencies or one sort or another will find 
Pearl's interpretation especially contentious. 
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thereby affecting changes to any other such relationships in the graph. This means 
that the overall effect of an intervention can be predicted by changing the relevant 
equations in a model and then using the modified model to compute the state of the 
new-post-intervention-model that results (typically a probability function) (Pearl 
2000 p 32)88• These views mark a break with the common or modem interpretation of 
model structure found in, for example, Duncan (1975), Kline (1998), Blalock (1985) 
and Bollen (1989). Pearl intends to re-capture the interpretation given to model 
structure by Wright (1921), Haavelmo (1943) and Koopmans (1950, 1985). What the 
functions of Pearl's formalism do is relate the values of the set of variables, which are 
'parents' of a variable x, with a proportion that affects x from outside the model and 
equates the result with the value of x. In other words, x' s value is a function of x' s 
'direct causes' and the invariant properties summarised by a model's u's. Pearl offers 
the following insight into how these functions are to be interpreted: 
[ ... ]while I was working with Tom Verma on "A theory of Inferred 
Causation" [we] played around with the possibility of replacing the parents-
child relationship P(x; I pa,) with its functional counterpart x, = f, (pa,,u,) 
and, suddenly, everything began to fall into place: we finally had a 
mathematical object to which we could attribute familiar properties of 
physical mechanisms instead of those slippery epistemic probabilities 
P(x1 I pa1) with which we had been working so long in the study of Bayesian 
Networks (Pearl 2000a: 104). 
The specific mathematical form of such functions depends upon the application to 
which the model is put since the nature of the variables and the expression afforded to 
variables in the model varies from application to application. In models of the social 
and behavioural sciences, for instance, the functions are assumed to be linear. Even 
so, it is generally accepted since Spirtes (1994) that the form of the functions of a 
causal model is arbitrary and that it is more important to recognise the independence 
88 However, it is important to note that this works at the level of the model in contrast to what is being 
modelled. It is then a conceptual definition and not a claim about model validity or verification. See 
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of the background variables associated with each equation of the model. (Scheines 
1997: 192; Pearl 2000: 69)89• 
I now move on to the details of Pearl's interpretation of counterfactuals. The reader 
will recall from above that Pearl ties the syntactic account of interventions to 
counterfactuals in the formal semantics. Pearl remarks that his semantics for 
counterfactuals is closely related to those set out in Lewis (1973a, 1973b, 1979). 
Pearl's interpretation of counterfactuals is, however, considerably different. As this is 
so, a brief introduction to the nature of counterfactual conditionals is in order. 
'Counterfactuals' can be thought of as a species of conditional. In the context of 
natural language utterances, a conditional utterance, broadly construed is one 
containing an 'if' clause such as 'If Bob is at the shop, Wendy is at the shop'. A 
counterfactual conditional utterance can then (though not universally) be heard as a 
conditional utterance in the subjunctive mood. An example is the following: 'If Bob 
was at the shop, Wendy would have been at the shop.' There are numerous theories 
of conditionals. Some draw an explicit distinction between counterfactual 
conditionals and other conditional utterances. I have introduced counterfactuals by 
way of utterances only to flag the fact that the following discussion of Pearl's view of 
counterfactuals takes the expressions and inferences of scientists as its starting point. 
It is far too great a project to attempt a summary of available theories of conditional 
utterances here. Suffice it to say that debate continues about the correct way to 
analyse both conditional and counterfactual utterances. By and large, philosophers' 
interest in conditionals and counterfactuals has tended to be with semantic properties. 
In tum, the interest in semantic properties has tended to centre on investigating the 
truth conditions for conditionals and counterfactuals90• 
further discussion in chapter 3 below. 
89 See also the discussion of identifying causal effects in Pearl (2000a: 92-93). 
90 See for instance Edgington (1995), Adams (1975), Lycan (2001), Lewis (1973b), Jackson (1979, 
1991), Jeffrey (1964), Horwich (1990), Kvart (1986) Barker (1995). Though some, such as Adams, 
deny that (indicative) conditionals have truth conditions. 
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Counterfactuals have also been implicated in the task of providing an account of 
causation. A basic version of a counterfactual analysis of causation takes the 
following form: 
Where C is the putative cause and E the effect, the proposition 'C causes E' is 
true if and only if it is true that 'If C had not occurred then E would not have 
occurred' 91 • 
The broad idea behind a counterfactual analysis of causation is that (the truth 
conditions of) causal claims are reducible to counterfactual claims. It is common 
therefore to see the task of detailing a counterfactual account of causation to be that 
of showing all (relevant) causal utterances (or propositions) to be counterfactual 
utterances (or propositions). Here it is important to note the way in which an analysis 
of counterfactual utterances differs from an analysis of counterfactual propositions. 
The main difference between the two is that the former focuses on actual linguistic 
practices of language users as its object of study whilst the latter focuses on 
accounting for the truth-conditions of propositions. The two are, however, obviously 
related. Pearl, for example, briefly discusses the meaningfulness of counterfactual 
utterances commonly made by scientists before going on to assimilate such utterances 
under the umbrella of a small set of 'generic' counterfactual sentences. Pearl then 
proceeds to account for the truth-conditions of such sentences. Suffice it to say that, 
in the present context, it is typically the latter task that attracts the most attention. 
It is standard to argue that providing truth conditions for counterf actuals requires one 
to consider states of affairs that do not actually transpire. That is, to consider what 
'would occur' or 'would have occurred' but in actuality does not. Many have 
objected to counterfactuals on the grounds that what does not occur cannot be 
observed and since counterfactuals, by definition, do not occur and so cannot be 
observed, counterfactuals are not verifiable. The objection amounts to the claim that 
91 Throughout the literature C and E have been rendered as either event types or singular events. 
Pearl's account of type and token causes is at variance with the literature on this point. 
73 
counterfactual propositions have no empirical content and so cannot be 'tested' or 
empirically verified. 
For instance, Dawid (2000) asserts in the spirit of Popper that 
[ ... ]the meaningfulness of a purportedly scientific theory, proposition, 
quantity, or concept is related to the implications it has for what is or could be 
observed, and, in particular, to the extent to which it is possible to conceive of 
data that would be affected by the truth of the proposition or the value of the 
quantity. When this is the case, assertions are empirically refutable and are 
considered 'scientific.' When this is not so, they may be branded 
'metaphysical.' I argue that counterfactual theories are essentially 
metaphysical (Dawid 2000: 408)92• 
It is against this sort of view of counterfactuals that Pearl (2000) is reacting. 
According to Pearl (2000a) counterfactuals do not stand contrary to fact and can be 
empirically verified93• To illustrate its shortcomings Pearl (2000a) compares 
counterfactual propositions to scientifically accepted types of predictive propositions 
that are consistent with empirical laws. Pearl accepts that any number of propositions 
that make a prediction about the future states of a law governed system may be 
assessed for truth or falsity according to the laws that govern that system and 
measurements taken on the states of the system. But, in line with sentiments 
expressed by Dawid (2000) Pearl further accepts there is a prima facie problem with 
assessing counterfactuals precisely because such propositions appear to speculate 
about events that have not and could not have occurred and that consequently do not 
appear open to measurement let alone evaluation in the actual world (Pearl 2000a: 
92 Dawid (2000) does admit the use of counterfactuals for the purposes of causal modelling but denies 
that any inferences may be drawn from the counterfactual components of such models. See Dawid 
(2000: 409, 415-417) for discussion. 
93 I note in passing that when making their respective arguments regarding verification and falsification 
neither party appears aware of issues regarding confirmational holism discussed by Duhem (1954), 
Quine (1980, 1995) and Lakatos (1970). 
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217-218). But according to Pearl, in contrast with Dawid (2000), the problem is only 
apparent. 
Pearl (2000a) sidesteps the difficulty of assessing counterfactuals by interpreting the 
counterfactual form as shorthand for a predictive form of conditional proposition. The 
key difference between the two is, according to Pearl, that the factual portion of the 
counterfactual form makes superfluous many specifications that are either left open 
or covered by a ceteris paribus clause in the predictive form. Hence, 
... a counterfactual statement might well be interpreted as conveying a set of 
predictions under a well-defined set of conditions - those prevailing in the 
factual portion of the statement (Pearl 2000a: 219). 
Since, for Pearl, counterfactual statements are a form of prediction, counterfactuals 
may be evaluated for truth and falsity in the same fashion as are predictions provided 
the following clause is respected. To successfully carry out an evaluation of a 
counterfactual Pearl (2000a) believes that the mechanisms and the boundary 
conditions of the model to which the counterfactual belongs must remain invariant. In 
Pearl's words: 
Cast in the language of structural models, the [mechanisms] correspond to the 
equations {f} and the boundary conditions correspond to the state of the 
background variables U. Thus, a precondition for the validity of predictive 
interpretation of a counterfactual statement is the assumption that U will not 
change when our predictive claim is to be applied or tested (Pearl 2000a: 
219)94• 
What to make of this view of counterfactuals? It is noteworthy that Pearl (2000a) 
does not draw any explicit distinction between so-called 'might', and 'would' 
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counterfactuals. In fact, Pearl (2000a) contains no discussion of different 
counterfactual (or conditional) moods whatever. Nor does Pearl discuss the syntactic 
structure of counterfactuals. This is surprising given Pearl's assertions about the 
content of counterfactual utterances, and especially so when the immediate context of 
such utterances is communication between scientists when reasoning about the causal 
relationships of some specific causal systems. It is also noteworthy that Pearl's 
standard for testability is not obviously applicable to counterfactuals that have a 
probabilistic component. In fact, Pearl's view of counterfactuals easily leads one to 
confusion in cases where Pearl appears to offer both conditional and subjunctive 
paraphrases of the same 'counterfactual' sentence95 • 
The latter point is revealing. Pearl's assertion that counterfactuals may be interpreted 
as a set of predictions indicates that Pearl takes counterfactual conditionals to be of 
the same species as the so-called 'forward looking' indicative conditionals96• The key 
to the assimilation is clear from Pearl's assertion that predictive (forward looking 
indicatives) and counterfactual conditionals share a set of conditions which, when it 
can be ascertained that such conditions are invariant, guarantee that consequent 
follows from antecedent97• 
A closer look at how Pearl's account of counterfactuals differs from the account 
offered by Lewis is also instructive. There have been several attempts to specify the 
semantics of natural language counterfactual utterances. One prominent account is 
the so-called Stalnaker-Lewis account. It is generally assumed that natural language 
counterfactuals have the same syntactic structure as common conditional utterances98 • 
As I mentioned above, the distinguishing feature of counterfactual conditionals is that 
94 Note that Pearl says 'on the assumption' and not 'with the knowledge or belief that' when speaking 
of invariance. This suggests that Pearl is thinking of invariance as an objective property of the system 
under investigation. 
95 See, for instance the comments and paraphrasing of such 'counterfactuals' by Pearl (2000a: 208). 
96 See Gibbard (1981) for comment on forward looking indicative conditionals and Lycan (2001) for 
criticism of the indicative/subjunctive classification of conditionals. 
97 It is not clear whether Pearl takes all counterfactuals in the context of scientific practice to be 
translatable into such indicative conditionals (though I suspect this to be the case). 
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the antecedent of the conditional is made true relative to some state or other that is 
not necessarily the one witnessed or expected. On the Stalnaker-Lewis account 
sorting out how to assign truth-values to such apparently non-actual states or events 
calls for the comparison of propositions across some number of possible worlds99• To 
carry out the comparison requires evaluating the truth or falsity of counterfactual 
conditionals according to a suitable ordering relation across a class of possible 
worlds. Lewis's specification of an ordering relation takes the following form: 
<I> 0--7 \JI is true at a world i (according to a system of spheres S) if and only 
if: 
1. no <!>-world belongs to any sphere Sin S, or 
2. some sphere Sin S contains at least one <!>-world, and <P :::> 1f1 holds at every 
world in s100• 
where '<I> 0--7 \JI' represents the counterfactual conditional and where a sphere is 
made up of some number of possible worlds that are equally similar to the world at 
the centre of a system of spheres such that the larger the sphere the less similar are its 
worlds to the centring world 101 • In effect, Lewis's account of counterfactual 
conditionals offers a procedure whereby counterfactuals can be ranked according to 
how similar they are to what is true of some world at the centre of a system of spheres 
of increasingly different possible worlds. Hence, counterfactuals such as 'If P were 
the case then Q would be the case' are true of a possible world W iff there is some 
possible world W*, in which P and Q are true, and W* is closer to W than any world 
where P is true and Q is false102• Similarly, counterfactuals such as 'If P were the case 
then Q might be the case' are true in a possible world W iff there is some possible 
98 Though some think this may turn out to be a costly oversight. See, for instance, Lycan (2001) and 
Barker (1991). 
99 Where, for Lewis, possible worlds exist as concrete but non-actual entities. 
100 Reproduced from Tooley (2003: 371). See also Lewis (1973b: 16) and Lewis (1973a). 
101 Though Lewis and Stalnaker disagree over the nature of a similarity measure with a centring 
principle. 
102 Or where there is no world in which P is true. 
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world W*, in which P and Q are true, and W* is closer to W than at least one world 
where P is true and Q is false103 (Tooley 2003: 372). 
Pearl agrees that a measure of similarity amongst possible worlds is at the heart of 
Lewis's account, but is quick to mention his reservations as to whether a similarity 
measure of inter-world distances is the correct measure for evaluating counterfactuals 
(Pearl 2000a: 239). Pearl asserts that: 
In contrast with Lewis's theory, counterfactuals [on Pearl's interpretation] are 
not based on an abstract notion of similarity among hypothetical worlds; 
instead, they rest directly on the mechanisms that produce those worlds and 
on the invariant properties of those mechanisms (Pearl 2000a: 239)104• 
But, even so, Pearl later establishes via axomatic comparison that the formal 
component of his account is equivalent to Lewis's. The salient point is Pearl 
apparently agrees with Lewis on what the correct logic for reasoning with 
counterfactuals is but disagrees with Lewis on the correct interpretation of that 
logic105• Consequently, Pearl rejects Lewis's similarity measure and replaces it with a 
distance measure according to which the distance between two worlds d(w,w') is the 
minimal number of local interventions (governed by the do-calculus) required to 
transform one world into the other (Pearl 2000a: 241). Modality is therefore defined 
relative to a causal model (or world)106• No wonder then that Pearl thinks the term 
'counterfactual' is a misnomer. In effect Pearl is reading counterfactuals as a type of 
103 I leave aside the various amendments Lewis made to this account in his attempt to overcome its 
shortcomings. Nothing hangs on them for purposes of the present discussion. 
104 Note that Pearl considers Lewis to have adopted a 'hypothetical' view of possible worlds rather than 
the modal realist position Lewis actually held. This travels some way towards explaining why Pearl 
believes his account of counterfactuals does not differ greatly from Lewis's. Note also that Pearl 
suspects Lewis's account of counterfactual causation is circular since the similarity measure requires 
reference to causal laws. The claim that similarity judgements rest on causal judgements has been 
argued by Kitcher (1989). 
105 Though, I note that there are a number of questions left hanging about the details of this conditional 
logic. For instance, what theorems are valid in this logic and how exactly one is to paraphrase 'causal 
queries' into the formulae of this logic. For discussion of such issues see Priest (2001 ), Hopkins and 
Pearl (2003) and Meheus (2002) especially the article by Nickles. 
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indicative conditional sentence excepting that, where indicative conditional sentences 
in the present context are always accompanied by a ceteris paribus condition, the 
same conditionals in counterfactual form are not. That is, Pearl thinks of conditional 
sentences as enthymemes107• When such sentences are evaluated in the context of a 
causal model many of the missing details that are intended to attach to the 
antecedents of such (predictive) conditionals, but that remain obscure in the standard 
presentation, are made explicit. For Pearl the counterfactuals consistent with a causal 
model therefore are conditional sentences whose logical form makes explicit what 
would otherwise remain enthymematic. The important point to note is that the nature 
of counterfactuals in Pearl's account is tied to the evaluation of predictions under 
(simulated) experimental conditions and, thus, that Pearl assimilates counterfactuals 
to a species of indicative conditionals. On reflection of this fact Pearl may have been 
better to devise an alternative label for the generic counterfactual form that plays a 
central role in his semantics for causal models. Calling such conditionals 'predictive 
hypotheticals' would be more in keeping with the spirit of the account especially in 
light of the fact that the truth-conditions of such sentences are relativised to models 
and not to either the utterances of scientists or the truth-conditions of such utterances. 
As is the case with Pearl's conception of counterfactuals, Pearl's conception of type 
and token causes is somewhat unconventional. It is important to discuss Pearl's view 
of types and tokens in order to provide some specification of the information 
expressed by a causal model. 
As I note above, one important component of causal models is the representation of 
mechanisms by functions. According to Pearl these functions supply information at 
both the type and the token level: 
These functions are type-level in the sense of representing generic, 
counterfactual relationships among variables that are applicable to every 
106 And, hence, cannot straightforwardly be seen to pertain to concrete facts since the relation between 
models and reality is as yet undefined. 
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hypothetical scenario, not just the ones that were realised. At the same time, 
any specific instantiation of those relationships represents a token-level claim 
(Pearl 2000a: 310). 
That is, any given set of functions can be taken to represent a type of causal 
scenario-one where the variables are related according to the specification of the set 
of functions-and the specification of that scenario with actual values of each of the 
variables would represent a token of that scenario type. What differentiates one 
scenario from another is the level of detail available to the specification of the 
background variables U. A full specification of U turns a causal model into a causal 
world and allows causal claims to be assessed at the token level. However, for Pearl it 
is more often the case that the investigator does not 
... possess the detailed knowledge necessary for specifying a single world 
U = u, and [uses] a probability P(u) to summarise [their] ignorance of those 
details. This takes [the investigator] to the level of probabilistic causal models 
(M,P(u)). Causal claims made on the basis of such models, with no reference 
to the actual scenario, would be classified as type-level claims (Pearl 2000a: 
310). 
But, often the investigator will possess some information relevant to the scenario 
under study. Pearl (2000a) calls this information evidence and asserts that it may be 
used to update P(u) into P(u I e) such that causal claims derived from the model 
(M,P(u I e)) represent token claims of varying degrees, depending on the specificity 
of the evidence. Hence, on Pearl's account the difference between type and token 
causal claims is a matter of degrees such that the higher the level of specific evidence 
available to the investigator the closer the investigator comes to making token claims 
and hence statements about actual causes (Pearl 2000a: 311). Pearl defines an actual 
cause in the following way: 
107 For a discussion of enthymemes relevant to the present issues see Priest (2001: 77). 
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Actual Cause: 
X = x is an actual cause of <p in (M, u) if the following three conditions hold: 
(ACl) (M,u) semantically entails (X = x) A <p. That is, both X = x and <pare 
true in the actual world. 
(AC2) There exists a partition (Z, W) of V with X c Z and some setting 
(x', w') of the variables in (X, W) such that if (M,u) semantically entails 
Z = z* for Z E Z then 
(a) (M,u) semantically entails [x ~ x',W ~ w']-.,cp. In words, 
changing (X,W) from (x,w) to (x',w') changes <p from true to false, 
(b) (M,u) semantically entails [x ~ x,w ~ w',z' ~ z* ]cp for an 
subsets Z' of Z . In words, setting W to w' should have no effect on 
<p as long as X is kept at its current value x , even if all the variables 
in an arbitrary set of Z are set to their original values in the context u. 
- -(AC3) X is minimal; no subset of X satisfies conditions (ACl) and (AC2). 
Minimality ensures that only those elements of the conjunction X = x that are 
essential for changing <pin (AC2)(a) are considered part of the cause; 
inessential elements are pruned Halpern and Pearl 2001a). 
Where, given a signature S = (U, V, R) 108, a formula of the form X = x, for X E V and 
x E R(X), is called a primitive event. And a basic causal formula (over S) is one of 
the form [y; ~ Y1>···•yk ~ yk]cp where <p is a Boolean combination of primitive 
events, Yi, ... ,yk, X are variables in V, with Yi, ... ,yk are distinct, x E R(X), and 
108 A signature Sis a tuple (U, V, R), where U is a finite set of exogenous variables, Vis a finite set of 
endogenous variables, and R associates with every variable Y E U u Va nonempty set R(Y) of 
possible values for Y (the set of values over which Y ranges). A causal model over a signature then is a 
tuple M = (S, F), where F associates with each variable X E Va function denoted Fx such that Fx 
tells us the value of X given the values of all the other variables in U u V. 
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y, e R(Y;). And where such a formula is abbreviated as [ Y ~ ji] cp. A causal formula 
is a Boolean combination of basic causal formulas 109• Given this syntax, a causal 
formula \jf is true or false in a causal model given a context. Pearl writes (M,u) 
semantically entails \jf if \jf is true in a causal model M given a context u 110• (M,u) 
semantically entails [ Y ~ y] ( X = x) if the variable X has the value x in the solution 
to the equations in M y,,_y in context u. And (M, u) semantically entails [ Y ~ ji] cp for 
any arbitrary Boolean combination cp of formulas of the form X = x is defined 
similarly Halpern and Pearl 200la). The general idea, as Hopkins and Pearl (2003) 
put it, is that x is an actual cause of y just when x and y are the actual values of X and 
Y (ACI) and under a specific counterfactual contingency w, the value of Y is 
dependent on X in such a way that setting X to its actual value ensures that Y remains 
at its actual value even in the case that all other variables in the model are fixed at 
their actual values (AC2), so long as the set of actual values of X have no values that 
fail to sustain the effect (AC3)m. 
The following version of the desert traveller scenario illustrates well the move from 
general to actual causal claims. Consider the following model constructed by an 
investigator who has undertaken to uncover what caused the death of a desert 
traveller. All the investigator knows of the circumstances surrounding the travellers 
death is that two assassins were dispatched, each of whom claim to have caused the 
travellers death; one by shooting a hole in the travellers canteen and the other by 
poisoning the travellers canteen with cyanide. The investigator does not know the 
results of an autopsy later carried out on the tr~veller nor whether the traveller 
managed to drink from the canteen before it was emptied. The investigator, reasoning 
that the traveller died from either dehydration or cyanide poisoning conceives the 
following model consisting of six variables; y =desert traveller's death, D = 
IO!I For further discussion and interpretation of actual causality see Halpern and Pearl (2001a) and 
chapter 10 of Pearl (2000a). 
110 That is, a context is a specific setting of variables in U to some value u. 
111 For further discussion of Pearl's definition of actual causality, especially condition (AC2)(b) see 
Menzies (2002), Halpern and Pearl (2001a), Hopkins and Pearl (2003). 
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dehydration, C = cyanide intake, X = assassin 1' s attempt to shoot the traveller's 
canteen, P = assassin 2' s attempt to poison the traveller's canteen, u = the time 
elapsed before the traveller's first drink from the canteen112• The value of y is known 
to be true as is the value of X and P respectively. The value of u is not known by the 
investigator and so has to be estimated. For Pearl this amounts to summarising the 
investigator's ignorance of u by P(u). The model has the following functions: 
c = p(u'vx') 
d=x(uvp') 
y=cvd 
The investigator must then calculate the respective probabilities that either one of c or 
d was the cause of the traveller's death by elaborating on the effect that different 
values of u have on the function of y = c v d. The state u = 1 denotes the event that 
the traveller did not reach for a drink before assassin 1 holed the traveller's canteen. 
Given this setting the investigator notes the model's functions as: 
c=x', 
d=x, 
y=d, 
and proceeds to test whether x or p was the cause of y. In the instance the model 
identifies assassin 1 's actions as the actual cause of the traveller's death. It is easy to 
see that in the event that the traveller had a drink before assassin 1 had time to shoot 
the canteen (i.e. u = 0), the model identifies the actions of assassin 2 as the actual 
cause of the traveller's death. As Pearl notes, without knowledge of which state 
actually prevailed, the investigator must settle for the probability that x caused y. The 
example illustrates how the investigator is able to reason about the general tendency 
of x to cause y in the given scenario and that the move towards the identification of 
the actual cause of y is limited by the total evidence available (Pearl 2000a: 310). 
112 Plus two distinct variables that summarise the causes behind each assassin's actions. 
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In ending the outline of Pearl's account I admit to neglecting a number of details. 
Some of the details I consider important but that remain outstanding include: the 
nature of the relation between mechanisms and laws; the relation between models and 
reality; the distinction between statistical and causal analysis; and the role that 
pragmatic issues play in model construction. There are two main reasons for not 
addressing such details here. First, each of these issues are, I think, far from clear as 
they are presented in Pearl (2000a) and as such require a good deal of space to 
adequately address and, second, each of these issues deserve a lengthy independent 
treatment. Unfortunately, to do justice to each is well beyond the present forum. 
However, one issue cannot go by without investigation. The issue involves the 
distinction Pearl (2000a) draws between various statistical and causal notions. I deal 
with this in the following section. 
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2.1 The Poverty of Statistics 
In this section I present and discuss a collection of Pearl's views on the boundary 
between statistical modelling and causal modelling. I set these views out more or less 
as they are found in Pearl (2000a) except for the fact that here they are collected 
together whereas there they are scattered throughout the book. The reason for 
including this section is to add further crucial detail beyond that which I have already 
afforded to Pearl's theory of causality before I offer my interpretation of the theory in 
the following chapter. Important detail would be missing were an interpretation to 
proceed without taking note of Pearl's views on the boundary between 'the statistical' 
and 'the causal.' 
The first issue to discuss involves Pearl's views on the nature of probability and his 
commitments to Bayesian statistics. Pearl (2000a) presents his account from a 
Bayesian perspective and so treats probabilities as degrees of rational belief 
expressible as propositions 113• For the sake of simplicity Pearl assumes there is no 
relevant difference between sentential propositions and the 'events' denoted by 
propositions. Consequently Pearl has no truck with evaluating probabilistic 
statements as either true or false. Pearl's commitment to a subjective Bayesian 
interpretation of probability extends also toward Bayesian statistical methods. 
As I have mentioned above, the basic expressions in the Bayesian canon are 
statements about conditional probabilities. Typically, the specification of a 
conditional probability statement is interpreted as the degree of belief in some event 
A under the assumption that another distinct event B is known with certainty. 
Bayesians think that this value may in tum provide guidance in assigning degrees of 
belief to probability statements that involve joint events, or that may be independent, 
or that may be conditionally independent. In short, conditional probability statements 
113 Pearl's account is primarily set out for systems comprising a finite number of discrete variables. The 
account may be extended to handle continuous variables with the addition of the appropriate 
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are taken by Bayesians to be more fundamental than probability statements 
concerning joint events, since, Bayesians argue, conditional relationships are more 
compatible with the organization of human knowledge (Pearl 2000a: 3). 
A related characteristic of Bayesian methods concerns the status of Bayes' inversion 
formula: 
P(H I e) = P(e I H) P(H) I P(e). 
Bayesians take the inversion formula to state that the belief accorded to a hypothesis 
H upon obtaining evidence (e) is the result of multiplying one's previous belief or 
prior probability P(H) by the likelihood or posterior probability P(e I H) that such 
evidence will appear if the hypothesis His true. As Pearl states; 
The Bayesian subjectivist regards the inversion formula as a normative rule 
for updating beliefs in response to evidence. In other words, although 
conditional probabilities can be viewed as purely mathematical constructs, the 
Bayes adherent views them as primitives of the language and as faithful 
translations of the English expression' ... , given that I know A' (Pearl 2000a: 
5-6). 
However, Pearl (200la) is at pains to qualify his commitment to Bayesian principles. 
Pearl holds the following three assertions to express several core principles of 
Bayesian statistics: 
(i) When reasoning about the world one cannot do so in ignorance of one's 
own knowledge of the world. 
(ii) It is natural and useful to cast what we know about the world in the 
language of probabilities. 
mathematical machinery. Pearl adheres to the Kolmogorov axiomatization of the probability calculus 
(Pearl 2000a: 2-3). 
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(iii) If our subjective probabilities are erroneous, their impact will get washed-
out in due time as the number of observations increases114• 
As is clear from the prior points Pearl accepts (i).But Pearl expresses reservations 
about (ii) due principally to the fact that Pearl thinks there is a point at which 
reasoning about the world with probabilities and evidence alone becomes 
unproductive. Pearl doubts (ii) because Pearl believes causality is different (though 
not unrelated) in formality and subject matter to probability and that causality is the 
more fundamental notion of the two. I discuss this further directly. In tum, the 
reasons behind Pearl's reservations about (ii) hold negative consequences for the 
prospect of accepting (iii). Pearl holds that (iii) is false. One reason given by Pearl is 
that one cannot expect prior probabilities and evidence about a system to lead to 
correct estimates and sound inferences of and from the systems parameters unless one 
has identified the 'correct' measures. Pearl does not think that correct measures are 
forthcoming without resort to non-statistical (i.e. causal) information. In other words, 
Pearl denies that techniques based on probability theory alone can guarantee the 
reliability of estimates and inferences about systems involving causal relationships. 
Pearl's reservations about Bayesian statistical methods hinge on their being a 
meaningful difference between causal and statistical notions. Indeed, at several points 
throughout his (2000a), Pearl is at pains to establish a boundary between causal 
concepts, and statistical concepts. Pearl dedicates several discussions to the topic of 
the 'fundamental' nature of causal parameters in contrast to the 'superficial' nature of 
statistical and probabilistic parameters. The primary reason behind Pearl's belief that 
there is a boundary between the two is that concepts we commonly and un-
controversially take to be causal in nature cannot be expressed in terms of 
probabilities alone. One example Pearl often cites to illustrate this point involves the 
statistical dependence of mud on rainfall. Pearl asserts that one may assess the 
relationship between mud and rainfall using only statistical methods and expressions 
114 For a deeper discussion of Bayesianism see De Finnetti (1990), Howson and Urbach (1993), 
Kyburg and Smolder (1980). 
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so long as no attempt is made to provide the relationship with a causal sense. Pearl's 
point is that there is no way of using the probability calculus to express the fact that 
mud does not cause rain, and, because of this, no other causal relationships between 
rainfall and mud can be read into the statistical dependence of one upon the other. But 
this is despite the fact that it is natural to interpret the dependence of mud on rainfall 
in a (pre-theoretic) causal sense. Pearl seeks to generalise this point across the sorts of 
associations commonly displayed throughout economics and the social and biological 
sciences 115• 
In order to illustrate this point in more detail it is necessary to first introduce Pearl's 
definitions of probabilistic, statistical (associational) and causal parameters, and 
statistical and causal assumptions and concepts respectively. 
Pearl thinks of a probabilistic parameter as any quantity defined in terms of a joint 
probability function. A statistical parameter is, in tum, any quantity defined in terms 
of a joint probability distribution of observed variables and where no assumptions are 
made about the existence of unobserved variables. Pearl thinks of a causal parameter 
as any quantity defined in terms of a causal model that is not already a statistical 
parameter. Speaking to these definitions Pearl remarks that: 
The distinction between probabilistic and statistical parameters is devised to 
exclude the construction of joint distributions that invoke hypothetical 
variables (eg counterfactual). Such constructions, if permitted, would qualify 
any quantity as statistical and would obscure the distinction between causal 
and non-causal assumptions (Pearl 2000a: 39). 
Furthermore, Pearl thinks a statistical assumption is any constraint on a joint 
distribution of observed variables and a causal assumption is any constraint on a 
causal model that cannot be realised through the imposition of statistical assumptions. 
115 For an analogous case made in terms of the deliberation on possible actions see Pearl (2000a: 108-
109). 
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Even so, Pearl admits it is possible that causal assumptions may have statistical 
implications, in which case Pearl calls the causal assumptions 'testable' or 
'falsifiable' (Pearl 2000a: 38-39). 
Pearl further elaborates the boundary between the causal and the statistical by 
providing examples of concepts, familiar from the field of statistics generally, which 
he thinks fall into one category but not the other. According to Pearl the following 
concepts are statistical: correlation, regression, conditional independence, association, 
likelihood, collapsibility, risk ratio, odds ratio. The remaining concepts are for Pearl 
causal: randomisation, influence, effect, confounding, exogeneity, ignorability, 
disturbance, spurious correlation, path coefficients, instrumental variables, 
intervention and explanation (Pearl 2000a: 40). The reader may substitute the word 
'associational' for 'statistical' without loss of meaning. 
Although Pearl claims the distinction between the probabilistic and statistical on the 
one hand and the causal on the other is clear and distinct he nevertheless thinks the 
two remain closely allied and, in fact, that the latter is an extension of the former116: 
And: 
Thus, I have tried in [setting out my theory] to present mathematical tools that 
handle causal relationships side by side with probabilistic relationships (Pearl 
2000a: xiv). 
The purpose of this demarcation line is not to exclude causal concepts from 
the province of statistical analysis but, rather, to encourage investigators to 
treat non-statistical concepts with the proper set of tools (Pearl 2000a: 40). 
In light of this demarcation between the statistical and the causal Pearl goes on to 
make several claims about the epistemology and ontology of causality. Pearl's views 
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appear to represent a reversal of at least one key characteristic of the statistics 
paradigm in that, on Pearl's account, it is causal relationships that are assumed to be 
the fundamental constituents of the world and which generate probabilistic 
relationships, not vice versa. Call this, for present purposes, 'Pearl's reversal.' The 
position Pearl adopts towards the border between statistics and causality can be 
summarised in the following way: Pearl thinks of the world as containing many 
actual physical processes that span the range from deterministic to indeterministic 
depending on the specific detail with which such processes are taken into account. 
Many of these processes are either unobservable or unmeasurable. The collection of 
these processes and their properties stand (for the most part) independent of human 
tastes and interests. However, the world is not closed to investigation since it may be 
manipulated and observed. Humans are capable of direct causal interaction with parts 
of the world and may possess in specific instances causal knowledge that is not itself 
merely the convenient linguistic abbreviation of perceived associations. Humans are 
further capable of learning and storing causal information either as the result of direct 
interaction with the world or by being taught by others. Typically this information is 
stored in the form of (some number of related) counterfactual propositions. Batteries 
of such counterfactuals will be true just in case the causal model, of which they form 
a part, offers an adequate representation of the behaviour of the physical 
circumstances it models. 
Hence, for Pearl the main difference between statistical modelling and causal 
modelling is the belief that the latter begins where the former ends (despite some 
commonalty of f<;>rrnalism). For Pearl (2000a), this means that statistical modelling is 
limited to the estimation and manipulation of expressions that represent what Pearl 
thinks of as 'static' observations, whereas causal modelling cont~ns the facility to 
extend manipulation to the mechanisms responsible for the production of those 
observations. Clearly the difference spans both the formal and subject matter 
116 See also the discussion of how probability relates to causality on pp 1-2 of Pearl (2000a). 
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components of statistical and causal modelling respectively but seems driven 
primarily by the latter117• 
A consequence of Pearl's attempt to draw a line between the statistical and the causal 
is that he rejects attempts to reduce causal relationships to probabilistic relationships. 
This holds negative implications for the project of providing a probabilistic account 
of causality. The nature of the implication necessitates a closer look at exactly what 
Pearl envisages the relationship between the subject matter of causality and 
probability to be. 
Pearl considers the project of providing a probabilistic account of causality to be 
characterised by the attempt to explicate causality solely in terms of probabilistic 
relationships. When discussing the possibility of providing a probabilistic account of 
causality Pearl (2000a) does not draw any explicit distinction between probabilistic 
theories of causality and theories of probabilistic causality. Even so, it is relatively 
clear Pearl intends to refer to probabilistic theories of causality since such theories: (i) 
claim that causes are probability raisers and, hence; (ii) causal concepts are reducible 
to probabilistic concepts118• Indeed, in his discussion of probabilistic theories of 
causality Pearl (2000a) refers primarily to the work of Cartwright and Eells119• Pearl's 
main criticism of this project is that it cannot be completed without circularity. 
Hence, the best that may be achieved by entertaining a probabilistic theory of 
causality is, according to Pearl, the construction of a consistency testing procedure for 
comparing sets of causal statements with available (temporal and) probabilistic 
information (Pearl 2000a: 251). On this point Pearl remarks: 
117 Elsewhere on this point, Pearl adds: "Even the theory of stochastic processes, which provides 
probabilistic characterisations of certain dynamic phenomena, assumes a fixed density function over 
time-indexed variables. There is nothing in such a function to tell us how it would be altered if external 
conditions were to change. If a parametric family of distributions is used, we can represent some 
changes by selecting a different set of parameters. But we are still unable to represent changes that do 
not correspond to parameter selection; for example, restricting a variable to a certain value, or forcing 
one variable to equal another'' Pearl (2001: 28 nl). 
118 For instance, see comments on p 249 of Pearl (2000a). 
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... the basic program of defining causality in terms of conditionalisation, even 
if it turns out to be successful, is at odds with the natural conception of 
causation as an oracle for interventions. This program first confounds the 
causal relation P(E I do(C)) with epistemic conditionalisation P(E IC) and 
then removes spurious correlations through steps of remedial 
conditionalisation, yielding P(E IC, F). The structural account, in contrast, 
defines causation directly in terms of Nature's invariants (Pearl 2000a: 252)120• 
Humphreys draws the connection between the notion of statistical correlation and 
causation: 
There is no purer case of an empiricist association between events than a 
statistical correlation, and when such associations [ ... ] concern occurrent 
events, they are the obvious analogues of classical regularity accounts of 
causation (Humphreys 1989: 50). 
It is just this commonality that Pearl has in mind when he lumps statistical 
assumptions together with the project of probabilistic causality under the same 
criticism, which has been dubbed 'passive empiricism' (Humphreys 1989: 47). 
According to passive empiricism, humans are a device capable of collecting and 
assessing observations so as to identify particular types of regularities. Humphreys 
(1989) provides the following summary of the passive empiricist's position: 
The essence of passive empiricism is the view that humans are special kinds 
of receiving devices capable of assessing observed data for empirical 
properties, that in the case of Humean causation, for example, would be 
regular temporal succession, spatiotemporal contiguity, and the kind of 
regular association that constitutes a lawlike regularity. Within Hume's own 
119 In particular Cartwright (1979) and Eells (1991). Pearl also mentions the work of Spirtes in this 
context. 
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account of sensory impressions, for example, what produces the impression is 
irrelevant. [ ... ] This disregard for the origins of the impressions is reasonable 
within a certain kind of empiricism. If one thing that motivates you to be an 
empiricist is the desire to remain epistemically conservative, then to avoid 
moving beyond the security of the immediately given to inferred entities is 
desirable, because such inferences are fallible; alternatively, if such inferences 
require a move from an observed effect (the impression) to an unobserved 
cause (the source), one might object to the circularity of such a move within 
the context of an empiricist analysis of causation. But whatever the reasons, 
the analysis is conducted at the level of the observations, and the source of the 
empirical data is not a part of the analysis itself (Humphreys 1989: 47). 
Pearl (2000a) clearly agrees with Humphreys' last assertion. Pearl criticises passive 
empiricism for what he calls the 'closed world assumption.' Pearl claims the closed-
world assumption is "the most critical and least defensible paradigm underlying 
probabilistic causality" (Pearl 2000a: 252). According to Pearl: 
[ ... ] probabilistic causality rests on the assumption that one is in the 
possession of a probability function on all variables in a given domain. This 
assumption absolves the analyst from worrying about unmeasured spurious 
causes that (physically) affect several variables in the analysis and still remain 
obscure to the analyst. [ ... ] Because they are unmeasured (or even 
unsuspected), the confounding factors in such examples cannot be neutralised 
by conditioning or by 'holding them fixed.' Thus, taking seriously Hume' s 
program of extracting causal information from raw data entails coping with 
the problem that the validity of any such information is predicated on the 
120 Where E is thought to be the effect, C the cause and F is a particular truth value assignment to 
variables in some background context K supposedly not containing C or E. By structural account read 
Pearl's account of causality. 
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untestable assumption that all relevant factors have been accounted for (Pearl 
2000a: 252)121 • 
Pearl continues on from this point to argue that human beings have a capacity for 
manipulative experimentation of their environment as well as the ability to 
communicate causal information that the passive empiricist is denied due to the 
assumptions (such as those just outlined) that underlie their position. This sets up 
what is probably the defining feature of Pearl's disagreement with empiricism 122; 
Pearl holds probability to be epistemic, but thinks of causation as an objective feature 
of the world. 123 : 
I now take causal relationships to be the fundamental building blocks both of 
physical reality and of human understanding of that reality, and I regard 
probabilistic relationships as but the surface phenomena of the causal 
machinery that underlies and propels our understanding of the world (Pearl 
2000a: xiii-xiv). 
And, 
[ ... ] causal relationships are ontological, describing objective physical 
constraints in our world[ ... ] (Pearl 2000a: 25)124• 
121 I am not certain of what Pearl means by the assertion that Hume held a program to extract causal 
information from observations since it is well known that Hume attempted to show that just such a 
program could not succeed. 
122 However, note that even though Pearl disagrees with empiricism he found it necessary to argue that 
counterfactuals have empirical content. 
123 However, Pearl does countenance a theory of objective chance but it is unclear whether he holds 
that probabilities are truly objective in this instance or merely offer a model of chance. See Pearl 
(2000a: 220-221) for discussion. I do not wish to beg any questions here against empiricism. Many 
empiricists believe causation to be an objective feature also, so long as one means by that nothing 
more than regularity. The salient point is that Pearl appears to be asserting that causal relations are 
something more than mere regularity. 
124 Clearly there is more going on here than meets the eye. Ultimately, identifying Pearl's stance on 
such issues will depend upon whether or not he endorses the Humean Supervenience Thesis. I note 
that this is a different issue from ascertaining whether or not Pearl's account requires the Humean 
Supervenience Thesis. I return to this issue in chapter 3. 
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Moreover, as I described in section 1.3.3 Pearl holds that the functions of a causal 
model may be read as law-like mechanisms and causal models offer a partial or 
complete description of reality: 
The basic building blocks of the structural account are the functions, which 
represent lawlike mechanisms [and the] ingredients that distinguish one 
[causal] scenario from another are represented in the background variables U. 
When all such factors are known, U = u, we have a 'world' on our hands-an 
ideal, full description of a specific scenario in which all relevant details are 
spelled out and nothing is left to chance or guessing. Causal claims made at 
the world level would be extreme cases of token causal claims (Pearl 2000a: 
310)125. 
With these points in mind it is necessary to reflect momentarily on the relationship 
between the statistical (and thus probabilistic) component of Pearl's account and its 
causal components. The thought occurs that the distinction Pearl has drawn between 
the causal and the statistical is so strong that his own account of causality and causal 
discovery may fall foul of it. 
It is fair to say the primary reason Pearl draws a distinction between statistical 
modelling and causal modelling is that statistical modelling is limited to working with 
observations, whereas causal modelling reaches deeper to work with the mechanisms 
that produce observations. This view apparently confers causal models with an 
objective character that statistical models lack. The reason Pearl thinks of the causal 
as in some way more objective and fundamental than the statistical is, I think, due to 
Pearl's conception of manipulative experimentation. 
Manipulation subjugates the putative causal event to the sole influence of a 
known mechanism, thus overruling the influence of uncontrolled factors that 
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might also produce the putative effect.[ ... ] The whimsical nature of free 
manipulation replaces the statistical notion of randomised experimentation 
and serves to filter [observations] produced by [interventions] from those 
produced by uncontrolled environmental factors (Pearl 2000a: 253). 
This understanding of causal influence permits us to see precisely why, and in 
what way, causal relationships are more 'stable' than probabilistic 
relationships. [ ... ]Causal relationships should remain unaltered as long as no 
change takes place in the environment, even when our knowledge about the 
environment undergoes changes (Pearl 2000a: 25). 
Pearl thinks that manipulation offers a method for revealing and correctly describing 
natural mechanisms (Pearl 2000a: 25, 253) and it is only 'stable' probabilistic 
relationships that are the manifestation of natural mechanisms (Pearl 2000a: 63). 
Pearl denies that the facility exists for the description of such relationships within the 
statistical paradigm. Shipley (2000) captures this world-view with the following 
analogy. Consider a puppet show where a puppet master tells stories by manipulating 
three-dimensional puppets behind a screen and in front of a bright light. The puppets 
intercept the light and cast two-dimensional shadows onto the screen for the audience 
to see and interpret. In order to infer the three-dimensional action the shadows must 
be detailed and placed in context. Shipley likens the puppet show to the scientists 
attempt to infer causality from patterns of association: 
Biologists are unwitting participants in nature's shadow play. These shadows 
are cast when the causal processes in nature are intercepted by our 
measurements. Like the audience at the [puppet show], the biologist cannot 
simply peak behind the screen and directly observe the actual causal 
processes. All that can be directly observed are the consequences of these 
processes in the form of complicated patterns of association and independence 
125 Furthermore, Pearl holds that humans possess some form of innate inferential machinery that 
enables the storage and processing of causal information in the form of counterfactuals. For instance 
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in the data. As with shadows, these correlational patterns are incomplete-and 
potentially ambiguous-projections of the original causal processes. As with 
shadows, we can infer much about the underlying causal processes if we can 
learn to study their details, sharpen their contours, and especially if we can 
study them in context" (Shipley 2000: 1). 
Hence, Pearl (2000a) accepts that correlation often implies causation and that 
causation fixes correlations, that is, causal relationships between objects or variables 
determine the correlational relationships between them (Shipley 2000: 1-2; Pearl 
2000a: 59-60). These views, being fundamental to Pearl's account, lead it to a 
difficulty I shall now discuss. 
Recall that Pearl interprets probabilities as degrees of belief and explains that 
Bayesian Networks gain their name (in part) due to the subjective nature of their 
input information (Pearl 2000a: 2, 14). Further recall that Pearl demonstrates the 
conditional dependencies of a distribution and the functions of a causal model 
representing that distribution are equivalent. That is, Pearl has shown that for every 
Bayesian network G and distribution P, there is a functional model that generates a 
distribution identical to P, and hence that functional models are another way of 
encoding joint distribution functions (Pearl 2000a: 30-31 ). These facts tie the 
statistical portion of Pearl's account very closely to the causal portion of Pearl's 
account. In particular, the subject matter of the probabilities in a Bayesian network is 
carried over to causal models. This is prima facie puzzling given the fundamental 
differences Pearl thinks exist between the statistical and the causal. In a nutshell, it is 
a puzzle how Pearl is able to move from a statistical interpretation of the relationships 
within a Bayesian Network to a causal interpretation of the same network when the 
former encodes degrees of belief and the latter encodes mechanisms, which represent 
constraints on objective law-like relations in the natural world. Glymour (2003) 
presents an argument which I will exploit to show that Pearl cannot both solve this 
see Pearl (2000a: 253, 223-224). I return to this issue in chapter 3. 
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puzzle and maintain a subjective interpretation of probability without giving up the 
view that causal models are about objective constraints in the world. 
Consider that probability is combined with science in two distinct ways. One is when 
probabilities become part of the content of science such as in statistical mechanics 
and quantum mechanics. The other is when probability is utilised by science to justify 
methods of inference from observation. Define instrumentalism about some part of 
language as the doctrine that there are sentences within it that are not claims about the 
way the world is or could be but linguistic devices for making inferences about other 
sentences that are claims about the way the world is or could be. On this definition, a 
probability claim is instrumental if it says nothing about what happens or what could 
happen in the domain under scientific study but plays a role in licensing inferences 
that do say something about what happens or what could happen (Glymour 2003: 
237, 240). 
Consider the claims of several common interpretations of probability. The probability 
claims of the subjective Bayesian, limiting frequentist and propensity theorist say 
nothing about what happens or what could happen. For instance, taking each 
interpretation in turn, the subjective Bayesian says nothing about what happens or 
could happen because the Bayesian' s subject matter is norms of belief as distinct 
from, say, data points. For the limiting frequentist, probability claims are statements 
about limiting relative frequencies of a property in an infinite sequence. However, 
since the latter are consistent with any claim about any finite set of events 
whatsoever, the limiting frequency interpretation of probability fails to say anything 
about what happens or what could happen. Propensity theorists propose an 
unmeasurable physical property that neither precludes nor necessitates any 
occurrence. Hence, the propensity interpretation of probability does not entail any 
claim about what happens or what could happen (Glymour 2003: 238). 
To get probability claims-whether subjective, limiting frequentist, or propensity-to 
support inferences from data, the accepted method is to follow a prescribed route that 
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first takes the investigator through a process of estimation and then through a process 
of decision. The former moves from measures of nature to probability and the latter 
moves from probability to judgements about nature (Glymour 2003: 240-241). But, 
as Glymour points out, stepping this route displaces the general goal of discovering 
what is happening in the world: 
Mathematical statistics and decision theory [ ... ] clarify immensely the role of 
probability in the analysis of data. There is a price. The justification for the 
[route taken through procedures for estimation and decision making] is that 
given the evidence, given the supposition that the reasoner was rational before 
acquiring the evidence, and given the utilities of the reasoner, the judgements 
that result are required by rationality. The clarification requires a change in 
the primary goal of inquiry from the pursuit of truth to the pursuit of 
rationality (Glymour 2003: 240-241). 
Now recall that Pearl draws a connection between causality and what he labels 
variously 'objective constraints' and 'laws'. The claim Pearl appears to make here is 
that successfully estimating causality is in part to uncover the objective constraints 
that govern the specific system under investigation. This seems to relate the notion of 
intervention with that of invariance126• As Woodward explains: 
[ ... ] one may think of an intervention as an idealisation of an experimental 
manipulation carried out on some variable X for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether changes in X are causally or nomologically related to changes in 
some other variable Y (Woodward 2000: 199). 
[ ... ]a generalisation describing a relationship between two or more variables 
is invariant if it would continue to hold-would remain stable or unchanged-as 
various other conditions change (Woodward 2000: 205). 
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In other words, Pearl's theory is designed for estimating causal quantities in 
manipulated and un-manipulated systems, or put simply, Pearl's theory is designed to 
say something about the way the world is, or could be. But, since Pearl attempts to do 
so using one of the three offending interpretations of probability mentioned above, 
Pearl (2000a) becomes a target for Glymour's argument. First, because Bayesian 
Networks encode degrees of belief Bayesian Networks do not say anything about 
what happens or what could happen. At best, Bayesian Networks speak about what 
the investigator is rationally compelled to accept given the evidence. Since causal 
models are equivalent to Bayesian Networks (in the salient sense), causal models do 
not say anything about the way the world is or could be. It follows immediately that 
causal models do not say anything about objective physical relationships in nature. 
To paraphrase Glymour (2003), in adhering to a subjective interpretation of 
probability, Pearl sets aside the primary goal of arriving at the true values of causal 
quantities in favour of the rational acceptability of estimates. But this conclusion, of 
course, conflicts with Pearl's interpretation of causal models. The puzzle remains; 
how can the causal models of Pearl's theory be about physical mechanisms when the 
probability expressions of such models are about norms of belief? Pearl's causal 
models do not appear to be consistent with the distinction Pearl enforces between the 
statistical and the causal. 
It is my view that this difficulty is rooted in Pearl's subjective interpretation of 
probability. However, one may expect Pearl to resolve the puzzle by showing it is 
possible to maintain both subjective and objective components of causal models via 
some appropriate form of bridging principle. For instance, Pearl might choose to 
conform his subjective probabilities to a principle of direct probability or to 
something like Miller's Principle127• Pearl might also seek to maintain a dualist 
position about the application of probability such as that expressed by Levi (2003). 
126 I discuss these notions more thoroughly in chapter 3. 
127 Although Pearl does not discuss such bridging principles directly Pearl's comments regarding 
human psychological capacities for 'causal identification and inference are suggestive. I discuss such 
issues in the following chapter. For discussion of direct probability and related issues see Hajek 
(2003), Hacking (1965), Kyburg (1974), Levi (1977), Williams (1963), Horwich (1982), and Levi 
(2003). For discussion of Miller's principle see Lewis (1980). 
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However, I suggest the solution offered by Glymour (2003) is at once implicit in and 
in agreement with the intended application of Pearl's theory (minus its subjective 
component)128• 
Glymour argues that the theory of probability provides instruments for making valid 
inferences about the values of quantities and the truth and falsity of hypotheses rather 
than valid inferences about which decision has the highest expected utility (Glymour 
2003: 251). The account of probability Glymour thinks is instrumental in drawing 
such inferences is the long-run frequency interpretation, which says the probability of 
an outcome in a trial is approximately the relative frequency of the outcome in a 
'long' (but not infinite) sequence of trials. Glymour suggests that probabilities on the 
finite frequency interpretation are appropriate instruments for drawing inferences 
about what happens or what could happen in the world so long as we understand the 
interpretation 
[ ... ] as a proposal to use the language and mathematics of probability to 
approximately describe actual or potential finite populations, and as a means 
of generating definite, nonprobabilistic hypotheses (Glymour 2003: 249). 
Glymour argues that the benefit of adopting the finite frequency interpretation is that 
the degree of approximation in an approximate finite frequency claim can, unlike the 
probability claim itself, be made explicit and empirical (Glymour 2003: 249). 
According to Glymour, once made explicit, 
[ ... ] 'probability' claims become assertions about bounds on arrangements of 
values of quantities in finite populations. They become an especially 
interesting variety of claims, not about probabilities, but about uncertain but 
bounded errors in finite frequency distributions. Entirely explicit versions of 
finite frequency claims of probability, on my analysis, are claims about the 
128 Especially so since Pearl claims to afford practitioners a method of reasoning about causal queries 
that contain no probabilistic elements. 
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uncertain but bounded error of some function of the empirical distribution of a 
quantity (or quantities) in an actual or potential finite population (Glymour 
2003: 249-250). 
In terms of Shipley's shadow analogy, one may interpret the shadows to represent 
finite frequency distributions (or a function of the distribution of a quantity in an 
actual or potential finite population), and the audience's inference to represent 
definite hypotheses. In the context of a causal model such hypotheses are (partly) 
encoded by the missing arrows of its DAG and are about what form finite frequency 
distributions take under manipulation. 
It remains to ask what becomes of the subjective and the objective characteristic of 
causal models. I suggest, in light of the forgoing discussion, two distinct senses of 
causality are employed by Pearl (2000a). One of the two senses is discemable from 
Pearl's comments regarding the psychology of causal knowledge and from Pearl's 
views on the transition from Bayesian Networks to causal models. A distinct sense of 
causality is discemable from Pearl's comment that mechanisms are to be interpreted 
as objective constraints on physical processes. Consider, for instance, the following 
comments: 
A causal model is not just another scheme for encoding probability 
distribution through a set of parameters. When we come to define 
mathematical objects such as causal models, we must ensure that the 
definition captures the distinct ways in which these objects are being used and 
conceptualised (Pearl 2000a: 63). 
Our objective is to preserve, explicate, and satisfy-not destroy-[scientist's 
causal] intuitions (Pearl 2000a: 26). 
The often heard argument that human intuitions belong in psychology and not 
in science or philosophy is inapplicable when it comes to causal intuition -
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the original authors of our causal thoughts cannot be ignored when the 
meaning of the concept is in question. Indeed, compliance with human 
intuition has been the ultimate criterion of adequacy in every philosophical 
study of causation, and the proper incorporation of background information 
into statistical studies likewise relies on accurate interpretation of causal 
judgement (Pearl 2000a: 26 nl2). 
[The] mechanism-based conception of interventions provides a semantical 
basis for notions such as 'causal effects' or 'causal influence,' [ ... ] (Pearl 
2000a: 24). 
[ ... ]it is no wonder that people prefer to encode knowledge in causal rather 
than probabilistic structures (Pearl 2000a: 25). 
It is, I think, natural to read such comments to refer to the concept of causality, 
especially as the concept is countenanced within the sciences129• I see these comments 
as an explicit statement of the underlying principles involved in the use or 
employment of causal concepts (Hart and Honore 1985: 26). That is, one might 
appropriately make these sorts of comments in case one wishes to (partly) explain the 
meaning of the term 'causality' in the context of modelling in science. Likewise for 
the step Pearl takes from an associational reading of graphs to the causal reading. 
This step is taken on the assumption that one interprets the functions of graphs to 
represent the sorts of apparently natural relations (Pearl believes are) connoted by the 
term 'causality'. The remaining sense is then to be identified with Pearl's assertions 
that causality is an objective feature of the world and that the mechanisms of his 
account are representatives for law-like relations in nature. 
A distinction I cited in chapter 1 helps to clarify the ambiguity. I said there that 
theories of causation may be ordered according to one of two categories. In one 
129 See also comments made in the same spirit throughout chapter 10 of Pearl (2000a) especially pp 
325, 327, 328. 
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category belong those theories that analyse causality against human concepts and 
practices. In the other category are those that analyse causation without (any 
intended) recourse to human interests or tastes and instead aim to describe what 
causality is in nature. Put simply, those in the former category seek to elucidate what 
people mean by causal terms whilst those in the latter seek to analyse what causation 
is in the objective world. It strikes me that the two senses of causation I identify in 
Pearl's account coincide with this distinction. I investigate the possibility that Pearl 
offers a two-part theory of causality in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Interpreting the Theory 
3.0 Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to provide a philosophical interpretation of Pearl's theory of 
causality having described the theory's key features in section 2.0 of the previous 
chapter. I set out my case by picking up the thread I began in section 2.1 and develop 
an interpretive line that remains consistent with the principles of causal modelling 
outlined in chapter 1. The latter is important since, when exegetical issues arise, it is 
those principles to which I will tum for guidance. The principal idea of the 
interpretation I develop throughout this chapter is that Pearl offers a 'two-part' theory 
of causality. Though I will seek a precise statement of this idea below, the basic claim 
runs as follows. It is my view that Pearl's theory of causality consists of both an 
account of causal modelling in science and an account of causal mechanisms as 
objective constraints on physical processes. Identify the former with what I will call 
'Pearl's regimentation of causal concepts for scientists' and identify the latter with 
what I will call 'Pearl's objective account'. I see the former as a regimentation of a 
limited set of causal concepts and a set of (largely formal) procedures for their 
application. These features make up the first part of Pearl's theory. The 'objective 
account' is a partial analysis of causal mechanisms, which I will later suggest is to be 
identified with a nomic account of physical processes. The objective account makes 
up the second part of Pearl's theory. In the final section of this chapter I discuss the 
question of model justification. 
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3.1 Pearl's Two-Part Theory of Causation ... 
Pearl (2000a) claims in his prefatory remarks that the central aim of many studies in 
the physical, behavioural, social, and biological sciences is the elucidation of cause-
effect relationships among variables or events, but that the elucidation undertaken by 
these sciences has been without the appropriate methodology for extracting causal 
relationships from data (Pearl 2000a: xiii)130• Part of the problem, Pearl claims, has 
been the lack of a clear semantics for causal talk and the lack of the requisite 
mathematical machinery suitable for manipulating causal information and identifying 
and estimating the strength of cause-effect relationships. In other words, Pearl 
suggests that the existing scattered and disputed methodologies for identifying causes 
from data need to undergo a process of 'mathematization' 131 • Causality is the result of 
Pearl's sustained effort to 
... [emphasise] practical methods for elucidating potentially causal 
relationships from data, deriving causal relationships from combinations of 
knowledge and data, predicting the effects of actions and policies, evaluating 
explanations for observed events and scenarios, and-more 
generally-identifying and explicating the assumptions needed for 
substantiating causal claims (Pearl 2000a: xiii). 
Although Pearl intends his theory to have a wide appeal his primary focus is on those 
disciplines that attempt to model causal processes such as economics, epidemiology, 
sociology, and psychology132• As I have pointed out above, Pearl considers that causal 
modelling within these disciplines functions within a specific framework. Pearl's take 
on this framework involves assuming that nature possesses (often unobservable but) 
stable causal mechanisms, which it is the task of the causal modeller to discern from 
130 These claims are not extended to the world of micro-phenomena. 
131 For discussion see Pearl (2002c, 2003a). 
132 This collection of disciplines has been grouped together and labelled by some as 'engineering 
disciplines' and thus as applied sciences. Pearl does not extend his theory to the marine sciences or 
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available observations with or without the aid of some (prior) causal knowledge133• 
This somewhat pragmatic view of causal discovery in science takes care to recognise 
the situation and requirements of the individual, person, or group of persons who 
wish to discover or reason about natural causal relationships. I have illustrated many 
of these commitments in chapter 1. 
I suggest that what Pearl (2000a) does when articulating this theory is propound a 
view of causality that straddles two parts. It is my view that Pearl's theory of causality 
is the conjunction of an account of causal modelling in the applied sciences and an 
account of the natural properties assumed to exist by those sciences. The first part of 
the theory-Pearl's account of causal modelling-resembles a conceptual analysis but 
isn't one and the second part of the theory-Pearl's objective account-resembles an 
empirical analysis of the causal relation but isn't complete134• In making the 
suggestion I do not intend to assert this view of causality is in fact the view held by 
Pearl or the view explicitly put forward by Pearl (2000a). One will not find this view 
listed in the index or the table of contents. Instead, the point is interpretive. It is what 
I take Pearl's theory to amount to when examined from a philosophical perspective. 
Nevertheless, I claim there is strong support for my interpretation throughout Pearl 
(2000a) and I detail much of it in section 3.3 below. But first there are several initial 
points worth making to motivate the interpretation. First, for Pearl (2000a), humans 
'possess', 'store', and 'process' causal knowledge and maintain the ability, in certain 
situations, to observe causal relationships directly and pass on causal information 
through language (Pearl 2000a: 22, 252-253). To possess such capacities requires that 
humans are competent users of 'causal talk.' For Pearl (2000a) the competency is 
increased and advanced, in the context of science, with the aid of (his theory's) 
related areas in biology and ecology although some have made a partial attempt to do so. See, for 
instance, Shipley (2000). 
133 That is, the modelling task typically takes place under conditions of either unknown structure and 
full observability or unknown structure and partial observability. 
134 By 'empirical analysis' I mean following Salmon (1984) an analysis that aims to articulate what 
causation is as a contingent fact. I discuss the notion of conceptual analysis further below. 
107 
formalisation. So, Pearl's theory is a 'mathematization' of human 'causal talk' 135• But, 
the fact that Pearl finds it necessary to detail an informal account of the theory's 
formalism demonstrates the theory amounts to more than just formalism. Put simply, 
it is my view that the informal account amounts to the explicit specification and 
regimentation of several key causal concepts beside a set of procedures for their 
application in non-experimental science136• But, since Pearl (2000a) does more than 
regiment and formalise causal concepts, these are just one component of Pearl's 
overall theory. 
In the attempt to corral causal concepts and provide a formal calculus to aid scientific 
discovery Pearl is compelled to talk of such things as 'nature's mechanisms,' 
'physical laws' and 'objective constraints'. For instance, recall that Pearl believes 
[t]he world consists of a huge number of autonomous and invariant linkages 
or mechanisms, each corresponding to a physical process that constrains the 
behaviour of a relatively small group of variables (Pearl 2000a: 223). 
And further that 'mechanism' is fancy talk for 'law' (Pearl 2000a: 239), and that 
causal relationships are " ... the fundamental building blocks both of physical reality 
and of human understanding of that reality ... " (Pearl 2000a: xiii-xiv), and hence are 
to be thought of as "ontological, describing objective physical constraints in our 
world ... " (Pearl 2000a: 25)137• These remarks are principally antic in nature and so 
mark a break from Pearl's formalism and regimentation of causal concepts. There is, 
therefore, good reason to think that Pearl (2000a) propounds a theory of causality in 
two parts. 
135 For discussion of this issue see Pearl (2000a: 22; 96-97; 135). 
136 See for instance Pearl's claim that 11 ••• compliance with human intuition has been the ultimate 
criterion of adequacy in every philosophical study of causation ... 11 (Pearl 2000a: 26 n12). Compare 
Glymour' s remarks that the causal modelling project, instead of" ... 'analyzing' the 'concept' of 
causation, give[s] axiomatic charactensations of the assumptions implicit in large segments of 
practice" (Glymour 1997: 317). 
137 See also related comments on pages 63, 104, 199, 202, 204, 219, 226, 228, 244, 250, 252 of Pearl 
(2000a). 
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It is natural at this point to question how the two parts of the theory are related to 
each other. As I mentioned above, it is my view that one should see the two parts as 
two tiers of the one theory. Hence, it is my view that Pearl's theory has a hierarchical 
structure. The stated aims of Pearl's theory are instructive here. As I mentioned 
above, Pearl states that his principal aim is to provide formal tools to the applied 
sciences to aid in the project of causal discovery. Pearl does not attempt to theorise 
causal discovery for all of science and, as such, does not mean for the theory to have 
a universal scope138• Furthermore, it is my view that it is the first part of Pearl's 
theory that is designed to aid in the clarification of causal expressions and the 
drawing of sound causal inferences and that the second part contains statements 
pertaining to the nature of mechanisms and physical processes. But, be this as it may, 
I do not see that either part is defined in terms of the other in any straightforward 
sense. Hence, I do not think that one part is or should be reducible to the other. 
Moreover, I do not consider that the set of equations of a model specify a distinct 
collection of operations that are to be identified with a set of worldly causal 
properties. Nor do I think the properties of the processes of the second part (whatever 
these properties turn out to be) are logically entailed by the conditions on the first part 
or vice versa, and, even if they were, the relation would not be isomorphic since the 
first part of Pearl's theory may be consistent with a number of distinctly different 
second part properties. As such, if models based on the first part fail to refer they are 
not thereby rendered meaningless. Therefore, it is not part of my interpretation that 
Pearl's theory is operationalist. 
Several of Pearl's comments make it tempting to draw a parallel between Pearl's 
theory and Hume' s approach to the study of causality. Some defend the view that 
Hume essentially offered a two-part analysis of causality consisting of both an 
analysis of the causal relation-Hume' s so-called 'regularity analysis' -and a distinct 
analysis of our conception of causation-Hume's conceptual analysis139• Hence, the 
temptation is greater still, given my suggestion that Pearl (2000a) offers a two-part 
138 Pearl draws the line at the border between macro phenomena and micro phenomena. 
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theory of causality, since one might assimilate the first part of Pearl's theory with 
Burne's conceptual analysis, and the second part with Burne's regularity analysis140• 
Indeed, several comments throughout Pearl (2000a) are suggestive of such a 
parallel141 • But, despite Pearl's numerous comments about Burne's view of causation, 
the orientation of Pearl's analysis is significantly different from Hume' s. In short, 
Pearl is, on my interpretation, attempting to provide science with better tools for the 
expression, identification, and estimation of natural causal relationships. Hume, by 
many accounts, attempted to explain away the very possibility of achieving that goal. 
Hence, it would be inappropriate to identify the two-parts of Pearl's theory with the 
(essentially) two-part account of causality given by Hume. 
Finally, I mentioned above that the first part of Pearl's theory-Pearl's 
regimentation-looks like a conceptual analysis but isn't one. This needs some 
elaboration. There are several different views of conceptual analysis. According to 
one recent statement conceptual analysis aims to make explicit our folk intuitions 
about a given topic through the identification and cataloguing of how individuals 
classify possibilities pertaining to that given topic (Jackson 1998: 31-33). Other 
notable accounts are due to Strawson (1959), Ryle (1971), Austin (1961), and Grice 
(1989). At several points throughout Pearl (2000a) Pearl speaks of explicating and 
protecting human causal intuitions. Moreover, Pearl (2000a) discusses what our 
concept of causality amounts to as part of a broader project aimed at clarifying 
communication between groups of scientists. It is tempting to see the sum of these 
comments and the project of clarification as a form of conceptual analysis of 
causality. 
It is true that Pearl engages in an attempt to make causal intuitions explicit. But, the 
intuitions Pearl explicates are not really those of the folk (unless one means by folk 
scientific folk). Pearl's explication occurs within the context of scientific discovery 
139 This distinction is drawn in Dowe (2000: 1-2). See also Beauchamp and Rosenberg (1981: 285-
290). 
140 Or if one prefers, Hume' s counterfactual analysis. 
141 See for example, Pearl (2000: 41, 228, 238, 249, 236, 243). 
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and so involves several components that stretch folk conceptions of causality. It is 
also true that Pearl is attentive to the ways in which scientists consider their 
possibility space when hypothesising. But, again, it would be drawing a long bow to 
suggest that what a scientist considers possible stems entirely from commonly held 
intuitions about causality. These considerations count against the view that Pearl 
(2000a) offers a conceptual analysis of causality. But the main reason against 
concluding that Pearl is engaged in conceptual analysis is that Pearl does not say that 
the intuitions he aims to protect and encode are all there is to our concept of causality 
(Pearl 2000a: 26-27, 220, 257). Hence, it is not appropriate to claim Pearl's project is 
one of conceptual analysis. Instead, Pearl engages in a practice of identifying, 
grouping, and constructing procedures around several pre-existing causal concepts as 
part of his attempt to make reasoning about a limited suit of empirical problems 
tractable. It is for these reasons I call the first part of Pearl's theory a regimentation of 
causal concepts for scientists. But, having said that, Pearl does express the view that 
his account of causal modelling aims at least in part to encode and perhaps extend our 
understanding of causality, a goal towards which Strawson (1959) aspired also. I 
conclude by highlighting the fact that the regimentation that takes place on the first 
part does have the effect of delimiting what may count as a causal relationship on the 
second part, and that, since the second part places limits upon what counts as a 
mechanism, it also delimits what form a model may take on the first part142• 
142 Note however, that each tier stands or falls independently of the other. Since it is not part of Pearl's 
formal approach to causal modelling that the world actually have any specific causal features, the first 
tier would not fall on arguments to the effect that the world actually possesses or fail to possess some 
specific causal features. Instead these issues might weigh against the formalism's measures of success. 
Likewise, that the world actually possesses some specific causal features does not logically require that 
a formal approach to its modelling have or lack the features of Pearl's account. 
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3.2 .. . and its Two Riders 
Many details need to be teased out and clarified from the picture just presented, 
especially since the content and purpose of the two parts may seem to many to be in 
tension. The forgoing picture is only cursory. I offer a more detailed examination 
directly. But before turning to that task, a further issue begs attention. Pearl 
apparently places two riders on the claims I have attributed to him regarding the 
nature of his theory of causal modelling and the world in which that modelling takes 
place. The first rider states that causality exists only relative to human agency (Pearl 
2000a: 349-350). The second rider states that causal models must be consistent with 
the symmetry of physical laws (Pearl 2000a: 349, 223-228). 
The first rider applies for the following reason. Pearl thinks causality is agent relative 
in as much as the causal conceptions, explanations, and causal talk of humans 
respects both a temporal direction and causal asymmetry the basis for which is not a 
feature of physical reality. For instance, Pearl asserts: 
[ ... ] certain patterns of dependency, which are totally devoid of temporal 
information, are conceptually characteristic of certain causal directionalities 
and not others. Reichenbach (1956) suggested that this directionality is a 
characteristic of Nature, reflective of the temporal asymmetries associated 
with the second law of thermodynamics.[ ... ] We offer a more subjective 
explanation, attributing the directionality to choice of language and to certain 
assumptions [such as stability] prevalent in scientific induction (Pearl 2000a: 
43). 
[Furthermore,] [ ... ] scientists rarely consider the entirety of the universe as an 
object of investigation. In most cases the scientist carves a piece from the 
universe and proclaims that piece in-namely the focus of investigation. [ ... ] 
The choice of ins and outs creates asymmetry in the way we look at things, 
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and it is this asymmetry that permits us to talk about 'outside intervention' 
and hence about causality and cause-effect directionality (Pearl 2000a: 350). 
Pearl offers the following line of reasoning for this position. First, what Pearl means 
by 'temporal asymmetry' is captured by the requirement that, in all cases, causes 
precede their effects in time143• The asymmetry is salient for Pearl since he claims 
temporal information is one of the best guides to causal structure but that, even 
without temporal information, it is possible to identify causes from data (Pearl 2000a: 
42). As such, Pearl believes we are owed a two-fold explanation. First, how is it that 
statistical information happens, as it turns out, to respect a temporal asymmetry, and, 
second, why do our causal judgements coincide with such a temporal asymmetry. 
Pearl thinks the appropriate explanation of these facts must tell us how causal 
directionality can be discerned from bare statistical information, and why the causes 
thus discerned coincide with the (apparent) direction of time. 
Pearl responds by first providing a formal definition of statistical asymmetry via the 
notion of 'statistical time': 
Statistical Time 
Given an empirical distribution P, a statistical time for P is any ordering of 
the variables that agrees with at least one minimal causal structure consistent 
with P144• 
Pearl then formalises an expression of the notion of 'temporal bias': 
Temporal Bias 
In most natural phenomena, the physical time coincides with at least one 
statistical time145• 
143 The notion of temporal asymmetry is of course far broader than this. It is so broad that I will not 
attempt a summary. See Price (1996) and Savitt (1995) for a variety of contemporary and historical 
views of temporal asymmetry. I remind the reader that Pearl does not suppose his theory to be 
universal in scope. 
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Recall that a causal structure over a set of variables Vis a DAG such that each node 
corresponds to a distinct element in V and where each link between two nodes 
represents direct functional relationships among the corresponding variables (Pearl 
2000a: 44 ). Further recall that, granted the disturbance terms associated with a causal 
model (Causal structure plus parameters) are independent, the model satisfies the 
Markov assumption. Pearl considers the Markov assumption to be underpinned by 
Reichenbach's Principle of Common Cause (PCC). In a generic form the PCC states 
that, for any non-accidental correlation between two distinct events, which are not 
themselves causally related to each other, there exists a common cause that screens 
off their correlation and thus renders them probabilistically independent 
(Reichenbach 1956: 157-160). But, according to Pearl, a causal structure may admit 
various statistical times (Pearl 2000a: 58-59). Hence, it is possible to show that any 
statistical time can run contrary to physical time just by choosing a different linguistic 
representation of causal structures of observed distributions (Pearl 2000a: 59). 
Pearl thinks that solving the problem requires one to recognise the fact that"[ ... ] the 
consistent agreement between physical and statistical times is a byproduct of the 
human choice of linguistic primitives and not a feature of physical reality" (Pearl 
2000a: 59). All that remains to be explained is the particular choice of linguistic 
primitives. Pearl speculates that the choice may have something to do with selection 
pressures to facilitate predictions for future rather than past events (Pearl 2000a: 
59)146. 
Having dealt with temporal direction, causal asymmetry remains. The task here, 
according to Pearl, is to explain our choice of causes as causes instead of effects. 
And, again, the issue is salient for Pearl since Pearl holds that causal models admit 
144 This definition appears on p 58 of Pearl (2000a). 
145 The definition of this conjecture appears on p 59 of Pearl (2000a). 
146 It would follow from this that Pearl talces the PCC to be a regulative epistemic principle rather than 
an empirical or metaphysical one. I disagree that reducing the problem at hand to choice of linguistic 
primitives under selection pressure is adequate. In fact, I believe such a reduction merely shifts the 
problem to another level. It is curious that Pearl cites Price (1996) but does not mention his solution. 
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relations of asymmetric dependency between variables that are causes and variables 
that are effects, and that in some instances this causal direction may be discerned 
from the topological features of a distribution that is itself devoid of a temporal 
ordering or indexation147• 
Pearl (2000a) asserts that causal ordering (of a model) ensues from one of two 
assumptions. First, the choice made by the investigator to partition the variables 
(events) into background and endogenous sets, and second, the overall configuration 
of mechanisms in the model (Pearl 2000a: 226-227)148• In essence, the identification 
of causes requires locating those variables within the distribution that remain 
invariant to local actions or surgeries. This is so since manipulations performed on 
the endogenous variables of a model are (in some cases) able to reveal the 
dependence relations present within the distribution. However, Pearl does not think 
that the asymmetry defined for a model is a constituent of nature, and instead he 
chooses to explain the asymmetry of cause to effect as an artefact of the modeller's 
interests. Pearl discusses the issue via a response to Russell's assertion that causation 
is inconsistent with the teachings of modem physics 149• Pearl's response to Russell 
admits that: 
[ ... ] the equations of physics are indeed symmetrical, but when we compare 
the phrases 'A causes B' versus 'B causes A,' we are not talking about a 
single set of equations. Rather, we are comparing two world models, 
represented by two different sets of equations: one in which the equation for 
A is surgically removed; the other where the equation for Bis removed. 
Russell would probably stop us at this point and ask: "How can you talk about 
two world models when in fact there is only one world model, given by all the 
equations of physics put together?" The answer is: yes. If you wish to include 
the entire universe in the model, causality disappears because interventions 
147 See Pearl (2000a: 226-228) for detailed discussion. 
148 It follows that particular variables or events may be causes or effects depending on the model they 
are part of. The two assumptions Pearl speaks of originate with the work of Simon (1953). 
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disappear - the manipulator and the manipulated loose their distinction. 
However, scientists rarely consider the entirety of the universe as an object of 
investigation. In most cases the scientist carves a piece from the universe and 
proclaims that piece in - namely, the focus of investigation. The rest of the 
universe is then considered out or background and is summarised by what we 
call boundary conditions. This choice of ins and outs creates asymmetry in the 
way we look at things, and it is this asymmetry that permits us to talk about 
'outside intervention' and hence about causality and cause-effect 
directionality (Pearl 2000a: 349-350).150 
Hence, the variables that are causes rather than effects result from the investigator's 
choice to partition the variable space into exogenous and endogenous sets. In the 
present context the variable space coincides with the investigator's observations and 
the partition amounts to an interest in ascertaining what happens to one set when the 
other is altered in some controlled fashion. However, the key point is that the 
asymmetry that results from the partitioning is for Pearl not a discovery but an 
imposition. The asymmetry does not exist beyond our conceptual apparatus. 
The second rider also relates to the direction of causality. Recall that Pearl places a 
second rider on his theory to the effect that the asymmetry of equations in a causal 
model is consistent with the symmetry of the equations common to modern physics. 
Pearl is concerned that the asymmetry of causal models is inconsistent with the 
apparent lack of asymmetry in physical equations. Against that case Pearl asserts: 
149 It is arguable that Pearl has misunderstood Russell's assertion that causation is inconsistent with 
modem physics. This will be of some minor importance below. 
150 Given this statement, some may wonder why I bother to lumber Pearl with empirical analysis, since 
Pearl apparently thinks that causation does not exist beyond human conceptions. However, the point 
ignores the fact that Pearl's theory is supposed to aid scientists in investigating the world, not human 
conceptual spaces. Pearl is asserting that scientists are forced to stop talking cause and effect just in 
case we are disallowed boundaries. In this case I read Pearl to be claiming that causality ceases to 
exist, not because there are no objective physical processes but instead because we cannot discern 
directionality in cases where we are banned from making effective manipulations. In effect, Pearl is 
pointing out that modelling (and presumably most science as it is presently practiced) would be 
pointless in such instances. 
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The asymmetry that characterises causal relationships in no way conflicts with 
the symmetry of physical equations. By saying that 'X causes Y and Y does 
not cause X,' we mean to say that changing a mechanism in which X is 
normally the dependent variable has a different effect on the world than 
changing a mechanism in which Y is normally the dependent variable. 
Because two separate mechanisms are involved, the statement stands in 
perfect harmony with the symmetry we find in the equations of physics (Pearl 
2000a: 228). 
Exactly what Pearl has in mind here is difficult to ascertain. There is a sense in which 
the symmetry of equations commonly utilised in physics (such as differential 
equations) is a matter of mathematical form. For instance, Newton's equations are 
symmetric in this sense. There is a distinct sense in which one means by symmetry in 
physics that processes permissible by an equation in one temporal direction are 
equally permissible in the opposite temporal direction (Price 1996: 116). Indeed, 
Pearl's talk of the symmetry of equations does seem to imply something more 
fundamental than mere symmetry of representation. To the extent that one might 
correctly read Pearl (2000a) to mean either, Pearl's assertions regarding symmetry in 
physics are ambiguous151 • The following comment by Pearl (2000a) adds some 
clarity. When Pearl (2000a) asserts that the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables in a causal model involves two distinct mechanisms he means 
to say the relationship is not governed by a single set of equations: 
Rather, we are comparing two world models, represented by two different sets 
of equations: one in which the equation for A is surgically removed; the other 
where the equation for B is removed (Pearl 2000a: 349). 
So, any given causal model is merely half of what one may think of as the 'complete' 
model for a given set of relationships. The 'complete' model is complete in the sense 
151 I note that Pearl does not attempt to spell out which symmetry of several available symmetries he 
has in mind. 
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that it coincides with the (appropriate set of) physical equations describing said 
relationships. According to Pearl (2000a) one may, therefore, break symmetry into a 
pair of asymmetries or convert a pair of asymmetries into symmetry. Hence, Pearl 
thinks there is no conflict between the asymmetry of causal models and the symmetry 
of physical equations because he has a procedure for breaking symmetries into 
asymmetries and vice versa. Pearl (2000a) says nothing more decisive on the matter 
and declines to make use of the definitions of asymmetry provided by Price (1996) 
and so stands the second rider. 
But to my mind the ambiguity remains. It is unclear whether Pearl (2000a) merely 
aims to maintain consistency with the form of representation chosen by modern 
physics or aims to demonstrate that the asymmetry of causal models does not conflict 
with the symmetry of physical laws. My reading leans towards the former. Note, 
however, that if the latter is Pearl's intention, making the case is not a straightforward 
matter for several reasons. For instance, a causal mechanism is, for Pearl, to be 
identified with objective physical constraints. Presumably, if physical constraints 
delimit objective physical processes, then if there are two such mechanisms for each 
symmetric constraint there ought to be two (asymmetric) physical processes to match. 
Or, put another way, the existence of pairs of physical processes (where one affects 
past events only and the other affects future events only) entails there are matching 
pairs of physical constraints. This result-being prone to problems of 
overdetermination-would then place considerable weight on Pearl's explanation of 
temporal direction152• 
152 I presume the assumption is also in conflict with modem physics. 
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3.3 Modelling Causal Processes: A closer look at the 'two-part' 
interpretation 
The forgoing sections set out a framework within which to understand the nature of 
Pearl's theory of causality, including the theory's two riders. I can now proceed to 
consider what the theory says about causality in greater detail. How complete these 
considerations can be is, of course, limited by the level of detail present in Pearl 
(2000a) and related sources. 
Not surprisingly, as there are two parts to the theory each part makes its own distinct 
contribution to the theory. The first part principally offers an account of causal 
modelling, and so, what causality is on this part directly concerns the nature of causal 
inference. From above, I found the account of causal modelling to consist of a 
regimentation and a formalisation of causality. The salient question to pose on this 
tier then should be more specific than simply 'What is causality?' Instead, it is more 
appropriate to ask 'What is a causal inference?' The aim of posing the question is to 
elicit an answer that lets one know what makes a given inference causal rather than 
(say) statistical. 
Unfortunately, Pearl's answer to this rephrased question is akin to the answer one 
might expect to receive after asking an appropriately qualified person 'what is a good 
move in a game of Chess?,' namely, multi-faceted and rather longwinded. Hitchcock 
offers the following summary: 
Most philosophers talk as though there is one specific relation-causation-that 
is the target of philosophical inquiry. In [Pearl (2000a)], one finds definitions 
of causal effect, causal relevance, total effect, direct effect, actual cause, 
contributing cause, and so on; the 'Causality' of Pearl's title does not name 
some specific relation, but rather an entire subject matter. Pearl's concept of 
actual causation comes closest to the notion of 'token causation' that most 
philosophers take to be central. It is telling that this concept appears only in 
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Pearl's final chapter; the concept is not needed for Pearl's treatment of rational 
deliberation, counterfactuals, experimental methodology, and so on 
(Hitchcock 2001: 640). 
One lesson to take away from Hitchcock' s summary is that the subject matter 
addressed by Pearl's theory is rather diverse, and so, presenting an exhaustive answer 
to the question at hand would necessitate covering considerable ground and involve 
unnecessary repetition of detail already presented in chapters 1 and 2153• Nonetheless, 
some headway can be made. One claim I asserted earlier was to the effect that Pearl's 
account (of causal modelling) really begins with the causal Bayesian Network and its 
associated interpretation 154• As such, and so as to avoid repetition, I will use that 
object as the foil for a less evasive answer. The consequence of focussing on causal 
Bayesian Networks in this way is that the question must be rephrased to suit. The 
appropriate formulation is 'What (on the first tier of Pearl's theory) does the term 
'causal' mean?' or, more succinctly; 'What does Pearl mean by the term 'causal' in 
'causal Bayesian network' and 'causal model'?' I do not believe the answer to this 
question is obvious or trivial. I reject out of hand answers taking the line that what the 
term 'causal' means here amounts to nothing more than a label placed on the output 
of iterations of Pearl's formalism. It is evident that Pearl rejects this line also. 
Pearl thinks that a Bayesian network becomes a 'causal' Bayesian network when it is 
furnished with a causal interpretation. That is, Bayesian networks are causal networks 
when interpreted 
... as a system of processes, one per family, that could account for the 
generation of the observed data. [ ... ] [Such that] each parent-child 
153 I again draw the reader's attention to the disparity, introduced in chapter 1, that exists between 
scientific orientations towards issues of causality and the orientations of the philosophy of science on 
this matter. Pearl's answer might be seen to be longwinded because he appears to be answering a 'how' 
question (i.e. 'How does one draw valid causal inferences?') rather than attempting to answer a 'what' 
or 'why' question (i.e. 'Why is this inference causal?' or even 'Why is this causal inference valid?' 
154 The reader should include the updated form of the causal Bayesian Net (Causal Models) as the 
referent in the following discussion. 
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relationship in the network represents a stable and autonomous physical 
mechanism[ ... ] [and where] it is conceivable to change one such relationship 
without changing the others (Pearl 2000a: 21, 22 original emphasis). 
When a Bayesian Network is given a causal rather than an associational interpretation 
the missing links of its graph represent the absence of causal connections rather than 
statistical independence (Pearl 2000a: 141). In other words, as I discussed in section 
2.0.3, Pearl holds that the meaning of the term 'causal', where it appears in the 
elaboration of his account of causal modelling, is read into the account's formal 
features. Were one to define the term 'cause', based solely on the formal features of 
the account (i.e. sections 2.0.1and2.0.2 but minus section 2.0.3 above) the term and 
its cognates become primitives. The comments are further suggestive of the fact that 
Pearl intends the formal component to be consistent with his view of physical 
constraints, which are yet to be dealt with 155• In any case, these and other comments 
see to it that for Pearl the term 'cause' is defined as the conjunction of the following 
four conditions: 
1. Determinism: the relation between causes and effects is mediated by an 
asymmetric deterministic structure. 
2. The Causal Markov Condition: a deterministic structure is Markovian in the 
sense that each variable X that is part of such a structure is independent of all 
its non-descendants, given its parents156• 
3. Modularity: each term that forms part of a causal structure exhibits the 
possibility of alteration (via interventions) without that alteration affecting 
any other terms in the structure. 
4. Minimality: the simplest causal structure that fits the data is the preferred 
structure. 
155 Such commitments would surface in answer to the question 'Why have you constructed the system 
like that./?' Recall Pearl's comments in the postscript to chapter 3 Pearl (2000a: 104-105). 
156 The CMC is often accompanied by a sufficiency condition. Broadly speaking, a sufficiency 
condition states that a set of variables V is causally sufficient for a population just in case in the 
population any common cause of two or more variables in V is also in V or has the same value for all 
the units in the population (Berkovitz 2002: 259-260). See also Scheines (1997). 
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5. Stability: a distribution is stable when the independencies that occur in it 
are the result of structure rather than chance. 
The conjunction of these conditions may also be thought of as the licence for causal 
inference, where, as one and another conjunct is removed from the definition, so it 
becomes more difficult to speak meaningfully of inferences as causal. More 
importantly, Pearl admits that the conjunction of these conditions presupposes either 
one of two conceptual categories. The two categories are fanctional relationships 
represented by structural equations or manipulations that substitute one equation for 
another under the guidance of the calculus of interventions (Pearl 2000a: 30 nl 7)157• 
For Pearl these two categories are 'models for causation' in the sense that they offer a 
context within which to understand each condition. In effect, the conceptualisation of 
causality as either functional mechanisms or manipulations coincides with the 
purpose of the informal semantics of section 2.0.3, adding to the primitive notions of 
the formal components a causal meaning. These notions plus the conjunction of the 
five conditions stated above and Pearl's formal machinery are what I call Pearl's 
regimentation. 
It is worth taking a brief look at each condition in tum before moving on to discuss 
the second tier. Condition 1 appears to be claiming nothing stronger than the output 
or dependent variables of structural equations are fully specified as a function of the 
variables on the l.h.s. of such equations158• The relevant meaning of 'determinism' is 
provided by the functions of causal models and not the physical constraints or 
processes such functions may serve to represent. Condition 2 follows, according to 
157 See also discussion on the role of mechanisms in defining causality in Pearl (2000a: 25). 
158 I mean this in the sense that, were the values of all variables and parameters that figure in the r.h.s. 
of the structural equation known, then so too would the value of the variable on the l.h.s. Recall, and 
further that the equality sign of structural equations does not function as does the algebraic equality 
sign. The former is closer to dependence than equality. Pearl makes explicit reference to 'deterministic 
functions' in his preface. But there the statement would appear to suggest reference to such functions 
merely as representations of actual deterministic physical processes. As such I take those claims to be 
part of the second tier to Pearl's account. The deterministic nature of functions is in contrast taken to 
refer to properties of causal models and as such belongs on the first tier of the account. 
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Pearl, from two causal assumptions; minimality (condition 4 above) and 
Reichenbach's (1956) common cause assumption: 
if any two variables are dependent, then one is the cause of the other or there 
is a third variable causing both (Pearl 2000a: 30). 
I discuss both assumptions in greater detail below. The condition of modularity 
pertains to the possibility of altering a mechanism featured in a model without 
thereby altering any other distinct mechanisms in the model. Minimality is a property 
of a causal structure just when there exists no distinct alternative structure with less 
observed parameters capable of reproducing equivalent independencies. Stability 
requires that the configuration of mechanisms in a model produce all and only those 
independencies present in the distribution associated with the model. Pearl's concepts 
of mechanism and manipulation are important here. The modularity condition is the 
modelling analogue of the concept of the autonomy of physical mechanisms159• 
According to the concept of autonomy, bona fide physical mechanisms remain 
invariant to certain forms of intervention. Pearl provides the following summary: 
A causal model is not just another scheme of encoding probability distribution 
(sic) through a set of parameters. When we come to define mathematical 
objects such as causal models, we must ensure that the definition captures the 
distinct ways in which these objects are being used and conceptualised. The 
distinctive feature of causal models is that each variable is determined by a set 
of other variables through a relationship (called 'mechanism') that remains 
invariant when those other variables are subjected to external influences. 
Only by virtue of this invariance do causal models allows us to predict the 
effects of changes and interventions, capitalising on the locality of such 
changes (Pearl 2000a: 63 original emphasis). 
159 It is with the notion of autonomy that counterfactuals are introduced. 
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A simple way to think of a causal model then is as a formal representation of a 
system of autonomous mechanisms explicitly constructed to meet the five conditions 
set out above so as to give the model every opportunity to licence inferences that 
coincide with the scientist's concept of causal relationships (and causal knowledge or 
evidence). Hence, what the term 'cause' means, is expressed through the five 
conditions cited above in the context of a functional mechanism that admits 
alteration. In short, a model that embodies all five conditions can be seen to express a 
set of causal relationships160• The idea is that such models may be used to guide 
inferences, which track pertinent physical relationships in the part of the world the 
scientist has under investigation. The latter notion moves the discussion onto the 
second part of Pearl's theory. 
The question of what causality amounts to on the second tier is far from obvious. 
There are at least two reasons for this. First, Pearl's (2000a) comments on the matter 
are sparse and invariably lack the depth necessary to assemble a definition. Second, it 
is common that one happens across comments that at first appear to refer directly to 
the nature of the relevant physical systems or processes but, on closer examination 
tum out to be statements made either; (i) in the context of the formal component of 
Pearl's account or; (ii) to features of human psychology thought (by Pearl) to be 
relevant to learning and storing causal information. In such instances one is struck by 
the fact that-contrary to first appearances-neither of these sorts of statements shed 
much light on the subject. The result is that Pearl's second tier commitments cannot 
be straightforwardly and un-problematically read off his interpretation of a formal 
system-let alone his views of human psychology. Indeed, despite the existence of 
numerous claims made throughout Pearl (2000a), which I claim commit Pearl to a 
second tier, none prove to be particularly suggestive of specific details. Even so, 
some of these comments do seem to travel some small way towards revealing Pearl's 
u;o I note in passing that missing from Pearl's first tier account are conditions relating to spatial and 
temporal contiguity. These conditions are assumed under the CMC and sufficiency condition. See 
below for discussion. See also Pearl (2000a: 63-64). I reiterate the point that some use Markovian 
models without attaching any causal interpretation to them whatsoever. 
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second tier commitments and so deserve closer examination. For instance, the 
following comment appears in a short discussion of mechanisms: 
The world consists of a huge number of autonomous and invariant linkages or 
mechanisms, each corresponding to a physical process that constrains the 
behaviour of a relatively small group of variables (Pearl 2000a: 223). 
On my view, the first part of this comment-that pertaining to the world-is to be 
identified with the first tier of Pearl's account rather than the second. This is so 
principally because the properties of autonomy and invariance are defined in terms 
of-and hence are relativised to-causal models and not to actual causal processes. I 
take the reference to the 'world' in this passage to denote the modeller's world161 • 
However, the second part of the comment claims that each of these properties 
corresponds to a physical process162• What does Pearl mean by this? 
In a remark about the difference between probabilistic and causal relationships Pearl 
asserts that 
[ ... ]causal relationships are ontological, describing objective physical 
constraints in our world[ ... ] (Pearl 2000a: 25 original emphasis). 
And further that structural assumptions (such as the CMC) are 
[ ... ] adopted as a useful abstraction of the underlying physical processes 
because such processes are too detailed to be of practical use (Pearl 2000a: 
61). 
161 See above for a definition and discussion of the causal modeller's world; especially section 1.2. For 
further comments supporting this interpretation see Pearl (2000a: 68, 219). But note that comments 
made later on p 250 count against this interpretation. On closer examination I suggest a slide has 
occurred from defining invariance and autonomy in Section 2.9.1 explicitly as properties of models to 
defining these properties in terms of physical processes. I prefer the earlier treatment. 
162 Physical processes are not to be confused or identified with active causal processes in Pearl's 
account. The latter are, in effect, a type of counterfactual dependency between variables in a causal 
model within a specified context. See Pearl (2000a: 318) and section 3 of Halpern and Pearl (200la). 
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These latter comments add something to Pearl's notion of physical processes. 
Together the comments suggest that Pearl means to tie the notion of law-like 
mechanisms or 'constraints' together with physical processes. The mechanisms are 
'law-like' in the sense that the relationship that obtains between the variables or 
events of a physical process bound by a mechanism is invariant to some specific class 
of perturbations. Pearl's identification of causal relationships with law-governed 
physical processes is suggestive of a 'nomic' account of causation. The general 
features of nomic accounts of causation are, therefore, worthy of some discussion as 
they may shed some light on Pearl's second tier commitments 163• 
To adopt anomic account of causality would be (minimally) to take the view that 
when two quantities or events are truly causally related then one quantity or event 
necessitates the other in a 'law-like' fashion (i.e. almost without exception) (Psillos 
2002: 169). One example of anomic account of causation is that offered by 
Armstrong (1997). Put simply, Armstrong is committed to the view that two event 
(types) are related by law iff there is a relation of nomic necessitation-written 
N(F,G)-between the properties (which are universals for Armstrong) F-ness and G-
ness where all F's are G's (Psillos 2002: 163), and where, for Armstrong (1997), the 
relation of Necessitation that exists between the properties (universals) F and G is the 
causal relation. That is, the putative causal relation that exists between two singular 
events is in fact a causal relation just in case it is the relation that exists between two 
universals of which the singular events are tokens164• 
Adding the sort of nomic account of causation that Armstrong elaborates to Pearl's 
theory would have the following result. Pearl's regimentation remains a formal 
163 I note in passing that Pearl does not address issues concerning the reduction of causal or law-like 
relationships in the special sciences to the laws of physics raised in Putnam (1973) Fodor (1974). 
164 On Armstrong's view then causation requires the instantiation oflaws. This is not, of course Pearl's 
view, but the question naturally arises as to whether Pearl's reference to laws is Humean or non-
Humean in spirit. In lieu of further investigation I conjecture that Pearl would not be forced to commit 
either way. This is another issue where the 'how?' of causal discovery in science displaces (the 
importance of) the 'why?' Pearl is not (obviously) doing metaphysics. 
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approach to causal discovery but where 'causal relationships' are those of the nomic 
variety. The role of Pearl's objective account is then to offer a general set of 
conditions defining such nomic relationships. This would be an attractive 
interpretation of Pearl's account but for the following difficulties. First, Pearl allows 
the granularity of causal relationships to be decided by the investigator on a case-by-
case basis. This is what Pearl means when he speaks of abstracting away from actual 
physical processes. As such it could not be the case that the events or quantities of 
Pearl's account coincide with the particular matters of fact or states of affairs required 
by anomic account such as Armstrong's. Second, on Pearl's account truth is 
relativised to a model rather than to eternal statements or that-clauses and so on. 
Third, Pearl does not appear to expound or endorse (or require) an account of natural 
laws of the sort required by anomic account of causality such as Armstrong's165• But, 
even so, I think the nomic account is the natural (philosophical) interpretation of 
Pearl's comments on objective constraints. Perhaps it is possible to alter the 
objectionable features of the nomic account so that it may be allied to the second part 
of Pearl's theory. I shall consider this line of thought briefly. 
Altering the nomic account will involve revisiting Glennan's (2000a, 2002) account 
of mechanical models from section I.I. Recall that I described there how Pearl's 
theory of causality could be given a suitably general philosophical context through a 
connection with Glennan' s account of mechanism. The salient points of Glennan' s 
account are as follows. Glennan (2000a, 2000b, 2002) defines a mechanism 
underlying a behaviour as a complex system that produces the behaviour through the 
interaction of a number of parts such that the interactions between the parts of the 
mechanism can be characterised by direct, invariant, change-relating laws (Glennan 
2002: S344). The notion of a mechanism then serves as a basis for Glennan's account 
of a mechanical model. Importantly, I noted in section I.I that Glennan's 
characterisation of mechanical models has two parts. One part is concerned with the 
165 A variation on the theme of taking the first tier to offer a formalism for caus~ discovery and the 
second tier to define the causal relation would be to assert that the second tier defines causality in 
terms of the transference of conserved quantities along the lines of Dowe (2000). However, there is 
little or no support for this interpretation either. 
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description of the behaviour of the mechanism, the other part with model's 
mechanical description. Glennan's point is that the mechanical description describes 
the internal structure of the mechanism whilst the description of the mechanism's 
behaviour is an external description. If one considers the behaviour of a mechanism 
to involve a set of observations, then one may identify external descriptions with 
causal models and internal descriptions with objective constraints. These two parts of 
Glennan's account then coincide with the first and second parts of Pearl's theory 
respectively. Fortifying Pearl's theory with Glennan's account of models endows it 
with the following features. 
The behaviour of a system of physical processes is described by the values of the 
variables of a causal model and the mechanism is described by the causal model's 
structure. Recall that for Pearl, mechanisms constrain processes in the sense that the 
variables related via a mechanism are invariant to some class of interventions. A 
causal model then encodes a class of invariant relationships166 • Drawing the 
connection between the two parts of Pearl's theory and Glennan' s two-part account of 
mechanism in the way I suggest adds to the former by illustrating the role the second 
part plays in Pearl's theory. Note, however, that on Glennan's account the relation 
that obtains between a model and a mechanism is one of 'approximate similarity' in 
the sense that the description of the mechanism offers only a degree of approximation 
of reality. That is, on Glennan' s account, to make claims about the nature of a 
mechanism, one constructs a model and asserts that it is similar to a system in nature 
(Glennan 2000a p 12)167• But, what exactly is a system in nature? If one grants the 
connection between Pearl's theory and Glennan's account of mechanism, then the 
advance toward Pearl's second part answer depends upon an account of approximate 
similarity168• 
166 Which Pearl describes with counterfactual sentences. Woodward (2000, 2001, 2002a) explore the 
notion of constraints as domains of invariance and details a concomitant account of explanation. 
167 I note in passing that there are several other accounts of mechanism besides Glennan' s available in 
the literature. See for instance, Machamer et al. (2000) and Tabery (2004). I prefer Glennan's account 
since it appears the most consistent with Pearl's account. 
168 I return to the issue of approximate similarity and the relationship between Pearl's and Glennan's 
view of mechanism when I discuss identification and model justification in section 3.4. 
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Hence, a frank assessment of the prospects pursued thus far must conclude that one is 
not carried a great deal closer to understanding what exactly Pearl thinks a physical 
process is. I would like to suggest that Pearl is committed to the view that causality is 
in some sense the instantiation of contingent law-like connections between events but 
the level of detail available does not warrant it169• So far then the nature of a 'physical 
process' remains almost entirely obscure in Pearl's account. However, the 
significance of Pearl's comments regarding objective constraints dictates that I 
consider any available avenue around the impasse. 
One might think it possible and worthwhile to attempt to draw inferences from the 
content of the regimentation or from Pearl's views of human psychology to arrive at 
the commitments Pearl does or ought to have regarding the nature of causal 
processes. But, since I have claimed above that each part of Pearl's account is 
independent of the other, this strategy, even if it were informative, is not likely to 
have any prescriptive weight. Several of Pearl's statements concerning human 
psychology and causal assumptions are suggestive though, and so I will follow up 
this line of thought despite reservations. 
In regard to the psychology of causal learning Pearl claims that: 
Structural equations and their associated graphs are particularly useful as a 
means of expressing assumptions about cause-effect relationships. Such 
assumptions rest on prior experiential knowledge, which-as suggested by 
ample evidence-is encoded in the human mind in terms of interconnected 
assemblies of autonomous mechanisms. These mechanisms are thus the 
building blocks from which judgements about counterfactuals are derived. 
Structural equations {f} and their graphical abstraction G(M) provide direct 
mappings for these mechanisms and therefore constitute a natural language 
169 This phraseology is from Dowe (2000: 169). 
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for articulating or verifying causal knowledge or assumptions (Pearl 2000a: 
244). 
The basic picture Pearl appears to articulate here and elsewhere involves a relation 
between four things: 
1. Human psychological properties. 
2. Human knowledge 
3. Human causal assumptions. 
4. Pearl's formal language. 
As far as I can see the relation between the four is as follows. Humans possess a 
certain psychological capacity or mental structure such that causal information170, 
especially counterfactual information, is gathered and stored in the form of 
autonomous mechanisms. Human a posteriori knowledge, especially knowledge of 
causal relationships, reflects the structure of our psychology. In tum, the structure of 
our causal knowledge and assumptions is accessible via (i.e. reflected in) and 
expressed through our causal judgements as these judgements appear in our natural 
languages. Last, Pearl's account borrows from our psychology its assemblies of 
autonomous mechanisms and utilises them as primitives in a formal language which, 
of course, Pearl intends to be a tool for organising and guiding our causal judgements 
and building knowledge of our environment171 • 
Do these relations suggest or rule out any specific features of nature and in so doing 
move us closer to Pearl's views on physical processes? I cannot say that they do. Even 
if it were true that Pearl's formalism offered a 'direct mapping' of human mental 
structures the nature of reality need not thereby fit the specific mould cast for it172• In 
170 Gained via observing and interacting with the world. 
171 Where counterfactuals are those endorsed in Pearl's account and causal information is to be 
contrasted with statistical information. 
172 Although, I am aware it may be the case that Pearl intends to elaborate on a theme familiar from the 
evolutionary epistemology project. If it were the case that our causal reasoning 'apparatus' was in 
some coherent sense the result of selection pressures then Pearl might advocate a naturalistic line of 
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any case, Pearl (2000a) offers no argument for the latter position and the former is 
controversial. For instance, Pearl's view here is to the effect that human mental 
structures are governed by or instantiate causal primitives and not (probabilistic) 
parametric primitives. Such a position takes an inversion of Fisherian epistemology, 
and utilises it as a psychological foundation. Pearl cites Tversky and Kahneman 
( 1980) as the source of the empirical support for this view. The standout passage that 
demonstrates Pearl's commitment to such a view of human psychological structure 
reads as follows: 
... humans are generally oblivious to rates and proportions (which are 
transitory) and [instead] they constantly search for causal relations (which are 
invariant). Once people interpret proportions as causal relations, they continue 
to process those relations by causal calculus and not by the calculus of 
proportions. Were our minds governed by the calculus of proportions [ ... ] 
Simpson's paradox would never have generated the attention that it did (Pearl 
2000a: 182)173• 
Although I confess some sympathy for the epistemic equivalent of this view I do not 
follow Pearl's journey into psychology. Nor do Cosmides and Tooby (1996) who 
argue that (amongst other things) uncovering evidence (allegedly) supporting the 
view that humans are poor statistical reasoners, and thus that human psychology is 
not naturally inclined to probabilistic or proportional reasoning, depends crucially 
upon the experimental design from which such evidence is thought to arise. They 
claim to have shown through a series of experiments that people's performance in 
reasoning with proportions gets better due purely to the way in which the problems 
are presented. From this fact Cosmides and Tooby (1996) go on to argue the opposite 
view to that reached by Pearl, namely that people are proportional reasoners by 
reasoning to the effect that the success of our reasoning and the power of our causal explanations 
commits us to some form of direct realism regarding (some) causal relationships. Since Pearl (2000a) 
does not explicitly elaborate this line I mention it only to set it aside. But see Pearl (2000a: 59, 253) for 
supportive comments. 
173 Pearl also cites the work of Waldmann et al. (1995) in support of this position. See Pearl (2000a: 
60). 
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nature. What is clear is that the work of Tversky and Kahneman is not the last word 
on the matter and so Pearl's claims concerning human psychology cannot be 
decisive174• 
However debates concerning mental content turn out the upshot as I see it for present 
purposes is as follows. Even if inferences from these components of Pearl's account 
to the relevant nature of physical processes were coherent and sanctioned (and I find 
no clear grounds in the literature that establish the validity of such inferences) the 
basis from which such inferences spring is questionable. Now that I have exhausted 
the promising avenues I move on to evaluate the regimentation's answer. 
Is Pearl's regimentation cogent? Many will not think so. It seems there are ample 
grounds to challenge each and every conjunct that forms part of Pearl's 
regimentation. Many problems have been cited across several disciplines, which 
pertain to either the nature of Pearl's project or specific portions of its formal 
machinery and underlying assumptions. For example, Heckman (2001) offers a 
review of modelling and related issues from an econometric standpoint, Dawid 
(2000), Pratt and Schlaifer (1984), Singpurwalla (2002) and Lemmer (1993) offer a 
critical statistical perspective, Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998) edit a collection of 
essays written by sociologists, and Freedman (1997, 2002, 2003), Humphreys (1997), 
Humphreys and Freedman (1996, 1999) offer critical reviews that focus on graphical 
models. More recently Cartwright (1995, 2000), Woodward (2001, 2002b), Hausman 
and Woodward (1999), and Hopkins and Pearl (2003) offer critical review of several 
formal components specific to Pearl's project as do Moldonado and Greenland (2002) 
and Cole and Hernan (2002). 
Before looking into the detail of the issues raised in the literature it will be useful to 
introduce a partition between two forms of criticism Pearl's regimentation faces 175• 
174 On the broader issue of whether Pearl is referring to cognitive algorithms or culturally conditioned 
behaviours I suggest Pearl means to refer to the former. For critical discussion of the distinction see 
Hankinson Nelson (2003: 279). 
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On the one side of the partition are those criticisms that originate from statisticians, 
whether applied or otherwise, and on the other side are more thoroughly 
philosophical criticisms. The two sides of the partition are not mutually exclusive. 
Some of the criticism offered by statisticians is at least in part philosophical in nature 
and likewise philosophical criticisms sometimes pertain to statistical technicalities. 
Even so, I make the partition for three reasons. First, Pearl appears to abide by a 
similar partition when replying to criticism. Second, identifying the origin of specific 
criticism allows one the opportunity to respect the intentions of those who offer it, 
intentions that often reflect specific disciplinary concerns. Third, I wish to focus on 
criticism offered by philosophers without neglecting altogether criticism offered by 
statisticians and others. 
The criticisms offered by statisticians, or, at least, the criticisms offered on statistical 
grounds, tend to revolve around one specific point. It is that causality may be 
adequately dealt with within the boundaries of probability theory; no extra 
mathematical machinery and no new language is required to deal with causality. 
Hence, so the claim goes, Pearl's account of what causality is is misguided and un-
necessary. Less sophisticated versions of this criticism elaborate on the familiar 
theme that correlation does not equal causation, and that Pearl misunderstands the 
limited place of causal inference in statistics. Criticism taking this form stems from 
the worldview according to which causation is a form of correlation between 
stochastic variables or events. More sophisticated criticisms of Pearl's answer take 
the view that statistical tools are already available to adequately cope with causal 
inferences and the identification of causal effects. For instance, Nozer Singpurwalla 
asserts that 'the calculus of probabilities, endowed with a time dynamic, is indeed the 
calculus of causality' and seeks to demonstrate this by examples (Pearl 2002b: 210). 
Pearl believes two points underpin most criticisms of his theory by statisticians. The 
first is that causal analysis starts with theoretically or judgementally based 
assumptions for which there exists no support from (frequency based) data. The 
175 I explicitly exclude criticism of the formal component of Pearl's account from the partition. The key 
characteristic of such criticism is typically the focus on the richness of the semantics. Some claim that 
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second is that causal analysis, at least as Pearl conceives it, requires an extension to 
the syntax of the probability calculus (principally with the 'do(x)' operator). 
Apparently statisticians find this requirement unacceptable176• Other criticisms find 
that complex systems such as economies can be modelled adequately without 
recourse to causal models (LeRoy 2002), or that the key components of Pearl's theory 
are not obviously applicable because of over-idealization on Pearl's behalf (Morgan 
2004) or because no clear method exists to translate between Pearl's theory and pre-
existing statistical methods (Neuberg 2003; Hoover 2003). 
Unfortunately a detailed account of these criticisms and analysis of Pearl's defence 
against them falls outside the aim of this thesis. As such I leave these issues aside and 
move on to consider criticisms of Pearl's regimentation arising in the philosophical 
literature. However, I emphasise to the reader that the partition introduced above, 
whilst not entirely artificial, is not entirely natural either. As such I direct the reader's 
attention back to section 2.1 where I discuss in some detail Pearl's attempt to draw a 
line between the statistical and the causal. On reflection, the discussion undertaken in 
that section might be seen to point towards several unresolved foundational issues in 
the field of statistics that are (arguably) philosophical in nature. Moreover, it might 
further be argued that some of the criticisms raised below by philosophers will be 
recognised as relatives of those criticisms offered by statisticians177• 
There are several approaches taken by philosophers who criticise, what is on my 
interpretation, Pearl's regimentation. Some are (or were at one time) sympathetic to 
Pearl's project and so tend to offer specific criticisms along with proposed solutions. 
Others deny the efficacy of the project either in part or in its entirety and so focus on 
exploiting perceived weaknesses in either the formalism or with the account's key 
Pearl's semantics are too permissive. I do not discuss such issues directly. 
176 For discussion see Pearl (2002c, 2003a). 
177 One example of philosophical criticism offered by a statistician is the criticism offered by David 
Freedman. I recount one such criticism below. Furthermore, I place counterexamples to the formal 
component of Pearl's account into the statistical basket since such counterexamples typically require 
technical fixes. However, some of these counterexamples are wielded by philosophers with the aim of 
making deeper criticism of the account. For instance see Menzies (2002). 
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assumptions. In discussing the acceptability of Pearl's answer I will only focus on the 
criticisms from those of the latter persuasion. This group seek to challenge Pearl's 
answer on the basis that it does not even get off the ground because one or more of its 
conditions is either incoherent or lacks applicability even by its own lights. Call these 
criticisms the 'no-answer' criticisms. Each and every conjunct of Pearl's 
regimentation has been criticised in the literature178• I will consider several of the 
more prominent criticisms in a moment. 
Since Pearl's answer is, I hold, the conjunction of conditions 1-5, Pearl's answer will 
be proven unsatisfactory in case any one condition is shown to fail. Even so, recall 
that Pearl is committed to the view that some causal claims remain viable without 
every conjunct being met. This is another way of saying that some of the criticisms 
targeted at each individual condition, granted they are successful, would be more 
damaging than others. For instance, Pearl's answer would face a significant set back 
were the Causal Markov Condition to be shown untenable. In light of this I will 
provide the greatest focus in the following discussion on conditions 2, 3, and 5 
respectively and only superficially focus on the remaining conditions179• Although I 
hold that a defence against the criticisms set out below is straightforward I will not 
entertain any defence of Pearl's regimentation until after the criticisms have been 
levelled. I will then argue that each criticism is misplaced. Some discussion will be 
necessary to sketch out a more appropriate target. I suggest that this should be Pearl's 
objective account. 
The criticism commonly levelled at the condition of determinism is straightforward. 
Condition 1 is, so the criticism goes, a non-starter because, as contemporary physics 
tells us, the world is fundamentally indeterministic. Hence, a condition that asserts 
the relation between causes and effects is deterministic in structure is either false or 
178 However, I can find no direct criticism of Pearl's employment of minimality. Minimality may be 
criticised indirectly however. I discuss this further below. 
179 But, having said that and, and as will become clear below, each criticism harbours further 
misgivings against Pearl's answer. Moreover, were those who criticise Pearl's answer provided ample 
time within which to articulate their case I am certain that what are now specifically focussed 
challenges would tum into challenges against more than one conjunct of Pearl's answer. 
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lacks applicability and the same goes for the answer to which it is part180• Nancy 
Cartwright puts this challenge in the following pragmatic way: 
[ ... ]for most cases of causality we know about, we do not know how to fit 
even a probabilistic model, let alone a deterministic one. The assumption of 
determinism is generally either a piece of metaphysics that should not be 
allowed to affect our scientific method, or an insufficiently warranted 
generalisation from certain kinds of physics and engineering models 
(Cartwright 2000: 13). 
There are several challenges levelled at condition 2 throughout the philosophy of 
science literature. I wish to consider one such challenge in particular but first cite 
some other prominent criticisms. A general challenge to the CMC is that it cannot be 
a universal condition for either one of two reasons. First, the CMC faces 
counterexamples. Second, there are cases of causation where it is far from obvious 
how the CMC is to be applied (Cartwright 2000: 16-17). 
The counterexamples to the CMC appear in various forms and are often accompanied 
by counterexamples to Reichenbach's (1956) PCC and fork asymmetry theory of 
causal direction 181 • The relevant class of counterexamples may be traced back (at 
least) to van Fraassen (1980)182• The thrust of these counterexamples is that there 
exist causal forks (structures) where, contrary to the CMC the common cause 
represented by the structure fails to screen off the correlation between its effects. 
Typically, the examples involve causal forks where the common cause and its effects 
are microscopic phenomena. However, some cases are presented where microscopic 
common causes are imbedded in scenarios that involve macroscopic effects. The 
180 I am uneasy about the notion of 'deterministic structure' as the notion appears in Pearl. The unease 
arises from being unsure whether Pearl is making a descriptive claim about model structures or actual 
physical systems or both. I take a deeper look at this issue when considering Pearl's answer on the 
second tier. 
181 For example Horwich (1987). 
182 But see also the work of Salmon (1984: 168-178), Cartwright (1995, 1997), Hausman and 
Woodward (1999) and Martel (forthcoming). 
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relevant point this class of counterexamples illustrate is that the CMC is not 
sufficient, as it is presumed to be by its proponents, for the identification of all causal 
models. Alternatively, the point is sometimes dressed as a sceptical worry along the 
following lines. Because Pearl's account is bound by the CMC it runs the risk of 
misidentifying or ignoring altogether non-Markovian causal structures, where it is 
conceivable that such structures are in fact commonplace. 
Cartwright frames another, related, criticism183• There surely are cases of causality 
where the CMC is applicable but, likewise, there are cases of causality where the 
CMC appears to fail. In the former instance the CMC is trivial and in the latter it is 
irrelevant. However, in between these two cases there are instances where it is 
unclear how one is to employ modelling techniques that presuppose the CMC. In 
such cases modellers are forced to make difficult judgements about whether or not, 
and in what way a specific causal relationship exists. One variable can contribute to 
the production or prevention of another variable in a great variety of ways. As a result 
reliable tests for whether one variable causes another must be finely tuned to how the 
cause functions to produce its effect almost case by case. In these instances it is far 
from obvious how the modeller is to employ the CMC and draw causal inferences 
(Cartwright 2000: 18-20). In summing up the problem Cartwright states: 
The term 'cause' is highly unspecific. It commits us to nothing about the kind 
of causality involved nor about how the causes work. Recognising this should 
make us more cautious about investing in the quest for universal methods for 
causal inference. Prima facie, it is more reasonable to expect different kinds of 
causes operating in different ways or imbedded in differently structured 
environments to be tested by different kinds of statistical tests (Cartwright 
2000: 4). 
183 This criticism forms part of a broader attack on the Screening Off relation. However, Cartwright 
considers the latter condition to be a part of or at least a corollary to the CMC. See Cartwright (2000: 
5) for discussion. Besides the stated criticisms, Cartwright offers several others. See for instance 
Cartwright (2003, 2002a). 
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The key challenge to condition 2 I wish to consider is due to Berkovitz (2002). The 
criticism comes in two parts. The first part of the challenge is general in that it refers 
to not just the CMC but also terms such as 'cause' 'influence' 'correlation' 'common 
cause' 'distinct event' and so on as these terms come to be recruited into the formal 
component of Pearl's account. The accusation is that the account takes several or all 
of these terms as primitives and imposes upon them formal constraints in the shape of 
axioms abstracted from and inspired by the intuition of those steeped in the practice 
of modelling and analysis. It then seeks to investigate the necessary consequences of 
these axioms and test their relevance against familiar problematic scenarios and 
competing methods of causal inference (Berkovitz 2002: 241-242). This approach to 
causality is problematic for the following reasons. The plausibility of the CMC 
depends on those principles upon which it is based, such as the PCC. But, the PCC is 
not really a principle so much as the blueprint or schema for a principle because the 
terms that form part of the principle's definition such as 'common cause' 'distinct 
event' 'correlation' and so forth may have as a matter of fact different specifications 
and different specifications yield different principles. Hence, the acceptability of 
condition 3 cannot be assessed until the exact meaning of terms such as 'causal', 
'common cause,' 'correlation' and so on, are specified (Berkovitz 2002: 242). But 
since these meanings are not forthcoming (by the very nature of the project) Pearl's 
answer is unsatisfactory. The second part of the challenge questions the reliability of 
the causal inferences sanctioned by Pearl's axiomatic system. Since the system 
depends crucially on the availability of domain specific causal knowledge, which 
may be unobtainable when the terms 'causal', 'correlation', 'distinct event' and so 
forth are not sufficiently specified no inferences can be drawn on behalf of the system 
(Berkovitz 2002: 242)184• So, again, condition 2 is a non-starter in its present form and 
so Pearl's answer is unsatisfactory. 
184 A further point may be pressed against Pearl were his answer to this challenge to offer a univocal 
definition of the terms under question. Since, Pearl may be asked to explain why different disciplines 
in the (social) sciences appear to mean different things or indeed nothing specific at all by the term 
'cause' and other terms under question. On this point see Woodward (2002b). 
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The substance of this last challenge relies (in part) on the fact that Pearl's use of the 
CMC is related to the PCC, which it is by Pearl's own admission (Pearl 2000a: 30, 
58, 61). But the PCC, even granted its status as a principle rather than merely the 
schema of one, has more than one formulation. Which formulation Pearl is committed 
to is not altogether clear185• This matters since the status of the PCC as a 
metaphysical, epistemological, or empirical principle, and so the status given to the 
CMC by Pearl's theory, depends upon the specific version articulated, as Berkovitz's 
criticism points out. Moreover, justification of the PCC, with the aim of supporting 
the CMC, may in tum require taking a particular stance in regard to additional 
conditions the PCC implies186• Part of the problem then is that Pearl (2000a) does not 
contain an adequate specification of the PCC187• For instance, Pearl's (2000a) few 
references to Reichenbach's PCC are recorded in the form of slogans rather then 
detailed remarks or definitions. Pearl speaks of 
... several familiar relationships between causation and association that are 
usually associated with Reichenbach's (1956) principle of common cause-for 
example, 'no correlation without causation,' 'causes screen of their effects,' 
'no action at a distance' (Pearl 2000a: 61). 
Other comments suggest that Pearl holds the principle to be an 'assumption' which 
states: 
.. .if any two variables are dependent, then one is the cause of the other or 
there is a third variable causing both (Pearl 2000a: 30 original emphasis). 
However, Reichenbach took the following statement to express the PCC: 
185 And so must be inferred, which I do below. 
186 I have in mind here the Cause-Correlation Link and the Screening Off relation as well as 
assumptions about the uniformity of nature. 
187 This challenge might easily be extended to several of the conditions making up Pearl's answer. See 
below for details. 
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If an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must exist a common cause 
(Reichenbach 1956: 157), 
by which Berkovitz thinks Reichenbach meant: 
Any representative correlation between distinct events or quantities, neither of 
which causes the other, must be due to a common cause. Where 'correlation' 
means positive statistical dependence and where 'representative' denotes the 
appropriate relative frequencies given the population within which the 
correlation apparently appears (Berkovitz 2002: 243)188• 
Note that the latter specification of the PCC does not include a screening off 
condition nor any explicit reference to contiguity requirements. It is arguable then 
that Pearl confuses the PCC with a distinct principle called the Cause Correlation 
Link (CCL)189: 
(CCL) Any non-accidental correlation between two distinct events or quantities is 
due to either (i) a causal connection between them, or (ii) a common cause, or 
(iii) both (i) and (ii), 
The CCL appears to be an adjunctive motivating principle of (statistical) inference or, 
at best, a corollary of the PCC (Berkovitz 2002: 241). Furthermore, Reichenbach held 
the PCC to pertain to probabilities interpreted as (relative) frequencies, not as degrees 
of belief as does Pearl, a fact that, for some, may compound the problem posed by the 
present criticism (Reichenbach 1976: 126). Exactly which specification of the PCC 
Pearl is committed to then remains obscure. Fortunately it is possible to clarify the 
status accorded to the PCC by examining Pearl's comments about the CMC. Pearl 
(2000a) contains a level of detail sufficient to specify the status of the CMC. It is 
188 See also Reichenbach (1956: 163) and Salmon (1984: 159-168). Note also that Reichenbach 
thought the principle was true because of thermodynamic properties. Hence, I take it that Reichenbach 
thought of the principle as empirical rather then epistemic. 
189 This formulation appears in Berkovitz (2001: 241). 
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clear that Pearl is committed to an epistemic specification of the CMC since Pearl 
uses this condition as a filter through which to acquire and organise data. It is 
reasonable to conclude that Pearl thinks of the PCC in the same way190• So, one 
portion of the criticism Berkovitz offers against the CMC has been met through 
clarification, the remainder is yet to be dealt with. 
The next challenge to consider is levelled against the condition Pearl labels variously 
as 'autonomy' or 'modularity.' The reader will recall that autonomy is the assumption 
that each child-parent relationship (i.e. each function) in a causal model represents a 
distinct mechanism that can vary independently of other such mechanisms present in 
the model (Pearl 2000a: 63). One of the key reasons the modularity condition is 
considered to be a non-starter is that, if taken to be universal, it faces many 
counterexamples. So many, in fact, that its negation is a more plausible candidate for 
inclusion in an account of causation. The thrust of this challenge is, therefore, that 
there is no good reason to support the assumption that causal processes are (in general 
if not universally) autonomous. That is, modularity is false as a matter of empirical 
fact. For instance, critics offer the following counterexample: autonomy may fail due 
to the fact that what at first appear to be intuitively distinct mechanisms turn out to be 
stand in the same spatiotemporal location in such a way that intervening to alter one 
mechanism without disrupting the other is impossible (Woodward 2002). Cartwright 
(2001) illustrates the point with a stylised scenario involving the mechanisms within a 
bread toaster: 
The expansion of the toaster's sensor due to the heat produces a contact 
between the trip plate and the sensor. This completes the circuit, allowing the 
solenoid to attract the catch, which releases the lever. The lever moves 
forward and pushes the toast rack open. I would say that the movement of the 
lever causes the movement of the rack. It also causes a break in the circuit. 
190 This interpretation gains further support from Pearl's comments on temporal asymmetry and causal 
directionality. Nonetheless it remains a fact that the details are found to be wanting. I note in passing 
that Pearl's view of the CMC and the PCC as epistemic principles or conditions makes Pearl's account 
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Where then is the special cause that affects only the movement of the rack? 
Indeed, where is there space for it? The rack is bolted to the lever. The rack 
must move exactly as the lever dictates. So long as the toaster stays intact and 
functions as it is supposed to, the movement of the rack must be fixed by the 
movement of the lever to which it is bolted (Cartwright 2001: 72). 
The upshot is that with this particular type of toaster design one cannot claim that the 
rack operates according to a different mechanism than that of the circuit despite the 
fact that they are intuitively distinct (Woodward 2002). According to Cartwright such 
instances, far from being novel, are in fact common features of the world. 
Cartwright raises a related objection to condition 5-the stability, or, faithfulness 
condition. The thrust of Cartwright' s criticism of stability is that the condition is 
commonly violated in scientific practice and, more to the point, violating stability is 
often a scientific goal in itself. For instance, Cartwright points out, the stability 
condition is violated whenever two causal processes are equally effective and cancel 
each other out. Moreover, Cartwright assert that, far from being pathological, 
violating stability is one of the ways that scientists and policy makers "minimise 
damage in our social systems and in our medical regimens" and allows technicians 
and others to construct many useful technological devices (Cartwright 2000: 16, 17). 
The lesson Cartwright draws from the criticism is that, as with the Markov condition, 
the stability condition is an unreliable measure of causal processes, and so, any 
conclusions drawn about causal relations based upon methods that presuppose 
stability can only be as secure as the prior understanding one has of the structure 
under investigation (Cartwright 2000: 17). This is not the only criticism Cartwright 
has of stability. Cartwright also criticises the stability condition on the grounds that 
the condition presupposes causal structures are fundamental and fixed whereas 
(probabilistic) parameter values are free to vary. Cartwright claims that this view is 
surely incorrect in most instances. For, says Cartwright, it is more often the case, if 
distinct from that of SGS who I gather take the principles to range over frequencies of variables from 
well-defined classes and thus to be primarily empirical. 
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not always a general feature of causal systems, that structure and parameters arrive 
together. That is, contrary to the stability condition, probabilities and causal structures 
constrain each other and if the probabilities are fixed then certain causal structures are 
ruled out (Cartwright 2003: 262-263). 
Detailed criticisms of Pearl's minimality condition are rare. Indeed Pearl notes " ... 
few have challenged the principle of minimality (to do so would amount to 
challenging scientific induction)" (Pearl 2000a: 61). It is, however, not difficult to 
construct a criticism of minimality. First, recall that the principle of minimality 
relates to causal structures191 • The principle is invoked to guide decisions concerning 
model preference in response to problems related to observational equivalence 
discussed in section 2.0.1: 
In principle, since Vis unknown, there is an unbounded number of models 
that would fit a given distribution, each invoking a different set of 'hidden' 
variables and each connecting the observed variables through different causal 
relationships. Therefore, with no restriction on the type of models considered, 
the scientist is unable to make any meaningful assertions about the structure 
underlying the phenomena. [ ... ]Likewise, assuming [the set of variables Vis 
equivalent to the set of observed variables] but lacking temporal information, 
the scientist can never rule out the possibility that the underlying structure is a 
complete, acyclic, and arbitrarily ordered graph-a structure that can mimic the 
behaviour of any model, regardless of the variable ordering (Pearl 2000a: 45 
original emphasis). 
Pearl (2000a) provides the following statement of the principle of model minimality: 
[ ... ] following standard norms of scientific induction, it is reasonable to rule 
out any [structure] for which we find a simpler, less elaborate [structure] that 
191 More correctly, minimality relates to latent structures-causal structures with unmeasured variables. 
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is equally consistent with the data. [Structures] that survive this selection 
process are called minimal (Pearl 2000a: 45 original emphasis)192• 
Based on these points it is clear the condition involves a decision procedure that 
encodes for a form of abductive inference. Since minimality is reminiscent of the so-
called 'Inference to the Best Explanation,' one may dub minimality 'Inference to the 
Best Structure' or IBS for short. I take it that IBS is a part of what Pearl means by 
'scientific induction.' I further note that Pearl's observation that few seek to 
challenge IBS must be tempered by the fact that no one can claim to have adequately 
vindicated it either. It is at this point important to be clear about what exactly IBS is. 
IBS is a procedure for locating the simplest model structure-that is consistent with a 
specific set of observations-from a class of model structures. Pearl provides the 
following characterisation of 'simplest model structure.' The simplest model structure 
is called the 'preferred' model structure. Call a model structure a latent structure just 
in case: 
The model structure is a pair L = (D,O) where Dis a causal structure over V 
and where 0 c V is a set of observed variables193• 
One latent structure L = (D,O) is strictly preferred over another latent structure 
L'= (D',O) (written L~') iff: 
D' can mimic D over 0-that is, iff for every e v there exists a 8'v·, such that 
1(01 ((D',8'v· )) = 1(01 ((D,8v)). Two latent structures are equivalent (written 
L'= L ) iff L~' and LtL' 194• 
192 I have replaced the word 'theory' with 'structure' throughout. I find the latter term more appropriate 
in the context. Note that Pearl (2000a: 45) equates a causal structure with a scientific theory but does 
not elaborate on the point. The formal details are available in Pearl (2000a: 45-46). 
193 This definition is taken from Pearl (2000a: 45). 
194 This definition is taken from Pearl (2000a: 45-46). 
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Hence, a latent structure L is minimal with respect to a class of latent structures L iff: 
No member of L is strictly preferred to L-that is, iff for every L' E L we have 
L = L' whenever L'-::!), 195• 
Minimality becomes a procedure when model structures are compared and accepted 
or rejected on the basis of these definitions. The question naturally arises as to why 
minimality is an adequate basis on which believe in one structure over another if it is 
the case that any putative causal model structure may be mimicked by a latent 
structure containing alternative causal relationships. 
There are apparently several good reasons against doing so196• The nub of IBS is that, 
given the data, the scientist can utilise IBS to arrive at the simplest DAG consistent 
with the data. At least two steps are involved in this inference. First, there is a 
weighing of evidence in relation to distinct structures from the class of latent 
structures L197• This step arrives at an equivalence class of minimal structures. The 
second step involves claiming that the structure(s) identified by the first step are more 
likely to be the correct structure of the processes that generated the data than not. The 
second step arguably depends upon the prior belief that the true structure is more 
likely to be found amongst the structures of the equivalence class than not. It is 
straightforward to construct a criticism of minimality by denying it is rational to hold 
this prior belief. Denying the rationality of the prior belief requires attacking attempts 
to justify it. Since there are several possible justifications there are likewise several 
avenues of attack. The most relevant justification in the present context involves the 
attempt to vindicate the prior belief by arguing that humans are by nature predisposed 
to hit upon the right range of structures. This justification is relevant because it 
underpins Pearl's claim that human capacity for causal knowledge is the result of a 
process of natural selection (Pearl 2000a: 26 n12, 244). But, so the criticism runs, 
195 This definition is taken from Pearl (2000a: 46). 
196 The following criticism is an adaptation of a criticism of abduction offered by van Fraassen. For the 
details of the original see van Fraassen (1989: 142-144). 
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such a justification is illegitimate because it requires that evolution select for 
predispositions towards correct judgements, which amounts to the claim that there is 
such a thing as selection pressure on future contingents. The upshot of the criticism is 
that, however natural our inclination may be toward a class of preferred structures the 
inclination itself cannot be relevant information about the correctness of the 
structures in the class. 
Now that I have considered the apparent shortcomings of Pearl's answer, I can 
proceed to discuss possible responses Pearl may utilise in defence. As I mentioned 
above, I believe each of the criticisms may be defeated with the one strategy. Pearl 
has the option, given the two-part distinction, to show that each challenge is 
misplaced. The general idea behind the defence is to first show that each of the 
challenges (in effect) targets what amounts to the theory's first part and then 
demonstrate that each criticism fails to hit that target. This strategy, of course, stands 
or falls on the cogency of the two-part distinction. 
The misplacement defence begins with the following observation. None of the 
criticisms draws nor obeys any explicit distinction between providing an account of 
causal modelling on the one hand and devising an account of causation on the other. 
As a result none of the criticisms takes into consideration the disparate goals of the 
respective accounts. Instead, each of the criticisms I have considered presupposes that 
Pearl's theory consists of an explication of causation as it is in the world, or sets out 
an account of causal inference that somewhere involves the identification of bona fide 
causal connections198 • For instance, note that each of the criticisms presupposes that 
Pearl's theory is a representative of a distinct school of thought or approach to the 
analysis of causation. Berkovitz addresses his remarks towards the (contemporary) 
literature on causal inference (Berkovitz 2002: 238-239), Cartwright levels her 
criticisms at the 'Bayes Nets approach' to causality (Cartwright 2003: 253-254) and 
197 I have not discussed this process in great detail since I will not offer any criticism of it. Pearl 
(2000a) discusses the process in various contexts on pp 45-46, 51-55, 61-64, 274-275. 
198 Berkovitz (2002), Humphreys and Freedman (1996) are representatives of the former view and 
Cartwright is a representative of the latter. 
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other authors generally agree that Pearl belongs to a category of theories that attempt 
to give account of causality based on (graphical/statistical) modelling methods and 
principles199• This oversight, I believe, leads these authors to misplace their respective 
criticisms. Furthermore, it is no coincidence that each criticism is levelled at one or 
another conjunct making up Pearl's view of what puts the 'causal' into 'causal 
Bayesian network'. After all, this does appear to be Pearl's primary focus. Even so, 
my point is that the criticisms are misplaced precisely because each conjunct only 
represents the regimentation's answer, which is the part concerned to articulate an 
account of causal modelling, not an account of causation per se. And, in as much as 
each criticism aims to uncover the failure of Pearl's account of causal modelling to 
specify the nature of or to identify causal processes, the criticisms miss their mark. In 
short, each criticism is misplaced since each criticises a condition of the 
regimentation for failing to take proper account of a subject matter only appropriate 
to the objective account of Pearl's theory200• 
I now detail the defence of each condition taken in tum, beginning with condition 1. 
According to condition 1, the values of effect variables, as they appear in a model, are 
completely determined by the values of the effect variables direct cause (and error) 
variables as they appear in the model. But so what? That the independent variables 
determine the value of the dependent variable is a condition that allows the model to 
be useful and informative. Very little would be achieved by banning a modeller from 
building models sufficient for prediction. Pearl explicitly points out that the relevant 
notion of determinism is subjective and that deterministic functions offer an adequate 
representation of that notion. It is left to the modeller to decide at what level of 
abstraction causal statements are meaningful. When the modeller settles on the 
appropriate level the modeller may then proceed to evaluate the truth of those causal 
199 Wolfgang Spohn's (2001) expresses this view explicitly. Other research that attracts philosophical 
attention as a representative of this school-of-thought, besides Pearl (2000a), is SGS. See also the 
critical review of Pearl (2000a) offered by Gillies (2001) and Hitchcock (2001). Both of these authors 
read Pearl to be offering an analysis of causation. Furthermore, the assertion that Pearl's account of 
causality, as is the case with most agency accounts of causation, is circular and hence not an analysis 
of causation after all, is precisely to view the account as a failed analysis. 
200 Korb and Wallace ( 1997: 550-551) make a similar point regarding the use of linear modelling 
methods to draw causal inferences from measurements of causal processes that are not linear. 
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statements. Banning determinism prevents the modeller from finding the appropriate 
level of abstraction and so prevents model construction altogether. Deterministic 
functions offer a far more simple approximation of the complexity of worldly causal 
processes than do stochastic functions. It is not important whether or not the natural 
world is truly deterministic at the level causal models operate201 • 
The criticisms of condition 2 are misplaced in as much as the criticisms presupposes 
the CMC plays the role of an empirical assumption in Pearl's account of causal 
modelling. The presupposition is that actual physical processes confirm a specific 
category of independence relationships. But, as Pearl (2000a) is at pains to point out, 
theCMC 
[ ... ]is more a convention than an assumption, for it merely defines the 
granu1arity of the models we wish to consider as candidates before we begin 
the search. [ ... ]After all, investigators are free to decide what level of 
abstraction is useful for a given purpose, and Markovian models have been 
selected as targets of pursuit because of their usefulness in both prediction and 
decision making (Pearl 2000a: 44, 61). 
As such, Pearl freely admits his willingness to ignore non-Markovian causal 
structures. In effect Pearl is asserting that models built to conform to the CMC prove 
to be predictively and/or explanatorily successful, and therefore useful, in a broad 
range of circumstances202• Enshrining the CMC as part of a formalism built to aid the 
task of causal discovery is to enshrine prediction and explanation as the goals of 
causal modelling203 • Ironically, Cartwright makes this point on Pearl's behalf whilst 
castigating Pearl (2000a) for not taking note of causal diversity and not including a 
201 Again, the distinction between how and why is involved. Also note that Pearl (2000a) offers an 
extension of his modelling methods to cases involving objective chance on p 220. Whether or not the 
extension is correct the attempt demonstrates Pearl's willingness to find a work around for difficult 
cases without dispensing with deterministic functions. 
202 Though in fact, the successes may be few. See the discussion of the identification problem below. 
203 Of course, that there is a conceptual component to Pearl's theory requires that these terms are also 
provided with their meaning from conditions such as the CMC. Models that adhere to the CMC are 
explanatory in part because the CMC adds to the definition of causality and explanation in science. 
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contiguity requirement. Cartwright follows Shafer (1997), who points out the pitfalls 
involved in attempting to specify causal relationships: 
Experience teaches us that regularity can dissolve into irregularity when we 
insist on making our questions too precise, and this lesson applies in particular 
when the desired precision concerns the timing of cause and effect [for 
instance] (Shafer 1997: 6). 
Based on Shafer's point, Cartwright asserts that natural causal relationships are 
extremely complex and fragile: 
[Shafer's] point is reinforced when we realise that the kind of physical and 
institutional structures that guarantee the capacity of a cause to bring about its 
effect may be totally different from those that guarantee that the causal 
message is transmitted. Here is an example. My signing a check at one time 
and place drawn on the Royal Bank of Scotland in your favour can cause you 
to be given cash by your bank at some different place and time, and events 
like the first do regularly produce events like the second. There is a lawlike 
regular association and that association is a consequence of a causal capacity 
generated by an elaborate banking and legal code. Of course the association 
could not obtain if it were not regularly possible to get the cheque from one 
place to the other. But it is; and the ways to do so are indefinitely varied and 
the existence of each of them depends on quite different and possibly 
unconnected institutional and physical systems: post offices, bus companies, 
trains, public streets to walk along, legal systems that guarantee the right to 
enter the neighbourhood where the bank is situated, and so on and so on 
(Cartwright 2000: 15-16). 
Hence, a putative regularity may actually involve many and varied causal 
relationships as producers and sustainers. But Pearl presupposes just this fact when he 
asserts that the decision of the appropriate level of abstraction at which point the 
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useful properties of prediction and explanation are lost remains in the hands of the 
investigator. But this just means that ascertaining whether or not and in what way the 
structure of a model corresponds to underlying physical processes in the world is not 
the goal of modelling. In other words, the latter task stands to the side of the 
regimentation204• So, basing a challenge to condition 3 on such grounds is misguided. 
So too is pointing out that in many cases it is not obvious how to apply the CMC to a 
specific scenario. The onus of constructing an appropriate model for a given problem 
rests with the individual(s) performing the investigation and not with the formalism 
chosen as an aid to that end205• A similar point holds for the criticism that many key 
terms in Pearl's account remain undefined. This criticism ignores the fact that there 
is, in practice, interplay between the semantics of the formalism on the one side and 
the content and context in which models that employ those semantics are constructed 
on the other. Expecting a (largely formal) modelling procedure to furnish the 
meaning of 'cause,' 'effect,' and their cognates and criticising it when it does not is 
akin to criticising a decision procedure after finding one does not thoroughly 
understand the meaning of the propositions of an argument the decision procedure 
has deemed valid. The task of the modelling procedure is to aid in the identification 
and organization of elements within the domain in which the data are gathered that 
enable successful prediction and explanation. The specification provided to the term 
'cause' within Pearl's account is sufficient for this task206, and the further details 
expected by this challenge can only be furnished through specific application and 
mental exercise on behalf of those carrying out an investigation. Therefore, it is to 
specific applications of the formalism that criticism of a lack of meaning be attached 
and surely not to the formalism itself. 
The key criticism of the autonomy condition was to the effect that it fails to hold 
universally. This claim is false. A model containing a causal relationship that does 
not display the possibility of alteration without affecting other causal relationships in 
the model would indeed be destructive to Pearl's account. But, far from being a 
204 Indeed, these questions fall in the domain of the second tier. 
205 Though the formalism is built to be useful. 
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counterexample, on the semantics of Pearl's account such a model is simply not well-
formed. All well-formed models conform to the autonomy condition. What then is the 
point of attempting to construct counterexamples to autonomy? To my mind what the 
toaster (and other similar) examples illustrate is nothing more than the importance of 
building models appropriate to one's purposes. That is, one should strive to build 
models capable of answering all the causal queries one might care to answer about 
the process under investigation. If this is the thrust of the challenge then it is good 
advice, but the advice hardly constitutes a counterexample to Pearl's account. 
Perhaps then this is not the thrust of the challenge and I have built a straw-person out 
of it. Instead, it may be the aim of this challenge to attack the autonomy condition for 
failing to correctly describe the mechanisms that (at least intuitively) form part of the 
system under study. But, this being the case, a similar defence seems appropriate; 
what counts as the correct description turns on the interests and context of the 
investigator who constructs the model-their interests determine the granularity of the 
model and what the model describes follows suit207• 
A similar defence is also appropriate for defending against the criticisms levelled at 
the stability condition. The universality of the stability condition is another defining 
characteristic of the account's semantics and it cannot be altered without thereby 
altering the entire nature of Pearl's theory. Whether or not stability is violated in 
specific instances is again a matter for the modeller and only to a minor extent the 
modelling procedure. Similarly, the fact that the stability condition's holding of a 
model is a reflection of the degree of prior understanding the modeller possesses of 
the system they have under investigation, does not count against Pearl's theory. A 
modeller's knowledge of what they are modelling is in many cases very good. Good 
enough that, with the aid of a formal modelling procedure, the modeller can provide 
excellent explanations and predictions. But, often the modeller's knowledge of the 
system under investigation is poor. One doesn't necessarily blame the procedure for 
failures in such cases. Moreover, there are numerous instances where a modeller may 
206 Setting aside faults in the formalism itself. 
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be investigating a causal system but be content to draw inferences about correlations 
and ignore causal information altogether. For instance, an investigator may discover 
that inferences based upon correlations guide predictions, whereas, with the addition 
of causal information, predictive power is lost2°8• Ignoring stability to reach such ends 
does not count against the formalism in any sense other than to delimit its 
applicability. Last, is it really the case that structure and parameters are fixed and 
arrive together? Not as the matter concerns the construction of a model. Model 
construction may occur in many and varied ways but typically begins with parameters 
and ends with (the reasonable acceptance of a) structure. Surely, it would be better to 
say that whether specific or proposed parameters and structure are fixed together is to 
be discovered case by case209• The criticism has a metaphysical dimension to it. Since 
the actual world is just the succession of particular matters of fact, so the argument 
goes, it is a general feature of bona fide causal processes that structure and parameters 
are invariant in relation to one another. What to say here? Even if this were true it is a 
discussion pertaining to the objective account and not to the regimentation. And, 
again, rather than being an assumption of the regimentation, it is just the sort of thing 
it is designed to model. For Pearl, invariant parameters are invariant because they 
track model structures. 
In a similar vein defending the minimality condition will lead me to consider the 
justification of modelling assumptions in the following section. The criticism of 
minimality I considered involved attacking the rationality of basing one's beliefs 
about the correct causal structure on the fitness of our natural inclinations. The 
weakness of the criticism is its supposition that Pearl's account of causal modelling 
requires that the investigator not merely assent to the choice of structure but actually 
believe it to be correct. Since Pearl's account requires no such thing employing 
207 However, this criticism treads close to another-the failure to address the identification problem. See 
below for details. 
208 The example in mind involves data complexity. In cases where there are several levels of 
complexity present within a causal system, the level at which predictive power is greatest may not 
withstand a causal interpretation. This occurs, for example, in marine ecology modelling. It remains to 
be seen whether Pearl's theory can be extended to such cases. 
209 Which is in effect the thrust of the stability condition. 
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minimality does not commit one to the prior belief that the true structure is more 
likely to be found amongst the structures of the equivalence class than not. Indeed, 
minimality is not the only condition that pertains to structure preference; being only 
one of several conjuncts to Pearl's account of causal modelling. Hence, despite the 
comments Pearl apparently makes to the contrary, the minimality principle does not 
force epistemic assent and so nothing of consequence is lost if the true structure is not 
located. This fact does, however, propel the issue of justifying causal models to the 
fore. 
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3.4 Interpreting and Justifying Causal Models 
The discussion of Pearl's regimentation has returned me to the subject matter of 
Pearl's objective account. Recall that the mistaken presupposition common to each 
criticism was that Pearl's theory articulates an analysis of causation solely in terms of 
what amounted to the five conjuncts of the regimentation210• I have claimed that this 
defence is well supported by Pearl (2000a) despite the fact that Pearl does not 
explicitly articulate his account in the terms of the two-part division I set out. 
Whatever the level of support, the guiding idea was to defend Pearl (2000a) from 
criticism that failed to take into consideration the disparate goals each part plays a 
role in achieving and, in so doing, increase the depth of the two-part interpretation. In 
support of this line of defence Pearl (2003b) submits the following challenge: 
... these confusions and difficulties stem primarily from a reluctance to 
communicate causal questions in a formal language such as the one offered by 
the atomic framework [set out in Pearl (2000a)]. In my experience, I have 
found that, invariably, questions about interventions and experimentation, 
ideal as well as non-ideal, practical as well as epistemological, calculational 
as well as interpretive can be formulated precisely and managed 
systematically using the atomic intervention as a primitive notion. The same 
applies to questions about the 'correctness' of causal models. I will thus end 
[ ... ]with a conjecture (or a challenge) that any philosophical question, 
disagreement, or difficulty concerning causal objects or causal relationships 
can be resolved if expressed formally in the language of atomic interventions 
and reduced to a mathematical exercise in the calculus of [ P(y I do(x))] (Pearl 
2003b: 4). 
210 This is not the only point about which the criticisms are mistaken. See below for details. 
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The challenge is not as outlandish as it first appears211 • I interpret Pearl to be asserting 
that difficulties and disagreements-especially those concerning alleged 
counterexamples-had by philosophers and others over the nature of Pearl's theory 
should be (whenever possible) formalised and a solution attempted before negative 
conclusions are attributed to the account itself. The distinction I have drawn between 
Pearl's regimentation and Pearl's objective account helps explain the point. Pearl 
does not accept, I argue, that the criticisms and alleged counterexamples I have 
discussed above are appropriate if levelled at the various components of the 
regimentation and formalism of the theory's first tier. Instead, Pearl appears to be 
suggesting the criticisms operate at the level of and presuppose specific models (or 
structures) of causal scenarios. But, of course, at the level of the model and where a 
specific causal scenario is under investigation, the problems alluded to by each 
challenge are commonplace and it is through utilising the components of the 
regimentation that Pearl thinks such problems may be at least clearly stated if not 
rendered tractable, a point that I will return to momentarily. 
There are consequences for adopting this strategy. One consequence of wielding the 
sort of defence I have on Pearl's behalf is that the theory does not escape criticism 
completely unscathed. If I am correct, and the criticisms I consider are indeed 
misplaced, then it is natural to ask whether they might not fare better were they to be 
reformulated and aimed at another component of Pearl's theory. After all, the 
challenges have not been shown to be incoherent and so it remains a live option to 
refocus or reformulate each of them212• I suggest the most appropriate reformulation 
211 Indeed, if one took the scope of 'any philosophical question,[ ... ]' widely enough then Pearl's 
challenge is easily met. For instance Pearl says nothing about adicity and his identification of variables 
with events (represented as propositions) sidesteps the issue of whether causal relata are immanent or 
transcendent. Furthermore, given the two-tier interpretation of Pearl (2000a) these types of 
metaphysical questions would appear to belong (if anywhere) to the second tier, which of course Pearl 
says very little about. I take it then that such questions do not have ready answers even if they could be 
reduced to mathematical exercises in the do-calculus. 
212 Refocussing the challenges onto Pearl's objective account is I think the best option. But, since I 
have been unable to uncover the key characteristics of the objective account, I cannot go far towards 
assessing the success of otherwise of such a new round of challenges. In any case, such challenges are 
all too common within the domain that is the subject matter of the second tier. Suffice it to say that, in 
this domain, questions of universality, direction, determinism and so forth are faced by everyone who 
takes causal analysis seriously and not just Pearl. 
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would see the challenges levelled at Pearl's objective account. But, having said that, 
and being mindful of Pearl's comments cited in relation to the matter, I shall not now 
attempt a reformulation nor detail a new round of criticism of this portion of Pearl's 
theory. It is my view that, once clarified, each challenge will be either less urgent 
than first appearances suggested-since almost every modelling procedure faces the 
sort of problems these challenges are intent on recording-or merely a corollary to 
another pre-existing problem of how to justify modelling assumptions-which, again, 
is a problem every account faces. Hence, in lieu of any attempt to repair and refocus 
existing criticism I will instead examine the role modelling assumptions play in 
Pearl's account. The examination boils down to articulating what, on Pearl's theory, a 
causal model is a model of. 
Recall that on Pearl's theory models have two primary roles. One role is to aid the 
investigator's reasoning about those subject matters in the sciences that inevitably 
involve causality. The other role is to act as a testable representation device for causal 
relationships in the context of a specific study design. These roles immediately 
involve issues of 'identifiability', a notion that will take a moment to outline. 
Put simply, a model is said to be identifiable when it contains a sufficient number of 
independence assumptions to permit the quantification of the effect one set of 
modelled variables have on other modelled variables (Pearl 2000a: 91). Identifiability 
can become a problem when, in cases where any one of several (distinct) models can 
generate an identical distribution, the desired quantity the investigator seeks to 
quantify might not be discemable unambiguously from the data. Pearl (2000a) sees 
this difficulty as an instance of the general problem of how to estimate a causal 
quantity from passive observations (Pearl 2000a: 77). According to Pearl (2000a), 
having a solution to identification is 
... essential for integrating statistical data with incomplete causal knowledge 
of {f;}, as it enables [the investigator] to estimate quantities Q consistently 
from large samples of [probability distributions] P without specifying the 
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details of M; the general characteristics of the class M suffice213 (Pearl 2000a: 
77). 
The general approach taken towards solving identification problems is to specify a 
condition for model 'identifiability' and then assess a model's quantities against such 
a standard before moving on to estimation and model testing in case the assessment 
of identifiable quantities has been positive. In statistics generally, identifiability is the 
property a statistical model exhibits such that it may be estimated consistently from a 
suitably large amount of data on the system the model represents (Dodge 2003:192). 
In fact, a statistical model may be 'under-identified', 'just-identified', or 'over-
identified'. Shipley (2000) provides the following simple example to illustrate each 
category. Given the equation y = 2x + z, together with the information that x = 1, it 
follows that more than one combination of values for the variables y and z will solve 
the equation. In cases of this variety the equation is said to be under-identified. If 
instead one knows both that x = 1 and z = 3, then it follows that the variable y can 
take only one value; 5, and so the equation is called just-identified. However, if it is 
known that x = 1 but that two distinct estimates of z are 2.5 and 3.5, then the equation 
is over-identified (Shipley 2000: 145). Of the three possibilities it is under-identified 
models that investigators seek to avoid. 
At one time it was common wisdom that identifiability attaches to models taken in 
their entirety. It is now common to speak of identifiability in terms of parameter 
identifiability. Hence, it is thought that to estimate a model it is first necessary to 
establish whether the model's (unknown or free) parameters are identifiable. If each 
of these (unknown) parameters is identifiable, then the model is considered 
identifiable. A similar line holds for causal models, but where, according to Pearl, 
since the aim of the causal modeller is to predict a post-intervention distribution from 
a pre-intervention distribution, identifiability amounts to assessing whether a model 
will permit the estimation of the causal effect of one variable upon another. (Pearl 
213 Where M is a causal model and M a class of such models. Granted a model M with variables X and 
Yan example of a estimable quantity Q is the causal effect of X on Y. 
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2003a: 297-298). Koopmans (1985) explains that the difference between 
identifiability in causal models, in contrast with identifiability of associational 
models, hinges on the requirement of causal models: 
[ ... ]to predict the values of one or more[ ... ] variables either under changes 
in structure that come about either independently of [the investigator] or under 
hypothetical changes in structural parameters [ ... ]. [ ... ]In such cases, the 
'new' distribution of the variables on the basis of which predictions are to be 
constructed can only be derived from the 'old' distribution prevailing before 
the structural change, if the known structural change can be applied to 
identifiable structural parameters, that is, parameters of which knowledge is 
implied in a knowledge of the 'old' distribution combined with the a priori 
considerations that have entered into the model (Koopmans 1985: 122). 
Pearl (2000a) offers the following specification of identifiability for causal models214: 
Let Q(M) be any computable quantity of a model M. We say that Q is 
identifiable in a class M of models if, for any pairs of models M 1 and M 2 from 
M, Q(M1) = Q(M2) whenever PM, (v) = PM 2 (v). If our observations are limited 
and permit only a partial FM of features (of PM (v)) to be estimated, we define 
Q to be identifiable from FM if Q(M1) = Q(M2) whenever FM, = FM 2 215 • 
Pearl considers quantities (and so some models) not computable in this way to be 
'non-identifiable'. In practice a quantity is non-identifiable when it is under-
identified216. According to Pearl (2000a), models that are non-identifying limit the 
ability of the modeller to determine the quantitative relationship between a model's 
214 The following definition of identifiability is from Pearl (2000a: 77). 
215 This specification holds for estimating models where each parameter of the model is measurable. 
Semi-Markovian models and models used to estimate counterfactual quantities are given a slightly 
different treatment which is not important for present purposes. 
216 Or when identifiability criteria are compromised by data-related problems. In the case of the latter it 
may be possible to specify bounds on estimates of causal quantities. See chapter 8 of Pearl (2000a) and 
Pearl (2003a: 308) for discussion. 
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variables. For instance, it may not be possible to specify the direct effect one variable 
has on another in a non-identifiable model. In turn, non-identifying models provide 
no support for (and may even cast doubt upon) model structure. In the converse case, 
identifiable models can withstand further testing in terms of further observation or 
experiment. 
Along these lines, Pearl (2004) acknowledges that in many cases an investigator is 
only interested in understanding the effect one variable has on another or wishes to 
corroborate only a small set of claims a given model implies about such relationships 
whilst ignoring other relationships implied by a given model as irrelevant. It is in 
instances such as these, Pearl finds, the investigator needs to know whether or not a 
relationship to be estimated is non-identifiable just as a consequence of specific 
assumptions the investigator has built into the model217• Similarly, in cases where the 
specific relationship of interest is over-identified, the investigator requires 
reassurance that when the relationship is estimated the result is not solely a reflection 
of the investigator's assumptions embedded in the structure of the model218 (Pearl 
2004: 2). In other words, the investigator's general concern regarding identifiability is 
to delineate relevant sets of assumptions from irrelevant sets in order to assess which 
assumptions are sufficient for uniquely substantiating a given claim implied by a 
model. In turn, this concern is underpinned by the investigator's interest in locating 
bonafide over-identified quantities, since these present an option of testability 
missing from just-identified quantities219 (Pearl 2004: 1-2). Put simply, the 
investigator wishes to know whether the assumptions embodied by a model are 
sufficient for uniquely substantiating a given set of causal claims in order to be in a 
position to assess to what degree such claims are merely a reflection of those 
assumptions. 
217The assumptions are typically related to the structural specification of the model and are typically a 
consequence of a priori considerations. See below for examples. 
218 Pearl (2004) labels this 'irrelevant over-identification'. 
219 Examples of model assumptions include the absence of directed paths or of variables in an equation, 
fixed coefficients in some equations, equality constraints between some parameters and so forth. See 
Pearl (2004) and Shipley (2000) for further discussion of modelling assumptions. 
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The question of what a causal model is a model of can thus be broken into two parts. 
Broadly, one part involves interpreting what a causal model says and the other part 
involves justifying the interpretation to hand. Hence, for a model to (meaningfully) 
represent causal relationships, its (relevant) parameters must be identifiable and its 
supporting assumptions must withstand scrutiny. Recall that Pearl identifies his 
theory with a collection of procedures that 
[ ... ]facilitate the drawing of quantitative causal inferences from a 
combination of qualitative causal assumptions (encoded in the diagram) and 
nonexperimental observations (Pearl 2000a: 94). 
Drawing such inferences amounts to providing a model with an interpretation. The 
interpretation is conditioned on a set of assumptions about the model's structural 
features. In tum, the interpretation stands or falls pending the quality of its 
justification. Pearl (2000a) addresses the matter in the following way: 
[ ... ] causal assumptions in themselves cannot generally be tested in 
nonexperimental studies, unless they impose constraints on the observed 
distributions. The most common type of constraints appears in the form of 
conditional independencies, as communicated through the d-separation 
conditions in the diagram. Another type of constraints takes the form of 
numerical inequalities. [ ... ]For example, we show that the assumptions 
associated with instrumental variables are subject to falsification tests in the 
form of inequalities of conditional probabilities. Still, such constraints permit 
the testing of merely a small fraction of the causal assumptions embodied in 
the diagrams; the bulk of these assumptions must be substantiated from 
domain knowledge as obtained from either theoretical considerations or 
related experimental studies (Pearl 2000a: 94-95 my emphasis). 
Freedman (2002) agrees: 
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The issue boils down to this. [Given a three variable model, for example,] 
does the conditional distribution of Y given X represent mere association, or 
does it represent the distribution Y would have had if we had intervened and 
set the values of X? There is a similar question for the distribution of Z given 
X and Y. These questions cannot be answered just by fitting the equations and 
doing data analysis on X, Y, and Z; additional information is needed. From 
this perspective, the equations are 'structural' if the conditional distributions 
inferred from the equations tell us the likely impact of interventions, thereby 
allowing a causal rather than an associational interpretation. The take-home 
message will be clear: you cannot infer a causal relationship from a data set 
by running regressions - unless there is substantial prior knowledge about the 
mechanisms that generated the data (Freedman 2002: 6). 
So it seems only proper to question the role that theoretical kriowledge plays in 
justifying modelling assumptions. Freedman (2002) does just this when he draws 
attention to the friction created by the attempt to draw causal inferences from a model 
where interventions are only hypothetical: 
We want to use regression to draw causal inferences from nonexperimental 
data. To do that, we need to know that certain parameters and certain 
distributions would remain invariant if we intervene. That invariance can 
seldom if ever be demonstrated by intervention. What then is the source of the 
knowledge?[ ... ] 'Theory' seems like a natural answer, but an incomplete one. 
Theory has to be anchored in reality. Sooner or later, invariance needs 
empirical demonstration, which is easier said than done (Freedman 2002: 8). 
Recall that Pearl intends that the appropriate (class of) causal models can 
demonstrably track the physical constraints present in the system under investigation 
just in case the causal inferences drawn on behalf of a model are valid. The forgoing 
discussion has highlighted the fact that to carry out the demonstration one must either 
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justify or discharge the assumptions underlying the model. It is precisely this attempt 
to 'anchor theory in reality' that leads to the difficult task of model justification: 
Given that the arrows and kernels represent causation, while variables are 
independent and identically distributed, we can use Pearl's framework to 
determine from the diagram which effects are estimable. This is a step 
forward. However, we cannot use the framework to answer the more basic 
question: Does the diagram represent the causal structure? (Freedman 2002: 
15). 
Freedman's scepticism implies that because models constructed according to Pearl's 
theory are vulnerable to problems of justification the models do not succeed in 
modelling causal relationships. In other words, Pearl's theory does not produce 
models that represent causality since the theory does not provide the means by which 
the models of the regimentation may be identified with the objective constraints 
mentioned by the objective account. To assess whether Freedman's point is sound 
consider the following example from Pearl (2000a). 
Figure 1: Smoking and Cancer 
As Freedman points out, the inference to cause in this model is conditional on (at 
least) three assumptions. First, genotype has no direct effect on tar deposits. Second, 
smoking has no direct effect on lung cancer. Third, tar deposits can be measured with 
reasonable accuracy. To highlight the difficulty of vetting modelling assumptions 
162 
Freedman asserts that none of these assumptions has been demonstrated by empirical 
studies: 
[Against the first assumption,] the lung has a mechanism-'the mucociliary 
escalator' -for eliminating foreign matter, including tar. This mechanism 
seems to be under genetic control. (Of course, clearance mechanisms can be 
overwhelmed by smoking). The forbidden arrow from genotype to tar 
deposits may have a more solid empirical basis than the permitted arrows 
from genotype to smoking and lung cancer. [The second assumption] is just 
that-an assumption. And [the third assumption] is clearly wrong (Freedman 
2002: 14). 
In other words, it is important to realise that identification problems are not solved 
just because a model meets an identifiability criterion. Indeed, the aim of making 
model identifiability decidable plays only a minor role in representing causal 
quantities220• Pearl acknowledges this: 
[ ... ]the primary use of [identifiability methods] lies not in testing causal 
assumptions but in providing an effective language for making those 
assumptions precise and explicit. Assumptions can thereby be isolated for 
deliberation or experimentation and then (once validated) be integrated with 
statistical data to yield quantitative estimates of causal effects (Pearl 2000a: 
95). 
Pearl might therefore question Freedman's claim that the model of smoking and 
cancer receives little or no empirical support by demonstrating that the studies have 
been inconclusive precisely because key assumptions are yet to be isolated and 
clarified. Nevertheless, Pearl's admissions on the matter do place considerable weight 
220 The discussion of justifying modelling assumptions is somewhat continuous with the literature on 
justifying auxiliary hypotheses as well as the various issues that surround the problems and successes 
of the hypothetico-deductive method. See, for instance, Shipley (2000: 50). The discussion is also 
continuous with the literature on the nature of experiment in science. 
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on the need to discharge modelling assumptions before pronouncing causality. To 
reiterate the point, the issue of representing causal quantities requires, in addition to 
measures of identifiability, the justification of modelling assumptions within the 
context of the domain the models serve. Whilst Pearl (2000a) mentions the issue only 
in passing, elsewhere Pearl offers the following comment: 
Causal analysis with graphical models does not deal with defending modelling 
assumptions, in much the same way that differential calculus does not deal 
with defending the physical validity of a differential equation that a physicist 
chooses to use. In fact no analysis void of experimental data can possibly 
defend modelling assumptions. Instead causal analysis deals with the 
conclusions that logically follow from the combination of data and a given set 
of assumptions, just in case one is prepared to accept the latter. Thus, all 
causal inferences are necessarily conditional. These limitations are not unique 
to graphical models. In complex fields like the social sciences and 
epidemiology, there are only few (if any) real life situations where we can 
make enough compelling assumptions that would lead to the identification of 
causal effects (Freedman 2002: 15). 
There are two initial lessons to be drawn. First, it is improper to provide a model with 
a causal interpretation in ignorance of any accompanying modelling assumptions and 
without acknowledging the procedure followed by an investigator to vet modelling 
assumptions. Second, the vetting of modelling assumptions will vary from model to 
model and from domain to domain221 • Both lessons point toward the importance of 
recognising how models are used in science and are suggestive of a considerably 
broad methodological pluralism between some branches of science. 
But on my reading, these are lessons Pearl (2000a) has apparently learnt well, a fact 
that travels some way towards explaining why Pearl (2000a) contains almost no 
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direct discussion of modelling assumptions. Indeed, Freedman's (2002) assertions 
concerning the dangers of inferring causality based solely on the causal modelling 
methods of Pearl's regimentation and formalism are puzzling when read next to 
Freedman's acknowledgment that Pearl admits all causal inferences are necessarily 
conditional. The composition of Pearl's theory (as I have interpreted it) re-enforces 
the point. The division of labour between the two parts assigns the objective 
account-not the regimentation-the task of detailing a basic set of conditions that set 
the standard which modelling assumptions should meet if they are to justifiably 
represent cause/effect relationships. For Pearl, it is just these standards that allow one 
to judge when experimental techniques discern causal relationships. Hence, the 
attempt to establish that the first part of Pearl's theory is open to problems of 
identification and model justification is not sufficient reason from which to conclude 
that Pearl's theory does not succeed in modelling causal relationships. 
Pearl (2004) provides an indication of how to assess whether the causal relationships 
implied by a given model are in fact correct. Pearl considers that the issue of 
justifying modelling assumptions amounts to the problem of assessing whether the 
causal assumptions that support a given interpretation of a model actually hold in the 
real world. As is clear from the citations of this section, Pearl admits that such 
assumptions are primarily based on human judgement and cannot generally be tested 
unless those assumptions impose constraints on the model. Here Pearl finds that what 
is required is a formal method of assessing to what degree a given interpretation is 
robust to violations of those assumptions, since an interpretation that is robust to 
violations of model assumptions renders that interpretation more credible than one 
that is sensitive to the causal assumptions underlying a model (Pearl 2004: 1). The 
intuition behind this claim is that an estimate of a causal quantity is correct or, at 
least, highly plausible, when one can arrive at it via more than one means of 
calculation so long as each means of calculation employed is distinct from the 
221 i.e. from science to science if not also from study to study. For instance, the defence of modelling 
assumptions for causal models of economic phenomena will vary considerably from assumptions taken 
in epidemiology, psychology, and so forth. 
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others222 (Pearl 2004: 2). For Pearl, this intuition finds expression via the notion of 
testability: 
It is only through violating [a model's] implied constraints that we can falsify 
a model, and it is only by escaping the threat of such violation that a model 
attains our confidence, and we can then state that the model and some of its 
implications (or claims) are corroborated by the data (Pearl 2004: 2). 
So it would seem that Pearl's regimentation and formalism can take one a 
considerable way towards assessing whether or not a set of causal claims from a 
specific model are correct. According to Pearl it is possible in at least some instances 
both to make clear causal claims and to show those claims to be robust either by a 
process of reason or by demonstration. Freedman's prior criticism had been that one 
cannot pronounce causality without having first discharged the assumptions 
underlying a model, but that it is rarely the case that one has any compelling reasons 
for doing so. Whilst this may be true the forgoing discussion has shown that both 
Freedman and Pearl agree that where the requisite assumptions have been discharged 
one may proceed to draw causal inferences from a model. 
One might wish to interject that these responses only serve to relocate problems of 
interpretation and justification from Pearl's regimentation to Pearl's objective 
account. Indeed, I have already expressed my view that Pearl's objective account is 
the correct place to deal with such problems. It is, therefore, appropriate to question 
whether it follows, even granted a well-identified model with a robust set of causal 
claims, that the model actually succeeds in representing causal relationships present 
in the system under study223• For it would appear that nothing said so far rules out the 
possibility that a well-identified and apparently well-justified model based on Pearl's 
regimentation may nevertheless fail to capture (all relevant) actual causal 
relationships present in the system under investigation, even granted such actual 
222 Where two methods are considered distinct so long as neither shares the same assumptions 
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causal relationships fit the definition of objective constraints specified by Pearl's 
objective account. 
The mere possibility is enough reason on which to doubt the validity of the inference 
to causality224• Put another way, what one aims to do when interpreting and justifying 
causal models is to answer the following questions: 
(QI) Interpretation 'What does the model say about the way the world is?' 
(Q2) Justification 'Is the world the way the model says it is?' 
According to the present objection, Pearl can answer Q 1 readily but either fails to 
answer Q2 at all or provides answers that are (often) false225 • Although I think this 
complaint may gain traction it is difficult to assess constructively in the absence of 
close argument about actual models ofreal data226• However, the general charge is 
one that seeks to question the credentials a model can have to represent causality. 
Some discussion of how a model might attain such 'credentials' is in order. 
It has been accepted for some time that causal models do not really succeed in 
definitively answering questions such as Q2. For instance, Koopmans admits: 
[ ... ]the research worker who constructs a model does not really believe that 
reality is exactly described by a 'true' structure contained in the model. 
Linearity, discrete time lags, are obviously only approximations. At best, the 
model builder hopes to build a model that contains a structure that 
223 That is, whether the model structure correctly represents the modelled system. Cartwright (2003) 
expresses reservations. 
224 Of course, the strength of this assertion depends on the quality of counterexamples set out against it. 
Cartwright (2003: 258-265) provides a sketch of such counterexamples. 
225 In support of an equivalent claim Cartwright (2003) asserts that in many of the domains Pearl's 
theory is intended to be applied, we should expect Pearl's models to answer Q2 only rarely since the 
causal connections common in those domains are of a sort not readily detectable by Pearl's theory. 
226 For example, recall Bouman's point that models can be data probes and consequently may not be 
cleanly separable from the system they model. 
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approximates reality to a degree sufficient for the practical purposes of the 
investigation. [The research worker needs] to choose the simplest possible set 
(from two or more possible sets of structures) - in some sense - that contains 
a structure sufficiently approximate - in some sense - to[ ... ] reality 
(Koopmans 1985: 121). 
From comments I cite above it is clear that Pearl accepts Koopmans point also. We 
can grant then, that the complete justification of a causal model remains an ideal227• 
But this immediately begs the question of how one decides whether and in what sense 
a causal model is 'sufficiently approximate' to reality. Presumably, a good answer to 
this question must provide some assurance that the model has captured all relevant 
causal relationships present in the underlying system. The credentials of the model to 
make causal claims will depend on the quality of such assurances. But, as Winsberg 
(2003) points out, judging a model's credentials is not a simple process. A model's 
credentials do not straightforwardly follow from the model's fidelity to theory or to 
data or by the application of some a priori standard (Winsberg 2003: 121)228• Instead, 
credentials are earned in the field against numerous competing commitments: 
Whenever [modelling] techniques and assumptions are employed 
successfully, that is, whenever they produce results that fit well into the web 
of our previously accepted data, our observations, the results of our paper and 
pencil analyses, and our physical intuitions, whenever they make successful 
predictions or produce engineering accomplishments, their credibility as 
reliable techniques or reasonable assumptions grows (Winsberg 2003: 122). 
227 But, see Giere (forthcomingb) for an alternative approach to assessing modelling assumptions and 
claims. 
228 See also Pearl (2001: 3). I note in passing that many comments throughout Pearl (2000a) suggest 
commitment to the view that models may be tested and falsified against observation, a view parallel to 
the one held by some philosophers that observation and experiment provide a clear view of natural 
facts and regularities against which theories may be tested. Commitment to such a position seems at 
odds with the aims of Pearl (2004) regarding robustness since the latter appears to rule out model 
falsifiability. Indeed, Pearl's views on the testability of modelling assumptions by experiment, why 
experimental methods reveal causal mechanisms, and robustness, when taken together as a set appear 
inconsistent. But, see discussion of related issues by Giere (forthcominga: 17). For further discussion 
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The credibility of a model is not, therefore, an all or nothing matter and, even in the 
absence of outstanding accomplishments, modelling techniques and assumptions may 
still produce informative results229• Therefore, Pearl's theory does not stand or fall 
depending on whether or not its techniques capture the actual causal relationships of a 
system under investigation, and so Pearl is spared the need to make a new case for the 
efficacy of his theory. In fact, the key elements of how the theory responds to 
questions of model justification are already on the table and may be summarised in 
the following way. 
Recall that, for Pearl, studies by the behavioural, social and bio-medical sciences 
describe real systems in terms of random variables and presuppose that some of these 
random variables have a causal influence on others (Halpern and Pearl 2001a). The 
investigators who carry out such studies aim to locate and to describe the nature of 
these influences. The standard approach to locating which variables have a causal 
influence is to construct an appropriate experiment. Pearl asserts that the scientific 
experiment has two important components. The first involves intervention, which 
consists in circumscribing the real system of interest and the second involves 
randomisation, which renders the values of the variables of the circumscribed system 
either due to chance or to persistent influences still present in the circumscribed 
system. Logic is then applied to the results to determine the reason for the persistent 
influences230• Recall from the discussion of section 1.2 that at first glance the 
explanation of the persistent influences amongst experimental variables must be one 
of three types: either one variable is the cause of the other, or vice versa, or there are 
common causes influencing both (Shipley 2000: 8). The further one strays from the 
of the relationship between autonomy and falsification consistent with Pearl (2004) see Boumans 
(2003). 
229 See discussion of related matters by Sklar (2003). 
23° Further intervention and observation may also follow. 
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spirit of such experimental techniques the less one is able to infer causality with any 
precision231 • 
Further recall that, for Pearl, it is not experimental design in-and-of-itself that licenses 
causal inference. Instead the applicability of experimental techniques to problems 
involving causality follow from the fact that such techniques offer a way of locating 
what Pearl describes as autonomous mechanisms. In contrast to the experimenter, the 
(non-experimental) modeller seeks to construct an assembly of functional 
mechanisms that can explain how the data taken from the real system were produced 
without recourse to the actual realisation of a specific experimental set-up. The 
modeller then makes causal claims on behalf of the mathematical details and 
assumptions of the model rather than on behalf of the experimental design. The 
ground common to both experimental and non-experimental techniques, according to 
Pearl, is the attempt to locate and to describe causal iilfluences present in real 
systems. 
According to Pearl's objective account a relationship is causal if it involves objective 
constraints on physical processes. As I have discussed this is a fairly loose condition. 
For instance, it is not as detailed as Dowe' s account of causal processes as world-
lines of objects possessing physically conserved quantities (Dowe 2000: 90). What it 
does say is that causal relationships are mind-independent law-like constraints on 
interactions between objects or events. 
I have drawn a connection between the autonomous mechanisms of Pearl's theory 
and the account of mechanism offered by Glennan (1996, 2000a, 2000b, 2002). As I 
have discussed, for Glennan a mechanism is a kind of complex system, which 
produces a number of behaviours. A mechanism for a specific behaviour produces 
that behaviour by the interaction of a number of parts characterised by direct, 
231 Of course, this is a simplification of experimental methods. For discussion of experiment in science 
see, for example, Hacking (1991), Franklin (1989) and the collection of essays edited by Radder 
(2003). 
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invariant and change-relating generalisations (Glennan 2002: S345)232 • On Glennan's 
account, a mechanism may be decomposed into a number of parts. Parts, for Glennan 
must be objects rather than events. To be an object is to continue to possess properties 
in the absence of interventions. Parts are generally spatially localized. How a system 
is decomposed, and what parts result, depends upon which behaviour is being 
considered. An interaction is an occasion on which a change in a property of one part 
brings about a change in a property of another part. Direct, invariant, change-relating 
generalisations are equated with some number of counterfactual claims. A 
generalisation is 'change-relating' when it describes a relationship between two or 
more parts such that an intervention that changes one part will bring about a change 
in another part. A change-relating generalisation is 'invariant' when it remains true 
under some class of interventions performed on the background conditions of the 
mechanism described by the generalisation. And an invariant, change-relating 
generalisation is 'direct' when the generalisation pertains to the exclusive interactions 
between two parts, a condition which, according to Glennan (2000b ), rules out 
generalisations that would truly describe relationships between two distinct parts in 
which one part indirectly caused a change in the properties of a second part by 
changing properties of one or more intervening parts (Glennan 2000b: 9-10). Finally, 
on Glennan's analysis of mechanism, a complex system is typically hierarchical in 
the sense that objects that are parts of a mechanism may themselves be complex 
mechanisms that can be decomposed into further parts (Glennan 2000b: 10). 
Note that the key conditions Glennan specifies in his analysis of mechanism include 
the following notions: mechanisms are decomposable into parts; the interaction 
between parts is direct; an intervention on one part produces change in another, bona 
fide mechanisms display a sort of equilibrium other relationships are missing; 
mechanical relationships remain stable under a range of interventions; mechanisms 
can be described at different levels of abstraction. As I claimed in chapter l, the 
reason that Glennan makes for an excellent philosophical touchstone for interpreting 
232 The term 'direct, invariant, change-relating generalisation' replaces Glennan's earlier use of the 
term 'direct causal laws'. 
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Pearl's theory of causality is that Pearl accepts (a version) of each of these notions. 
Glennan's notion of decomposition, directness, abstraction, and stability are reflected 
in the conjunction of Pearl's determinism, causal Markov, modularity, minimality 
and stability conditions. Moreover, Glennan's idea that the relationships between the 
parts of a mechanism are change relating is a counterpart of Pearl's notion of 
manipulation. Similarly, for Glennan, mechanisms are the entities we appeal to when 
explaining the behaviour of real world systems; a causal relation between two events 
exists by virtue of the mechanism that connects them (Glennan 1996: 64). On the 
latter point Glennan is also in agreement with Salmon that it is causes that underwrite 
explanations rather than explanations underwriting causes. But, since explanations 
are for Glennan an appeal to mechanisms conceived as descriptions of the behaviours 
of complex systems, Glennan' s account is an ontic conception of mechanism. This 
means that each of the notions that together form Glennan's analysis of mechanism is 
to be understood as a description of certain features of a mind-independent reality. 
This is not so for Pearl (2000a). On my interpretation of Pearl's theory, the notions 
stand as regimented causal concepts put to work in a formal calculus, each a part of 
an apparatus designed for detecting causal relationships rather than the result of an 
analysis of causal relationships. Hence, the conditions are, according to Pearl's 
theory, epistemic rather than ontic. What one aims to detect or delimit via the 
employment of these notions are, according to the objective account, objective 
constraints on physical processes. 
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3.5 Concluding Remarks 
According to my interpretation Pearl (2000a) provides a theory of causality in two 
parts. I have described one part of the theory as an objective account of causation and 
the other part as the regimentation of a number of causal concepts important to 
discovery and explanation in the special sciences. The key features of Pearl's theory 
of causality are a formal language purpose built for expressing causal claims, a 
statement about the relationship between causal claims and objective constraints on 
real systems, and a logic for guiding inference with causal claims. I have interpreted 
Pearl's theory in two parts principally on the basis that Pearl's comments about 
causality are of two kinds: those that reflect the use of causal terms and concepts in 
the sciences on the one hand and those that address what (Pearl thinks) causal 
relationships are on the other. That is, the formal component of Pearl's theory 
encodes causal concepts and, reflected in statements about how causal claims relate 
to objective constraints, is an account of what makes causal relationships causal. The 
fact that Pearl spends the greater amount of time on the detail of the regimentation 
and less time elaborating the objective account is evidence that Pearl's primary 
interest in causality lay in articulating a theory of causal modelling rather than in 
analysing causation. Pearl's interest in causal modelling over analysis rendered the 
natural option of interpreting Pearl's theory into the language of mainstream 
philosophy of causation unattractive. Instead, I identified as the appropriate 
interpretive medium research in the philosophy of science that aims to understand the 
nature and use of scientific models. 
In chapter 2 I presented what I consider to be the standard features of Pearl's theory. I 
then focussed on the theory's use of counterfactuals, the theory's demarcation 
between statistical and causal information and concepts, and the theory's method of 
justifying causal claims. I think these components hold the greatest importance for 
understanding Pearl's theory. My examination of each component revealed: (i) the 
theory's employment of counterfactuals is devised to encode the sorts of conditions 
scientists decide are important when reasoning about modality in experimental 
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settings and simulations; (ii) the theory exemplifies the view that causal claims 
cannot be expressed in the language of probabilities and that it is causal relationships 
which drive the important associations described by statistics; (iii) the truth of a 
model's claims about causal relationships are judged not by demonstration or by 
showing the model's assumptions to hold in the system under study, but via a 
vindication of the model's claims in spite of the model's assumptions. 
According to my interpretation of Pearl's theory the thrust of the regimentation is 
epistemic and the thrust of the objective account is ontic. The regimentation pertains 
to the discovery of causal relationships and the objective account purports to provide 
an objective analysis of causation. On examination the objective account was found 
to provide only a general sketch of causation, one that says so little it almost defies 
categorising. The objective account allows that there are causal relationships beyond 
those detectable via the employment of the regimentation. Given the regimentation is 
not designed to uncover every instance of what passes for a causal relationship 
according to the objective account, the regimentation is one approach to causal 
modelling among many candidates. This stands to reason since there are, after all, 
many different ways of representing objective constraints in the sciences. I have 
suggested that what the objective account says is reminiscent of a nomic account of 
causal processes but that the level of detail precludes identifying where the account 
stands, for instance, in relation to the Humean supervenience thesis. Given the 
efficacy of the two-part interpretation, it is interesting to speculate about why so little 
detail is afforded to the objective account, doubly so when one considers the amount 
of time philosophers spend analysing causation. No doubt the answer is reflected in 
the aims and commitments of the causal discovery programs from which Pearl's 
theory springs. On reflection perhaps the most important part of Pearl's theory is its 
approach to the study of causality. According to the theory, the description of a causal 
connection is bound to the methods employed in its discovery. This means that many 
disagreements about the nature of causal relationships may be misunderstandings that 
can be avoided by adopting a common language for causal talk. These statements 
have a positivist ring to them and deserve closer examination. Indeed, I have argued 
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for the soundness of the interpretation while reserving critical evaluation of the result 
for a separate project. But, even in the absence of a critical evaluation it is clear that 
Pearl's theory, contra Freedman, says nothing about causality which is at odds with 
elementary scientific principles in an obvious way. Experimental and non-
experimental methods are alike in that both presuppose a model of causal discovery 
often prior to, if not always in conjunction with investigation of what the world is 
like. Finally, I have said that the case for categorising Pearl's theory as a 
manipulability or as a counterfactual theory of causality is not clear cut. Although it 
is clear that Pearl's theory makes mention of notions related to both, this does not 
seem enough to commit the theory to either. In light of my interpretation I suggest 
that the arguments made for such a classification of Pearl's theory face a dilemma: 
they either (i) confuse the nature of the causal relationships identified via application 
of the theory with the tools employed in the application of the theory, or (ii) can 
produce evidence from Pearl (2000a) for a more elaborate objective account than the 
one I have described above. Of course, all these claims are controversial and cannot 
be the last word. Pearl's theory continues to be developed and debate proceeds about 
what role key notions such as invariance have to play233• The critical evaluation 
should prove exciting. 
233 For example, see Woodward (2000, 2002a, 2002b), Menzies (2002), Cartwright (2000b) and 
Boumans (2003). 
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